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Abstract
Essays in Automation and Globalization
Daisuke Adachi
2021
This dissertation studies a range of topics in automation and globalization. Chapter 1 studies
the role of industrial robots in the US in expanding the occupational wage polarization.
Chapter 2 explores the effect of industrial robots in Japan on employment and wages in each
industry and region. Chapter 3 investigates the impact of recent growth in multinational
enterprises on headquarter country’s labor demand and labor share.
Chapter 1 studies the distributional and aggregate effects of the rising use of industrial
robots across occupations. I construct a novel dataset that tracks the cost of robots from
Japan by occupations. The dataset reveals a relative one-standard deviation drop of Japan’s
robot cost induces a 0.2-0.3% drop in the US occupational wages. I develop a general
equilibriummodel where robots are internationally traded durable goods that may substitute
for labor differently across occupations. The elasticities of substitution between robots and
labor within an occupation drive the occupation-specific real-wage effects of robotization. I
estimate the model using the robot cost shock from my dataset and the optimal instrumental
variable implied by the model. I find that the elasticities of substitution between robots and
labor are heterogeneous across occupations, and higher than those between general capital
goods and labor in production occupations such as welding. The estimated model implies
that the industrial robots explain a 0.9 percentage point increase in the 90-50th percentile
ratio of US occupational wages, and a 0.2 percentage point increase of the US real income
from 1990 to 2007.
Chapter 2 explores the impacts of industrial robots on employment in Japan, the country
with the longest tradition of robot adoption. We employ a novel data set of robot shipments by
destination industry and robot application (specified task) in quantity and unit values. These
features allow us to use an identification strategy leveraging the heterogeneous application of
robots across industries and heterogeneous price changes across applications. For example,
the price drop of welding robots relative to assembling robots induced faster adoption of
robots in the automobile industry, which intensively uses welding processes, than in the
electric machine industry, which intensively uses assembling process. Our industrial-level
and commuting zone-level analyses both indicate that the decline of robot prices increased
the number of robots as well as employment, suggesting that robots and labor are grossly
complementary in the production process. We compare our estimates with the ones reported
by existing studies and propose a mechanism that explains apparent differences between the
results.
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of multinational enterprises (MNEs) on the source-
country labor share. Our model shows that source-country factor demand elasticities with
respect to foreign factor prices affect aggregate labor share. To identify these elasticities,
we develop an estimator that leverages a foreign factor-productivity shock. We apply this
estimator to a unique natural experiment: the 2011 Thailand Floods, which negatively
impacted the foreign operation of Japanese MNEs. We employ a uniquely combined
Japanese firm- and plant-level microdata and find that the Floods decreased fixed assets in
Japan more than employment, suggesting that foreign factor productivity growth reduces
Japan’s labor share.
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Chapter 1
Robots and Wage Polarization: The
Effects of Robot Capital by Occupations
1.1 Introduction
In the last three decades, the global market size of industrial robots has grown by 12%
annually.1 International trade of robots is also sizable, with 41% of all robots imported.
Workers in different occupations are differentially susceptible to robots, raising concerns
about the distributional effects of such trends. Motivated by this concern, policymakers have
proposed various restrictions on automation, such as a robot tax.2 An emerging literature
has estimated the relative effects of robot penetration on employment and the potential
impact of such taxes (e.g., Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020, Humlum, 2019). However, due
to the limited data measuring the cost of robots across occupations and the lack of a model
capturing the trade of robots and their dynamic accumulation, our understanding of the
distributional and aggregate impacts of industrial robots is still limited.
1Throughout the paper, industrial robots (or robots) are defined as multiple-axes manipulators and are
measured by the number of such manipulators, or robot arms, a standard in the literature. A more formal
definition given by ISO and example images of robots in such a definition are provided in Section A.1.2 of the
Appendix. Such a definition implies that any automation equipment that does not have multiple axes is out
of the scope of the paper, even though some of them are often called “robots” (e.g., Roomba, an autonomous
home vacuum cleaner made by iRobot Corporation).
2The European Parliament proposed a robot tax on robot owners in 2015, although it eventually rejected
the proposal [Delvaux et al., 2016]. South Korea revised the corporate tax laws that downsize the “Tax Credit
for Investment in Facilities for Productivity Enhancement” for enterprises investing in automation equipment
[MOEF, 2018].
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In this paper, I study how industrial robots affect wage inequality between occupations
and aggregate income. First, I assemble a new dataset of the cost of robots by 4-digit
occupations that allows me to find stylized facts about the robot cost reduction and its
impact on the US occupational labor market. Second, to better interpret these empirical
facts, I develop a model where robots are internationally traded durable goods, are endoge-
nously accumulated, and substitutes for labor within occupations. Third, using these data
and model, I construct a model-implied optimal instrumental variable and provide the first
estimate of the elasticity of substitution (EoS) between robots and workers heterogeneous
across occupation groups as well as other model parameters. Finally, counterfactual exer-
cises based on this estimated model reveal the distributional and aggregate implication of
robotization in the US since 1990.
My dataset is unique in two ways. First, it tracks the robots’ monetary value as well
as their number. Second, the observation is disaggregated by the adopting country and
the 4-digit occupation in which robots replace labor. To obtain such a dataset, I first use
the information from the Japan Robot Association (JARA) about the shipment of Japanese
robots to each country and by task, which comprises one-third of the world robot supply. I
then combine the JARA data with the O*NET Code Connector’s match score and the US
Census/ACS data. Finally, I derive the robot cost shock by occupations from the average
price variable after controlling for destination-country fixed effects. As a result, I obtain
the dataset that links the US occupational labor market outcomes to the cost shock of robots
imported from Japan (Japan robot shock).
The dataset reveals two stylized facts. First, over 1990-2007, the Japan robot shock
exhibits that the average cost of a Japanese robot reduced and that the cost reduction is
heterogeneous by occupations. Second, the Japan robot shock drives the drop in wages
and employment by occupations in the US. A relative decrease in one standard deviation of
Japanese robots’ cost drives an annualized 0.2-0.3 percent decrease in occupational wages.
This finding is robust to the control of non-robot occupational demand shocks, like the
China trade shock, and thus suggests high responsiveness of relative robot demand to the
cost reduction due to the strong substitutability of robots for labor. However, the Japan robot
shock measure is subject to a concern that it may reflect robot quality upgrading during the
sample period. Furthermore, the reduced-form empirical finding does not fully reveal the
distributional and aggregate effects of the Japan robot shock. To overcome these issues and
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derive more conclusive statement, I employ a dynamic open-economy equilibrium model
of automation.
I develop a general equilibrium (GE) model with robotics automation and the following
three key features. First, I incorporate the Armington-style trade of robots, which fits well
with the sizable robot trade in my dataset about Japanese robot export. Theoretically, trade
of robots in a large-open economy implies that a robot tax affects the price of robots traded
in the global market. Hence, a country may gain from the aggregate perspective if it can
reduce the cost of adopting robots by imposing the robot tax. Second, the model describes
the endogenous investment in robots with a convex adjustment cost, which implies sluggish
accumulation of robot capital. Therefore, the aggregate income implication of the robot tax
is nuanced and different over the time horizon. Finally, the model has a production function
with occupation-specific EoS between robots and labor, which varies across occupations.
This production function yields rich predictions regarding the real-wage effect of robot
capital for the following two reasons. Firstly, the accumulated stock of robots is different
across occupations. Secondly, a unit of robots can substitute for workers differentially in
each occupation.
To better understand the role of the occupation-specific EoS between robots andworkers,
I consider an automation shock à la Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020] in which robots can
exogenously perform a larger share of tasks compared to labor. I analytically show that,
in the equilibrium, the automation shock’s effect on occupational real wage is negatively
related to the robot-labor EoS. Namely, the higher the EoS, the larger drop of labor demand
given the automation shock because of the stronger substitution of labor with robots. The
model also features the EoS between occupations, which affects the across-occupation
effects of the automation shocks.
To identify the robot-labor EoS, I confront a challenge that the Japan robot shock is
correlated with the automation shock, affecting the labor market outcomes simultaneously.
To overcome this challenge, I use the GE structure and obtain the structural residual of
labor market outcomes, which controls the effect of the automation shock. I then construct
a moment condition in which this structural residual is orthogonal to the Japan robot shock.
Using this moment condition, I generate an optimal instrumental variable implied by the
model, which increases the estimation precision.
I apply this estimation method to the data on occupational labor market outcomes and
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robot adoption and find that the EoS between robots and workers is heterogeneous across
occupation groups. For routine occupations that perform production and material moving,
the estimates are as high as around 4. These estimates are significantly higher than the
values of the EoS between labor and general capital like structure and equipment estimated
in the literature, highlighting one of the main differences between robots and general capital
goods. In contrast, the EoS in other occupations is close to 1, or robots and labor are neither
substitutes nor complements in these other occupations.
The estimated model and shocks backed out from the model predict occupational US
wage changes from 1990-2007. The high EoS between robots and workers in production
and material moving occupations implies that the robotization in this period significantly
decreased relative wage in these occupations. Since these occupations tend to be in the mid-
dle of the occupational wage distribution in 1990, this finding indicates that the automation
shock compressed the wage growth of occupations in the middle deciles. Quantitatively, it
explains 0.9 percentage point, or 11.7%, of the wage polarization measured by the change in
the 90th-50th percentile wage ratio, a measure of wage inequality popularized by Goos and
Manning [2007] and Autor et al. [2008]. The robotization also explains a 0.2 percentage
point increase of the US real income, mostly accounted for by the rise in the firm profit due
to the accumulation of robots.
Finally, I examine the counterfactual effect of introducing a tax on robot purchases.
Such a robot tax could potentially increase the aggregate income of a country. Due to the
trade of robots, a government can exert monopsony power in the global robot market by
taxing robot purchases, leading to a decrease in the before-tax price of imported robots in
each period. In contrast, the robot tax also disincentivizes the accumulation of robots in the
long run, potentially reducing aggregate income. Quantitatively, the latter effect dominates
the former in the long-run, and the robot tax decreases aggregate real income.
This paper contributes to the literature that studies the economic impacts of industrial
robots by finding a sizable impact of robots on US wage inequality and a short-run positive
aggregate effect of a robot tax. The closest papers are Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020] and
Humlum [2019]. Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020] establishes that the US commuting zones
experiencing penetration of robots over 1992-2007 also saw decreased wages and total
employment.3 Humlum [2019] uses firm-level data on robot adoption and firm-worker-
3Dauth et al. [2017] and Graetz and Michaels [2018] also use the industry-level aggregate data of robot
adoption and its impact on labor markets.
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level panel data and estimates a model that incorporates a small-open economy of robot
importers, a binary decision of robot adoption, and an EoS between occupations. Using
these data and model, he studies the distributional effect of robots and a counterfactual robot
tax.4
In contrast to these papers, my study features the following three elements. First, I use
the data about the Japan robot shock by occupation, which empirically reveals impacts on
US occupations. Second, I consider the trade of robots in a large-open economy setting,
which implies that the US real income effect of robots is positive in the short-run in my
counterfactual exercise. Finally, these data and model allow estimating occupation-specific
EoS between robots and labor. The estimated model implies that the wage-polarizing effect
of the increase in robot use is larger than the prediction of the model with a conventional
assumption on the robot-labor EoS, such as Leontief.
Occupations are receiving attention in the literature of automation as they matter when
considering the distributional effects. While Jäger et al. [2016] finds no association between
industrial robot adoptions and total employment at the firm level, Dinlersoz et al. [2018]
report the cost share of workers in the production occupation dropped after the adoption of
robots within a firm. Cheng [2018] studies the heterogeneous capital price decrease and
its implication on job polarization. Jaimovich et al. [2020] construct a model to study the
effect of automation on the labor market of routine and non-routine workers in the steady
state. I contribute to this literature by estimating the within-occupation EoS between robots
and labor with the occupation-level data of robot costs and labor market outcomes, as well
as incorporating the endogenous trade of robots and characterizing the transition dynamics
of the effect of robot tax.
Following the seminal work by Autor et al. [2003], there is a growing literature that
attempts to detect the task contents of recent technological development. Webb [2019] pro-
vides a natural-language-processing method to match technological advances (e.g., robots,
software, and artificial intelligence) embodied in the patent title and abstract to occupations.
Montobbio et al. [2020] extends this approach to analyzing full patent texts by applying the
topic modeling method of machine learning. My matching method between robot appli-
cation and occupation complements these studies: On one hand, my methodology gives a
4There is also a growing body of studies that use the firm- and plant-level microdata to study the impact on
workers in Canada [Dixon et al., 2019], France [Acemoglu et al., 2020, Bonfiglioli et al., 2020], Netherlands
[Bessen et al., 2019], Spain [Koch et al., 2019], and the US [Dinlersoz et al., 2018].
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list of matching scores. Combined with the robot data by application, my dataset yields the
number and sales of robots for all 4-digit occupations. On the other hand, I do not provide
such detailed textual analysis as the previous literature since I can only observe the title of
robot applications.
Since robots are one type of capital goods, my paper is also related to the vast literature
of estimating the EoS between capital and labor (to name a few, Arrow et al., 1961, Chirinko,
2008, Oberfield and Raval, 2014). Although the literature yields a set of estimates with a
wide range, the upper limit appears around 1.5 [Hubmer, 2018, Karabarbounis and Neiman,
2014]. Therefore, the estimates as high as 4 in production and material-moving occupations
are significantly higher than this upper limit. In this sense, my estimates highlight one of
the main differences between robots and other capital goods: these workers’ vulnerability
to robots.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes my dataset of robots
by occupations. I set out the general equilibrium model in 1.3, and estimate it using the
model-implied instrumental variable in model 1.4. Using the estimated model, I study the
effect of robotization and counterfactual robot taxes in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data and Stylized Facts
This section begins with setting out two central data sources in Section 1.2.1: the Japan
Robot Association survey and O*NET for matching the robot application code to the labor
occupation code at the 4-digit level. Note that Japan has been a major robot innovator,
producer, and exporter. For example, the US imports 5 billion-dollar worth of Japanese
robots as of 2017, which comprises roughly one-third of robots in the US.5 Therefore,
Japanese robot cost reduction significantly affects robot adoption in the US and the world.
Using these data, I describe how to measure the robot cost, provide the matching method
to obtain robot measures at the occupation level, and derive the Japan robot shock formally
in Section 1.2.2. Section 1.2.3 provides stylized facts that suggest substitutability between
robots and labor and motivate the model and estimation in later sections.
5Appendix A.1.3 shows the international robot flows, including Japan, the US, and the rest of the world.
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1.2.1 Data Sources
The main part of my dataset is provided by Japan Robot Association (JARA), a general
incorporated association composed of Japanese robot producing companies. The number of
member companies is 381 as of August 2020. JARA annually surveys all these member and
several non-member companies about the units and monetary values of robots sold for each
destination country and robot application, or specified tasks of robots, which is discussed
in detail in Section A.1.2 of the Appendix. JARA publishes summary cross-tables of the
survey, which I digitize and use as one of the main data sources.
I also use Occupational Information Network OnLine (O*NET) Code Connector.
O*NET is an online database of occupational definitions sponsored by the US Department
of Labor, Employment, and Training Administration. O*NET Code Connector provides an
occupational search service that helps workforce professionals determine relevant 4-digit
level O*NET-SOC Occupation Codes for job orders. Along with the O*NET-SOC codes,
the search algorithm provides (i) the textual description of each code and (ii) a match score
that shows the relevance of the search target with the search query term. To match robot
applications and labor occupations, I use these textual descriptions and match scores, which
are further described in detail in Section A.1 of the Appendix.
1.2.2 Constructing the Dataset
Using these data, I construct a dataset that matches the cost of Japanese robots to the US
labor market outcomes at the occupation level. After clarifying robot cost measurement, I
describe the matching process between robot applications and labor occupations.
Measuring the Cost of Robots
To understand the measurement of the robot cost, I clarify how robots work. A modern
industrial robot is typically not stand-alone hardware (e.g., robot joints and arms) but an
ecosystem that includes the hardware and control units operated by software (e.g., computers
and robot-programming language). Due to its complexity, installing robots in the production
environment often requires hiring costly system integrators that offer specific engineering
knowledge. A relevant cost of robots for adopters, therefore, includes hardware, software,
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and integration costs.6
In this paper, I measure the price of robots by average price, or the total sales divided
by the quantity of hardware. In this sense, readers should interpret that my measure of
robot price reflects a portion of overall robot costs. Since the literature has not established
a method to deal with this issue, I will address this point in the model section by separately
defining the observable hardware cost and unobserved components of the cost, and placing
assumptions on the latter.
Another issue of this approach is that this pricemeasure includes robot quality upgrading.
Namely, innovation in robotics technology could entail both quality upgrading that makes
robots perform more tasks at a greater efficiency and cost saving of producing robots
that perform the same task as before. Inseparability of these two components poses an
identification threat as I describe later in Section 1.4.2, which none of the previous studies
could resolve. To work around this issue, I will use the general equilibrium model to predict
the labor market effects of quality upgrading in Section 1.3.7
Matching Robot Applications and Labor Occupations
My dataset provides the employment of labor and robots at the occupation level, comple-
menting data in the previous literature at the sector level or, more recently, firm level. This
is made possible by having robot application-level data, and converting robot applications
to labor occupations. I propose a method to match the JARA data and the Census 4-digit
occupation level labor market outcomes.
There has not been formal concordance between application and occupation codes,
although robot applications and labor occupations are close concepts. On the one hand,
robot application is a task where the robot is applied. On the other hand, labor occupation
6As Leigh and Kraft [2018] pointed out, the current industry and occupation classifications do not allow
separating system integrators, making it hard to estimate the cost from these classifications. Plus, there still
remains apparently relevant costs of robot use, like maintenance fee, about which we also lack quantitative
evidence. Although understanding these components of the costs is of first-order importance, this paper
follows the literature convention and measure robots from market transaction of hardware.
7Note that this problem occurs because I consider the price of robots, as the past literature mainly focuses
only on the quantity of robots [Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020] or even firm’s binary decision of robot adoption
[Humlum, 2019]. One of the more data-driven approaches to this issue is to control the quality change by the
hedonic approach as in Timmer et al. [2007], and in the application to digital capital in Tambe et al. [2019].
However, this strategy requires detailed information about the spec of each robot. Pursuing this direction is
the next step of my research agenda, as I collaborate with JARA for retrieving catalog information of robots
produced by major producers.
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describes multiple types of tasks the person does on the job. Each task has different
requirements for robotics automation. Therefore, a heterogeneous mix of tasks in each
occupation generates a difference in the ease of automation across occupations and, thus,
heterogeneous penetration of robots [Manyika et al., 2017]. I show examples of pairs of
robot applications and labor occupations in Section A.1.2 in the Appendix.
More specifically, let 0 denote robot application and > labor occupation. JARA data
measure robot sales quantity and total monetary transaction values for each application 0. I
write these as robot measures -'0 , a generic notation that means both quantity and monetary
values. The goal is to convert an application-level robot measure -'0 to an O*NET-SOC
occupation-level one -'> . First, I search occupations in O*NET Code Connector by the
title of robot application 0. Second, I web-scrape the match score <>0 between 0 and >.8



















> l>0 = 1. In other words, occupation-level robot
measures sum back to the application level when summed across occupations, as a desired
property of the allocation.
I then convert the O*NET-SOC-level occupation codes to OCC2010 occupation codes
to match the labor market measures from the US Census, American Community Survey
(ACS), retrieved from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) USA [Ruggles
et al., 2018], described in detail in Appendix A.1.1.
8I focus on consistent occupations between the 1970 Census and the 2007 ACS that cover the sample
period and pre-trend analysis period to obtain consistent data across periods. Therefore, this paper focuses on
the intensive-margin substitution in occupations as opposed to the extensive-margin effect of automation that
creates new labor-intensive tasks and occupations [Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018c]. My dataset shows that
88.7 percent of workers in 2007 worked in the occupations that existed in 1990. It is an open question how to
attribute the creation of new occupations to different types of automation goods like occupational robots in
my case, although Autor and Salomons [2019] explore how to measure the task contents of new occupations.
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Japan Robot Shock
To obtain the robot cost variation by occupation, write ?'
8,>,C
the average price of robots in









= k8,C + k>,C + n8,>,C , 8 ≠ *( (1.1)
where C0 is the initial year, k8,C is destination-year fixed effect, k

>,C is occupation-year fixed
effect, and n8,>,C is the residual. To obtain the cost changes that are not affected by the US
demand, I exclude the US prices from the sample. This regression controls any country-year
specific effect k
8,C
, which includes country 8’s demand shock or trade shock between Japan
and 8 that are independent of occupations. I use the remaining variation across occupations
k>,C as a cost shock of robots by occupations and term it as a “Japan robot shock.”
1.2.3 Stylized Facts
The resulting dataset permits me to study the robot cost variation by occupation, or Japan
robot shock, and the corresponding occupation’s labor market outcomes with demographic
controls, which I explore in the next subsection. Throughout the paper, I define the initial
year C0 = 1992 (or for Census data C0 = 1990), in which the JARA data starts tracking
the destination-country level variable, and 1992-2007 as the sample period, with notation
C1 = 2007.
Fact 1: Trends of the JapanRobot Shock I show the patterns of average prices of robots
across occupations that are not intensively studied in the literature. Figure 1.1a plots the
distribution (10th, 50th, and 90th percentile) of the growth rates of the price of robots in the
US relative to the initial year. The figure shows two patterns: (i) the robot prices show an
overall decreasing trend, with the median growth rate of -17% from 1992 to 2007, or -1.1%
annually, and (ii) a significant heterogeneity in the rate of price falls across occupations,
with the 10th percentile occupation experienced -34% growth (-2.8% per annum), while the
90th percentile occupation almost did not change the price in the sample period. The price
drop is consistent with the decreasing trend of prices of general investment goods since
1980, as Karabarbounis and Neiman [2014] report a 10% decrease per decade from their
data sources. The large variation of the changes in prices by occupations persists even after
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of the Cost of Robots
(a) US Robot Price by Occupations (b) Histogram of the Japan Robot Shock
Note: The author’s calculation based on JARA and O*NET. The left panel shows the trend of prices of robots in the US by occupations,
?'
*(,>,C
. The thick and dark line shows the median price in each year, and two thin and light lines are the 10th and 90th percentile.
Three-year moving averages are taken to smooth out yearly noises. The right panel shows the histogram of long-run (1992-2007) cost
shock of robots measured by the fixed effect k>,C1 in equation (1.1).
controlling for the destination-year fixed effect k
8,C
, as Figure 1.1b shows the distribution of
the Japan robot shock in the long-run (1992-2007), or k
8,C1
in equation (1.1).
There are several interpretations of the price trend, including the reduction in the cost
to produce robots and quality changes. First, if the cost of producing robots decreases,
the measured prices naturally drop. In the model, I will capture this pattern by positive
Hicks-neutral productivity shock to robot producers. Second, if the quality of the robots
increased over the period, the quality-adjusted prices may experience a larger decrease
than what is observed in the average price measure. They are hard to separate in my data
and thus interpreted through the lens of the general equilibrium model in Section 1.3 by
incorporating the quality change and examining its effects on robot prices and quantities.
As a result, the differences in the robot cost shock and the quality change may affect the
robot adoption and the labor market impacts by occupations.
Fact 2: Effects of the Japan robot shock on US occupations Using the variation of
Japan robot shock, I study the effect on US labor market outcomes. Since the labor demand
may be affected by the concurrent trade liberalization, notably the China shock, I control








where ;B,>,C0 is sector-B share of employment for occupation > and Δ<B,C is the per-worker
Chinese export growth to non-US developed countries.9 An occupation receives a high
trade shock if sectors that experienced increased import competition from China intensively
employ the occupation. With this measure of the trade shock, I run the following regression
Δ ln (.>) = U0 + U1 × k>,C1 + U2 × %,>,C1 + ^> · " + Y>, (1.3)
where .> is a labor market outcome by occupations such as hourly wage and employment,
^> is the vector of baseline demographic control variables are the female share, the college-
graduate share, the age distribution, and the foreign-born share, and Δ is the long-run time
difference between 1990 and 2007.
Table 1.1 shows the result of regression (1.3). Columns 1-3 take hourly wages as the
outcome, while columns 4-6 do employment. In columns 3 and 6, the main specifications
that includes both the Japan robot shock and the China shock, I find that the negative Japan
robot shock (reduction in the cost of Japanese robots) drives the drop of the labor market
outcomes by occupation. Quantitatively, one standard-deviation decrease of the robot cost
(annually, 2.8%) implies the fall of occupational wage by 0.2-0.3% in 95% confidence
interval. This finding suggests substitutability between robots and workers because when
the cost of robots falls in an occupation, the relative demand for robots (resp. labor)
increases (resp. decreases) in the same occupation.
In Section A.1.6 of the Appendix, I compliment the findings in Table 1.1 by confirming
the consistency with the result of Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020]. The section also shows
that these analyses are robust to a number of sensitivity checks such as measuring robot
stocks by quantity, quality adjustment following Khandelwal et al. [2013], and unweighted
regression. Although these regressions are informative about the drivers of robot adoption,
they do not give an answer to the distributional and aggregate effect of the Japan robot
cost shock. To derive such more conclusive statements, I develop and estimate a general
equilibrium model.
9Specifically, following Autor et al. [2013], I take eight countries: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Ger-
many, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Appendix A.1.1 shows the distribution of occupational
employment ;B,>,C0 for each sector.
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Table 1.1: Effects of the Japan robot shock on US occupations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Δ ln(F) Δ ln(F) Δ ln(F) Δ ln(!) Δ ln(!) Δ ln(!)
Japan Robot Cost (k ) 0.0970*** 0.1021*** 0.0459*** 0.0472***
(0.0263) (0.0266) (0.0151) (0.0142)
IPW -0.0697** -0.0748** -0.0639*** -0.0663***
(0.0348) (0.0307) (0.0143) (0.0138)
Demographic controls X X X X X X
Observations 324 324 324 324 324 324
R-squared 0.379 0.320 0.394 0.103 0.073 0.178
Note: The table shows the coefficients in regression (1.3), based on the dataset constructed from JARA, O*NET, and the US Census/ACS.
Observations are 4-digit level occupations, and the sample is all occupations that existed throughout 1970 and 2007. k stands for
the Japan robot shock from equation (1.1) and IPW stands for the occupation-level import penetration measure (in thousand USD) in
equation (1.2). Demographic control variables are the female share, the college-graduate share, the age distribution (shares of age 16-34,
35-49, and 50-64 among workers aged 16-64), and the foreign-born share as of 1990. All time differences, Δ, are taken with a long
difference between 1990 and 2007. All regressions are weighted by the employment in the initial year (1990, which is the closest Census
year to the initial year that I observe the robot adoption, 1992). Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.3 Model
The open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model has three features: (i) occupation-
specific substitution of robots for workers, (ii) robot trade in a large-open economy, and
(iii) endogenous investment in robots with an adjustment cost. Section 1.3.1 states the as-
sumptions, agents’ optimization problems, and the equilibriumdefinition. After showing the
solutionmethod in Section 1.3.2, I discuss a key analytical result that shows the occupational
wage implication of automation, which underscores the relevance of occupation-specific
substitution in Section 1.3.3.
1.3.1 Setup
I formalize the model settings, assumptions, and key characterizations. I relegate discus-
sions and comparisons to the literature in Section A.2.1 of the Appendix. Other standard
characterizations of equilibrium conditions are given in Section A.2.4 of the Appendix.
Environment Time is discrete and has infinite horizon C = 0, 1, . . .. There are #
countries and $ occupations. To clarify subscripts for countries, I use 8, 9 , and ;, where
; is a robot-exporting country, 8 means a robot-importing and non-robot good-exporting
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country, and 9 indicates a non-robot good-importing country. There are two types of goods
6, a non-robot good 6 =  and robot 6 = '. Both goods are tradable. The non-robot
good is differentiated by origin countries and can be consumed by households, used as an
intermediate good, invested to produce robots, and used as an input for integration, which I
will discuss in detail. Robot ' is differentiated by origin countries and occupations. There
are bilateral and good-specific iceberg trade costs g6
8 9 ,C
for each 6 = , '. I use notation .
for the total production,& for the quantity arrived at the destination. For instance, non-robot






. There is no intra-country
trade cost, thus g6
88,C
= 1 for all 8, 6 and C.
There are three factors for production of good : labor by occupation !>, robot capital
by occupation  '> , and non-robot capital  . The stock of non-robot capital is exogenously
given at any period for each country. There is no international movement of factors. Note
that non-robot capital is not occupational. While producers rent non-robot capital from
the rental market, they accumulate and own robot capital. All good and factor markets are
perfectly competitive.
The government in each country exogenously sets the robot tax. Buyers of robot &'
;8,>,C
have to pay ad-valorem robot tax D;8,C on top of producer price ?';8,>,C to buy from ;. The tax
revenue is uniformly rebated to destination country 8’s workers.
Workers Workers solve a dynamic discrete choice problem to select an occupation [Hum-
lum, 2019, Traiberman, 2019]. I follow the discrete sector choice problems in Dix-Carneiro
[2014] and Caliendo et al. [2019] in that workers choose the occupations that maximize the
lifetime utility based on switching costs and the draw of idiosyncratic shocks. The problem
has a closed form solution when the idiosyncratic shocks follow a suitable extreme value
distribution [McFadden, 1973].10 In Section A.2.2 of the Appendix, I formally define the
problem and show that the worker’s problem can be characterized by, for each country 8 and
period C, the transition probability `8,>>′,C from occupation > in period C to occupation >′ in
10One of the differences from these past studies is that I characterize the switching cost by an ad-valorem
term, which makes the log-linearization simpler when solving the model.
14





























respectively, where 8,>,C+1 is the real consumption, j8,>>′,C is an ad-valorem switching cost
from occupation > to >′, q is the occupation-switch elasticity, Γ̃ ≡ Γ (1 − 1/q) is a constant






with the total employment satisfying an adding-up constraint∑
>
!8,>,C = !8,C . (1.7)
Production Function I describe a production function in country 8 in period C. For
each good 6, there is a given mass of producers. Non-robot good- producers produce by
aggregating the tasks performed by either labor or robots within a given occupation )$
8,>,C
,

















)U" ( 8,C )1−U!−U" , (1.8)
where .
8,C
is the production quantity, 
8,C
is a Hicks-neutral total factor productivity (TFP)
shock, 18,>,C is the cost share parameter of occupation >, V is the elasticity of substitution
between occupations from the production side, and U8,! , U8," , and 1−U8,! −U8," are Cobb-
Douglas weights on occupations, intermediate goods, and non-robot capital, respectively.
Parameters satisfy 18,>,C > 0 for all 8, >, and C,
∑
> 18,>,C = 1, V > 0, and U8,! , U8," , 1 − U8,! −
U8," > 0. For simplification, I assume that robots ' for occupation > are produced by
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Note that the increase in the TFP term '
8,>,C
drives a reduction in the robot prices. To





















where \> > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between robots and labor within occupation >,
and 0>,C is the cost share of robot capital in tasks performed by occupation >. In the following
sections, I use the shift of 0>,C as a source of automation. I will discuss real-world examples












where Y the elasticity of substitution. Since intermediate goods are traded across countries
and aggregated by equation (1.11), elasticity parameter Y serves as the trade elasticity.
Given the iceberg trade cost g
8 9,C








Discussion–Production Function and Automation It is worth mentioning the relation-
ship between production functions (1.8) and (1.10) and the way automation is treated in the
literature. A common approach to modeling robots in the literature, called the task-based
approach, constructs the production function (task-based production function) based on the
producers’ allocation problem of production factors (e.g., robot capital, labor) to a set of
tasks (e.g., spot welding). A large body of literature develops the task-based approach to
model industrial robots (e.g., Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018c) and more general automation
(e.g., Acemoglu and Autor, 2011, Autor et al., 2003). I show this task-based approach im-
11The assumption simplifies the solution of the model because occupations, intermediate goods, and non-
robot capital are only used to produce non-robot goods. Furthermore, I can simply use the estimates measured
at the unit of output dollar values when taking the budget constraint of the model to the data in log-linearized
solution. To conduct the estimation and counterfactual exercises without this simplification, one would need
to observe the cost shares of intermediate goods and non-robot capital for robot producers.
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plies occupation production function (1.10) with a suitable distributional assumption of the
efficiency of task performance for each production factor. Intuitively, one can regard tasks
in the occupation > as simply the aggregate of inputs, robot capital and labor, abstracting
away from allocating robots and workers to each exact task. More precisely, in Lemma 2
in Section C.2, I show that the solution to the factor allocation problem implies production
functions (1.8) and (1.10).
The cost-share parameter 0>,C of equation (1.10) has several interpretations. First, since
the task-based approach consists of the allocation of factors to tasks, the cost-share parameter
0>,C is the share of the space of tasks performed by robot capital as opposed to labor. Since
automation improvements consist of expansion in the task space, I will log-linearize the
equilibrium respect to 0>,C and call the change as the automation shock. Second, following
Khandelwal [2010], quality of goods can be regarded as a non-pecuniary “attribute whose
valuation is agreed upon by all consumers.” Therefore, the increase in the cost-share
parameter 0>,C can also be interpreted as quality upgrading of robots, when combined with
a suitable adjustment in the TFP term I discuss in Section 1.3.3. In particular, equation
(1.10) implies that in the long-run (hence dropping the time subscript) the demand for robot
capital is










is the long-run marginal cost of robot capital formally defined in Section A.2.4
of the Appendix, and %$
8,>
is the unit cost of performing occupation >. In this equation, 0>
is the quality term defined above. For this reason, I use terms (positive) automation shocks
and robot quality upgrading interchangeably to describe an exogenous increase in 0>.
The robot-labor substitution parameter \> is the key elasticity that affects the changes in
real wages given the automation shocks. In Section 1.3.3, I show that \> is negatively related
to the real wage changes conditional on the initial cost shares. Hence it is critical to know
the value of the parameter to answer the welfare and policy questions. To the best of my
knowledge, equation (1.10) is the most flexible formulation of substitution between robots
and labor in the literature. For instance, I show that the unit cost function of Acemoglu
and Restrepo [2020] can be obtained by \> → 0 for any > under specific assumptions about
other parameters in Lemma 2 in Appendix A.2.3. I also show that my model can imply the
production structure of Humlum [2019] in Lemma 3.
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Producers’ Problem The producers’ problem comprises two tiers–static optimization
about employment for each occupation and dynamic optimization about robot investment.
The static optimization is to choose the employment and capital rental conditional onmarket
prices and current stock of robot capital. Namely, for each 8 and C, conditional on the >-vector























?;8,C";8,C − A8,C 8,C , (1.12)
where .
8,C
is given by production function (1.8).
The dynamic optimization is to choose the quantity of new robots to purchase, or
robot investment, given the current stock of robot capital. It requires the following three
assumptions. First, for each 8, >, and C, robot capital  '
8,>,C
accumulates according to
 '8,>,C+1 = (1 − X)  
'
8,>,C +&'8,>,C , (1.13)
where &'
8,>,C
is the amount of new robot investment and X is the depreciation rate of robots.
Second, I assume that the new investment is given by CES aggregation of robot arms from
country ;,&'
;8,>,C
, and the non-robot good input of integration 8=C
8,>,C















where ; denotes the origin of the newly purchased robots, and U' is the expenditure share
of robot arms in the cost of investment. Note that equation (1.14) implies that the robots are
traded because they are differentiated by origin country ;. This follows the formulation of
capital good trade in Anderson et al. [2019]. Furthermore, combined with equation (1.13),
equation (1.14) implies that the origin-differentiated investment good is aggregated at first,
and then added to the stock of capital. This specification helps reduce the number of capital
stock variables and is also used in Engel and Wang [2011]. Given the iceberg trade cost
g'
8 9 ,C






. Write the unit investment price of
robots as %'
8,>,C





measured in units of robots, where W governs the size of adjustment cost
(e.g., Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006, Holt, 1960). This reflects the technological difficulty
18
and sluggishness of robot adoption, as reviewed in Autor et al. [2020] and discussed in
detail in Section A.2.1.




































are owned by households, the producer uses the household discount rate ]. Since this is
a standard dynamic optimization problem, the standard method of Lagrangian multiplier
yields the standard investment Euler equations, which I derive in Appendix A.2.4.
Equilibrium To close the model, the employment level must satisfy an adding-up con-
straint (1.7), and robot and non-robot good markets clear as described in Section A.2.4 of
the Appendix. I first define a temporary equilibrium in each period and then a sequential
equilibrium, which implies the steady-state definition. Some of the exact expressions are
derived in Appendix A.2.4 to save a space.
































































C , RC ,\C
}
as state variables.
Definition 1. In each period C, given state variables YC , a temporary equilibrium (TE) xC is













given pC , workers choose occupation optimally by equation (1.4), (ii) given pC , producers
maximize flow profit by equation (1.12) and demand robots by equation (A.15), and (iii)
markets clear: Labor adds up as in equation (1.7), and goods market clear with trade
balances as in equations (A.23) and (A.25).
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The temporary equilibrium inputs all state variables and outputs other endogenous
variables that are determined contemporaneously. The following sequential equilibrium
determines all state variables given initial conditions.





equilibrium (SE) is a sequence of vectors yC ≡ {xC , YC}C that satisfies the TE conditions
and employment law of motion (1.6), value function condition (1.5), capital accumulation
equation (1.13), producer’s dynamic optimization (A.19) and (A.18).
Finally, I define the steady state as a SE y that does not change over time.
1.3.2 Solution
I log-linearize around the initial equilibrium in order to solve the model. In particular, I






and amatrix K that summarize the first-order effect on sequential
equilibrium in transition dynamics and steady state, respectively. The steady state matrix K
is a key object in estimating the model in Section 1.4. Section A.4 of the Appendix gives
the details of the derivation of these matrices.
In the economy described in Section 1.3.1, the shocks comprise changes in the economic
environment and changes in policy. For instance, consider the increase of the robot task
space 0>,C in baseline period C0 by Δ> percent, or
0>,C =

0>,C0 if C < C0
0>,C0 × (1 + Δ>) if C ≥ C0
.
In this formulation, Δ> is interpreted as the size of the expansion of the robot task space. I
combine all these changes into a column vector . I take the following three steps to solve




C , RC ,\C
}
, and use “hat” notation to denote





Step 1. For a given period C, I combine the vector of shocks  and (given) changes in




. Log-linearizing the TE conditions,
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I solve for matrices JG and J such that the log-difference of the TE x̂C satisfies
JG x̂C = J
 ĜC . (1.16)
In this equation, JG is a substitution matrix and J ĜC is a vector of partial equilibrium
shifts in period C. Since the temporary equilibrium vector x̂C includes wages ŵC , equation
(1.16) generalizes the general equilibrium comparative statics formulation in Adao et al.





equation (1.16) can be written as
JG x̂C − J,( ŶC = J,Δ. (1.17)
Step 2. Log linearizing laws of motion and Euler equations around the old steady state,
I solve for matrices JH,(( and JΔ,(( such that JH,(( ŷ = JΔ,((, where superscript ((
denotes steady state. Combined with steady state version of equation (1.17), I have













which implies the first-order steady state matrix K that satisfies ŷ = K.
Step 3. Log linearizing laws of motion and Euler equations around the new steady state, I
solve for matrices JH,)
C+1 and J
H,)
C such that J
H,)
C+1 y̌C+1 = J
H,)
C y̌C , where the superscript
) stands for transition dynamics. Log-linearized sequential equilibrium satisfies the
following first-order difference equation
LH
C+1 ŷC+1 = L
H
C ŷC + LΔC+1. (1.19)
Using conditions in Blanchard and Kahn [1980], there is a converging matrix representing
the first-order transitional dynamics LC such that
ŷC = LC and LC → K . (1.20)
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1.3.3 Real-wage Effect of Automation
What does the occupation production function (1.10) imply about the effect of automation?
This question is directly related to the distributional and aggregate effects of industrial robots.
In this section, I show that the effect of automation on occupational real wages depends
negatively on substitution elasticity parameters \> and V conditional on the changes in input
and trade shares. The key insight is that the real wages are relative prices of labor to the
bundle of factors, and the relative price changes are related to changes in the input shares
and trade trade shares via the demand elasticities. These elasticities are among the target
parameters of the estimation in Section 1.4.


























































shock on robots and labor, respectively. The following proposition claims that the long-run
real-wage implication of the robot productivity change ̂ 
8,>
can be expressed by changes in
input and trade shares and elasticities of substitutions.12
Define the good-producers’ labor share within occupation G̃!
8,>,C
, occupation cost share
12By equation (1.21), robot productivity change  
8,>,C





+ 0̂>,C . Namely, robot productivity change is the sum of total factor productivity change caused
by robotics and the automation shock. I choose to use the automation shock in my main specification in
equations (1.8) and (1.10) since it has a tight connection to the task-based approach, a common approach in





















































, and non-robot goods consumed in country 8, respectively. In
Appendix A.2.4, I discuss how one can compute steady-state labor share G̃!
8,>
. Given these,
the following proposition characterizes the real-wage changes in the steady state.
Proposition 1. Suppose robot productivity grows ̂ 
8,>





















Proof. See Appendix A.2.5. 
Proposition 1 clarifies how the elasticity parameters and change of shares of input and
trade affect real wages at the occupation level. Among the elasticity parameters, one can
observe that if \> > 1, then (i) the larger the fall of the labor share within occupation ̂̃G!8,>,
the larger the real wage gains, and (ii) pattern (i) is stronger if \> is small and close to 1.
Therefore, conditional on other terms, the steady state changes of occupational real wages
depend on the elasticity of substitution between robots and labor \>.






. The first term reveals the robot cost reduction relative to labor cost. If \> > 1,
then the reduction in the price index or cost savings dominates the drop in nominal wage,
increasing the real wage. Similar intuition holds for the second and third terms. The second
term reveals the relative occupation cost reduction, whereas the last term reveals the relative
sectoral cost reduction.
Proposition 1 also extends the welfare sufficient statistic in the trade literature. In
particular, Arkolakis et al. (2012, ACR) showed that under a large class of trade models,
the welfare effect of the reduction in trade costs can be summarized into the well-known
ACR formula, or log-difference of the trade shares times the negative of trade elasticity. In
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fact, by dropping the robots and non-robot capital and aggregating occupations into one,













which is a modified ACR formula with intermediate goods as in Caliendo and Parro [2015]
and Ossa [2015].
Although Proposition 1 concisely represents the effect of the automation shock on real
wages, it is not straightforward to take this equation directly to the data. The reason is that
the observed data contain not only the automation shock but also other shocks such as trade
shocks that significantly affect ̂̃G
88
. To study robotization’s role in the occupational wage
effect, I estimate the model and back out the automation shock in the following.
1.4 Estimation
Using the occupation-level Japan robot shock described in Section 1.2 and the solution
to the general equilibrium model in Section 1.3, I develop an estimation method based
on the generalized method of moments (GMM), in particular, the model-implied optimal
instrumental variable (MOIV, Adao et al., 2019a). To do so, Section 1.4.1 sets the stage
for the structural estimation by giving the implementation detail. I formalize the MOIV
estimator in Section 1.4.2, which gives the structural estimates in Section 1.4.3.
1.4.1 Bringing Model to Data
To simplify the notation and tailor to my empirical application, I stick to country labels 8 = 1
as the US (USA), 8 = 2 as Japan (JPN), 8 = 3 as the Rest of the World (ROW). Following my
data, I interpret country 8 = 1 as the country of interest in terms of labor market outcome
variables, country 8 = 2 as the source country of automation shocks by robots, and country
8 = 3 as the (set of) countries in which the measurement of robots proxies the technological
changes in country 2.
In the estimation, I allow heterogeneity across occupations of the within-occupation
EoS between robots and labor. To do so, I define the occupation groups as follows. I first
separate occupations into three broad occupation groups, Abstract, Service, Routine follow-
ing Acemoglu and Autor [2011]. Routines occupations include production, transportation
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and material moving, sales, clerical, and administrative support. Abstract occupations
are professional, managerial and technical occupations; service occupations are protective
service, food preparation, cleaning, personal care and personal services. Given the trend
that production and transportation/material moving occupations introduced robots over the
sample period, I further divide routine occupations into three sub-categories, Production
(e.g., welders), Transportation (indicating transportation and material-moving, e.g., hand
laborer), and Others (e.g., repairer), where Others include sales, clerical, and administra-
tive support. As a result, I obtain five occupation groups, for each of which I assume a
constant EoS between robots and labor.13 With each occupation group (or mapping from
4-digit occupation > to the group) represented by 6, notation \6 denotes the robot-labor
EoS for occupation group. In Section A.3.1 of the Appendix, I examine a different choice
of occupation grouping.
The vector of structural parameters are denoted as  and its dimension is 3 ≡ dim ().
To formally define , I fix a subset of parameters of the model at conventional values. In
particular, I assume that the annual discount rate is ] = 0.05 and the robot depreciation rate
is 10 percent following Graetz and Michaels [2018].14 I take trade elasticity of Y = 4 from
the large literature of trade elasticity estimation (e.g., Simonovska and Waugh, 2014), and
Y' = 1.2 derived from applying the estimation method developed by Caliendo and Parro
[2015] to the robot trade data, discussed in detail in Appendix A.3.2. Following Leigh and
Kraft [2018], I assume U' = 2/3. With this parametrization, structural parameters to be
estimated are  ≡
{




I observe changes in endogenous variables, US occupational wages ŵ1, US employment R̂1,
robot shipment from Japan to the US Ŵ'21, and the corresponding unit values p̂
'
21 between
1992 and 2007, as well as the initial equilibrium yC0 . I approximate the 15-year changes as
the steady-state changes. To simplify, I focus on the expansion of robot task space 0̂> and
the efficiency gain to produce robots in Japan ̂'2,> as the source of the occupational shocks
13In terms of OCC2010 codes in the US Census, Routine production occupations are ones in [7700, 8965],
Routine transportation are in [9000, 9750], Routine others are in [4700, 6130], Service are in [3700, 4650],
and Abstract are in [10, 3540].
14For example, see King and Rebelo [1999] for the source of the conventional value of ] who matches the
discount rate to the average real return on capital. For Y, see Simonovska and Waugh [2014] or Caliendo and
Parro [2015].
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in this section. Note that the robot production function (1.9) implies that ̂'2,> is negative of




where, again, k>,C1 is the Japan robot shock defined in equation (1.1) and measured in my
dataset.
To discuss the identification challenge and the countermeasure, I decompose the au-
tomation shock 0̂> into observed component 0̂obs> and unobserved error component 0̂err> such
that 0̂> = 0̂obs> + 0̂err> for all >. The component 0̂obs> is observed conditional on parameter
\>–namely, it satisfies the steady-state change of relative demand of robots and labor implied






























is endogenous and is correlated




that represents the task-space expansion of robots
[Hubmer, 2018, Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014]. Second, the Japan robot shock k>,C1
also does not also work as an instrumental variable (IV) in the linear regression model of
(1.25) because of a potential correlation between k>,C1 and observed task-space expansion
shock 0̂obs> .
To overcome these identification issues, I employ a method based on the full GE model
below. Conditional on 0̂obs> , the error component 0̂err> can be inferred from each observed
endogenous variable. Take the changes in occupational wages ŵ1 for example. The steady-
state solution matrix K implies that there is a $ × $ sub-matrices Kw1,a and Kw1,G'2 such
that15
ŵ = Kw1,a â + Kw1,G'2 Ĝ
'
2 . (1.26)
15I use the steady-state matrix K instead of the transitional dynamics matrix LC for a computational reason,
which is described in Appendix A.3.1 in detail.
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Since â = âobs + âerr, I have
.w = ŵ − Kw1,a âobs − Kw1,G'2 Ĝ
'
2 ,
where .w ≡ Kw1,a âerr is the $-vector structural residual generated from the linear com-
bination of the unobserved component of the automation shocks. Note that the structural
residual depends on the structural parameters . To clarify this, I occasionally write the






, I perform the same
process and obtain corresponding structural errors
(
.R , . p' , .W'
)
. Then I stack these vec-
tors into an $ × 4 matrix . ≡
[
.w, .R , . p' , .W'
]
, and from its >-th row define 4 × 1 vector
as E> =
[
aw,>, aR,>, a p' ,>, aW' ,>
]>






, I assume the following moment condition.






Assumption 1 puts restriction on structural residual . in that it should not be predicted
by the Japan robot shock. Note that it allows that the automation shock 0̂> may correlate
with the robot efficiency change Ĝ'2 which is likely as I discuss in Appendix A.1.2 in detail.
Instead, the structural residual a> purges out all the predictions of the impacts of shocks â
and Ĝ'2 on endogenous variables, and I place the assumption that the remaining variation
should not be predicted by the Japan robot shock from the data.
Under what circumstances does Assumption 1 break? Note that the answer to this
question is not the correlation of the structural residuals with other shocks such as trade
shocks because I have confirmed controlling for the trade shock does not qualitatively
alter the reduced-form findings in Section 1.2.3. Instead, a candidate answer is a directed
technological change, in which the occupational labor demand drives the changes in the
cost of robots. Specifically, suppose a positive labor demand shock in an occupation >
induces the research and development of robots in occupation > and drives cost down in the
long run. This mechanism is not incorporated in my model where robots are produced with
production function (1.9) with exogenous technological change. Therefore, the structural
residual a> cannot remove this effect and is negatively correlated with k>,C1 . In this sense,
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the positive impact of Japan robot costs found in Section 1.2.3 still prevails qualitatively
even under the directed technological change.16
Using Assumption 1, I develop the two-step estimator that is consistent and asymp-
totically efficient, following Adao et al. (2019), who define the model-implied optimal
instrumental variable (MOIV) and extend the estimator of Newey and McFadden (1994)
to the general equilibrium environment. Namely, the optimal GMM estimator is based on
the instrumental variable that depends on unknown structural parameters. The two-step
estimator solves this unknown-dependent problem and achieves desirable properties of con-
sistency and asymptotic efficiency. See Propositions 2 and 3 in Appendix A.2.6 for the
detail.
1.4.3 Estimation Result
To apply the two-step estimator, I need to measure the initial equilibrium yC0 , which is an
input to the solution matrix K in equation (1.18). I take these data from JARA, IFR, IPUMS
USA and CPS, BACI, and World Input-Output Data (WIOD). The measurement of labor
market outcomes is standard and relegated to Section A.1.8 of the Appendix. I set the initial
period robot tax to be zero in all countries.
Table 1.2a gives the estimates of the structural parameters. Panel 1.2a shows the
estimation result when I restrict the EoS between robots and labor to be constant across
occupation groups. The estimate of the within-occupation EoS between robots and labor,
\6, implies that robots and labor are substitutes within an occupation, and rejects the
Cobb-Douglas case \6 = 1 at a conventional significance level. The point estimate of the
EoS between occupations, V, is 0.71, or occupation groups are complementary. The one-
standard error bracket covers Humlum’s (2019) central estimate of 0.49. The adjustment
cost parameter W is close to the estimate of Cooper and Haltiwanger [2006] when they
restrict the model with only quadratic adjustment costs, like in my model. The one-standard
error range of occupational dynamic labor supply elasticity q is estimated to be [0.55, 1.07],
which contains an estimate of 0.6 in the dynamic occupation choice model in Traiberman
[2019] in the case without the specific human capital accumulation.
Panel 1.2b shows the estimation result when I allow the heterogeneity across occupation
16With increasing returns for robot producers, I could model that the robot demand increase drives cost
drop. Estimating such a model requires detailed data on robot producers and is left for future research.
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Table 1.2: Parameter Estimates
(a) All Parameters



















Note: The estimates of the structural parameters based on the estimator in Proposition 3. Standard errors are in parentheses. In the
left panel, parameter \ is the within-occupation elasticity of substitution between robots and labor. Parameter V is the elasticity of
substitution between occupations. Parameter W is the capital adjustment cost. Parameter q is the occupation switch elasticity. The
column “\6 = \” shows the result with the restriction that \> is constant across occupation groups. The column “Free \6” shows
the result with \6 allowed to be heterogeneous across five occupation groups. In the right panel, estimates for parameters \6 with
heterogeneity are shown. Transportation indicates “Transportation and Material Moving” occupations in the Census 4-digit occupation
codes (OCC2010 from 9000 to 9750). See the main text for other details.
groups. The other structural estimates, (V, W, q), do not change qualitatively. Table 1.2b
shows the estimates of the within-occupation EoS between robots and labor, \6. I find that
the EoS for routine production occupations and routine transportation occupations is around
4, while those for other occupation groups (other occupations in routine group, service, and
abstract occupations) are not significantly different from 1, the case of Cobb-Douglas. The
estimates for routine production and transportation indicate the susceptibility of workers in
these occupations to accumulated robot capital.
What is the source of identification of these large and heterogeneous EoS between
robots and labor identified? As in the literature of estimating the capital-labor substitution
elasticity, the positive correlation between the robot price and the wage (labor market
outcome) suggests robots and labor are substitutes, or large \6. Intuitively, if \6 is large,
then given a percentage decrease in the cost of robots, the steady-state relative robot (resp.
labor) demand responds strongly in the positive (resp. negative) direction. Reducing
the occupation wage through the labor demand equation, the large robot-labor EoS yields a
positive correlation between the robot price trend and the wage trend, as found in Figure A.8.
Appendix A.1.7 further discusses this source of identification of the EoS, the correlation
between the Japan robot shock and the US wage change within each occupation group.
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1.4.4 Measuring Shocks and Model Fit
To examine the plausibility of these parameter estimates, I simulate the model and check
the model’s fit. The simulation process comprises two steps. First, I back out the observed
shocks from the estimated model for each year between 1992 and 2007. Namely, with the
point estimates in Table 1.2b, I obtain the efficiency increase of Japanese robots '2,>,C using
(1.24), equation the observed automation shock 0̂obs>,C using (1.25), and the US occupation
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+ 4̃8 9 ,C , and use ̂'8,C = −k̃8,C1 . The idea to back
out the negative efficiency shock k̃
8,C1
is similar to the fixed-effect regression in Section 1.2,
but without the occupational variation. Second, applying the backed-out shocks '
8,>,C
, 0̂obs>,C ,
and 11,>,C to the first-order solution of the GE in equation (1.20), I obtain the prediction of
changes of endogenous variables to these shocks to the first-order. Finally, applying the
predicted changes to the initial data in C0 = 1992, I obtain the predicted level of endogenous
variables.
I run the linear regression model (1.3) to examine the fit of the model and the role of the
automation shock in estimating the robot-labor EoS.17 First, I hit all the shocks generated
in the above paragraph. In this case, the prediction is consistent with the moment condition
(1.27) and thus I predict that the linear regression coefficient U1 of equation (1.3) is close to
the one in Table 1.1. I term the predicted wages in this way as the “targeted wage.” Second,
I hit all the shocks but the automation shock. In this case, the same moment condition is
violated since the structural residual fails to incorporate the automation shock. Therefore,
this exercise reveals how important taking into account the observed automation shock is
in estimation. Namely, the larger the discrepancy of the regression coefficient of equation
(1.3) between the data and this second simulation, the more severe the bias caused by the
automation shock. I call the predicted wages in this way as the “untargeted wage.”
Table 1.3 shows the result of these exercises. By comparing the first column that repeats
column (3) of Table 1.1 and the second column based on the targeted wage, I confirm that
the targeted moments match well as expected. The third column is the result based on the
17As another model validation exercise, I predict the stock of robots by occupation and find that the model
predict the actual robot accumulation dynamics well, described in detail in Appendix A.3.3. Appendix A.3.4
gives further discussion about the Japan robot shock and the backed-out observed automation shocks.
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Table 1.3: Model Fit: Linear Regression with Observed and Simulated Data
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Δ ln(F) Targeted ŵ Untargeted ŵ
k 0.0984*** 0.0980*** 0.126***
(0.0266) (0.0077) (0.0009)
Observations 324 324 324
R-squared 0.394 0.532 0.794
Note: The author’s calculation based on the dataset generated by JARA, O*NET, and the US Census. Column (1) is the coefficient of
the Japan robot shock k in the reduced-form regression with IPW. Column (2) takes the US wage change predicted by GE with k as
well as other shocks such as the observed automation shock a>1B . Column (3) takes the US wage change predicted by GE with shocks
including the Japan robot shock, but excluding the observed automation shock. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
untargeted wage and shows stronger positive correlation between the simulated wage and
the Japan robot shock. This is due to negative correlation between the Japan robot shock k>
and the observed automation shock 0̂obs> , which is consistent with that robotic innovations
that save cost (thus decreases k>) and that upgrade quality (thus increases 0̂obs> ) are likely
to happen at the same time, as exemplified in Appendix A.1.2.
More specifically, the real and simulated data with the targeted wage contain the negative
bias due to this negative correlation. Since the untargeted wage is free from this bias, the
linear regression coefficient U1 of equation (1.3) is higher than the one obtained from the real
data. In other words, if I have wrongfully assumed that the economy did not experience the
automation shock and believed the regression coefficient in Table 1.1 is bias-free, I would
have estimated higher EoS by ignoring the actual negative correlation between k> and 0̂obs> .
This thought experiment reveals the importance of taking into account the automation shock
in estimating the EoS between robots and labor using the robot cost shock.
1.5 Counterfactual Exercises
Using the estimated model and backed-out shocks in the previous section, I answer the
following questions. The first question is the distributional effects of robots. Autor et al.
[2008] argue that the wage inequality measured by the ratio of the wages between the 90th
percentile and the 50th percentile (90-50 ratio) steadily increased since 1980.18 Although
18AsHeathcote et al. [2010] argue, a sizable part of theUS economic inequality roots in thewage inequality.
Furthermore, the polarization is not a unique phenomenon in the US, but found in the other context such as
the UK [Goos and Manning, 2007].
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Figure 1.2: Robots, Wage Inequality, and Polarization
(a) Robot growths by Wage Decile (b) Robots’ Effect on Occupational Wages
Notes: The left panel shows the average annual growth rates of the observed robot stock between 1992 and 2007 for every ten deciles of
the occupational wage distribution in 1990. The right panel shows the annualized wage growth rates predicted by the backed-out shocks
and the estimated model’s first-order steady-state solution given in equation (1.18).
my data and model predicts the changes from 1990, can the increased use of industrial
robots explain the 90-50 ratio? If so, how much? The second question concerns the policy
implication of robot regulation. Due to the fear of automation, policymakers have proposed
regulating industrial robots using robot taxes. What would be the effect of taxing on robot
purchases?
1.5.1 The Distributional Effects of Robot Adoption
To study the contribution of robots to wage polarization, I begin by showing the pattern of
robot accumulations over the occupational wage distribution. Figure 1.2a shows the average
annual growth rates of observed robot stock between 1992 and 2007 for every ten deciles
of the occupational wage distribution in 1990. The figure clarifies that the occupations in
the middle deciles of the distribution received relatively many robots. Conditional on robot
prices, this pattern implies there are relatively large automation shocks on these occupations.
The right panel shows the steady-state annualized predicted wage growths due to the
shocks backed out in Section 1.4.4 and the estimated model with the first-order solution
given in equation (1.20). Consistent with the high growth rate of robot stocks in the middle
of the wage distribution and the estimation results that indicate the strong substitutability
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between robots and labor, I find that the wage effect in the middle deciles of the initial wage
distribution is strongly negative. Quantitatively, the 90-50 ratio observed in 1990 and 2007
is, respectively, 1.588 and 1.668. On the other hand, the 90-50 ratio predicted by the initial
1990 data and the first-order solution (1.20) is 1.597. These findings indicate that 11.7
percent of the observed change in the 90-50 ratio between 1990 and 2007.
These results emerge from aggregating the effects on 4-digit occupational wages and
my estimates of the robot-labor EoS. Specifically, relative occupational wages drastically
drops in production and transportation (material-moving) occupations. This is a natural
consequence of (i) the large quantities robots adopted in these occupations (Figure A.15)
and (ii) the high estimates of EoS between robots and labor for these occupations (Table
1.2b). To confirm these observations, Appendix A.3.5 describes the wage changes for each
of 5 occupation groups and Appendix A.3.6 performs the robotization exercise in case of
low EoS as specified in the literature.
1.5.2 Robot Tax and Aggregate Income
Next, I consider a counterfactual rise of robot tax as well as the automation shock. In
the baseline economy, all countries levied zero robot tax. On the one hand, consider an
unexpected, unilateral, and permanent increase in the robot tax by 6% in the US, or the
general tax scenario. I also consider the tax on only imported robots by 33.6%, or the import
tax scenario, which implies the same amount of tax revenue as in the general tax scenario.
Note that the 6% rate of the general tax is more modest than 30% considered in Humlum
[2019] for the Danish case, and that the 33.6% import tax would make the tax revenue
the same as the 6% general robot tax case, which makes the comparison straightforward
between the scenarios. How does these robot tax schemes affect the US real income?19
In Figure 1.3a, the solid line tracks the real-income effect of the general robot tax over a
20-year time horizon after the imposition. First, the magnitude of the effect is small because
the cost of buying robots and the contribution of robot capital in the aggregate production
are small. Second, in the short-run, there is a positive effect while the effect turns negative
quickly and continues so in the long-run.
19Appendix A.3.7 provides analysis for occupational workers’ welfare consequence and concludes that
there is no general tax rate that makes all workers better off. There, I numerically show that the 6% general
tax would roughly compensate the loss from robotization for production workers.
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Figure 1.3: Effects of the Robot Tax
(a) US Real Income (b) US Robot Stock and Import Robot Price
Notes: The left panel shows the counterfactual effect on the US real income of the two robot tax scenarios described in the main text over
a 20-year time horizon. The right panel shows that of the import robot tax on the US total robot stocks (solid line) and the pre-tax robot
price from Japan (dash-dot line) over the same time horizon.
Why is there a short-run positive effect on real income? A country’s total income
comprises the sum of workers’ wages, the non-robot good producer’s profit, and tax revenue.
Since robots are traded, and theUS is a large economy that can affect the robot price produced
in other countries, there is a terms-of-trade effect of robot tax in the US. Namely, the robot
tax reduces the demand for robots produced in the other country, let the equilibrium robot
price go down along the supply curve. This reduction in the robot price contributes to the
increase in the firm’s profit, raising the real income in the short-run. The short-run positive
effect is stronger in the import robot tax scenario because the higher tax rate induces a more
substantial drop in the import robot price.
The terms-of-trademanipulation is well-studied in the trade policy literature. This paper
offers the upward sloping export supply curve from the general equilibrium, as opposed
to the supply curve that is assumed upward sloping (e.g., Broda et al., 2008). Namely,
when the demand for robots in a robot exporter country decreases, the resource to produce
robots in the exporter country is freed and reallocated to produce the non-robot goods. In
my case, the resource is simply the non-robot goods that are input to robot production in
equation (1.9). This increases the supply of non-robot goods in the robot-exporting country,
depressing the price of non-robot goods. Again due to robot production function (1.9), this
decrease in the non-robot goods price means the decrease of the cost of producing robots,
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which in turn reduces the price of robots produced in the exporter country.
Why do I have the different effect on real income in the long-run? The solid line in
Figure 1.3b shows the dynamic impact of the import robot tax on robot stock accumulation.
The tax significantly slows the accumulation of robot stocks, and decreases the steady-state
stock of robots by 9.7 percent compared to the no-tax case. The smaller quantity of robot
stocks reduces the firm profit, which contributes to smaller real income.20 These results
highlight the role of costly robot capital (de-)accumulation in the effect of the robot tax on
aggregate income.
In Figure 1.3b, The dash-dot line shows a distinct dynamic effect: the effect of the
robot tax on the price of robots imported from Japan in the US. In the short-run, the price
decreases due to the decreased demand from the US. As the sequential equilibrium reaches
the new steady state where the US stock of robots is decreased, the marginal value of the
robots is higher. This increased marginal value partially offsets the reduced price of robots
in the short-run, pushing back the cost of robots imported from Japan. This figure shows
the effect of the international trade of robots in a large country as well as the accumulation
of robots. As an extreme case, I also consider an alternative model with no trade of robots
due to prohibitively high robot cost and give the robot tax counterfactual exercise in Section
A.3.8 of the Appendix.
1.5.3 Other Exercises
What does the same robot tax do to each occupation? The robot tax rolls back the long-
run real wage effect of automation. Workers in occupations that experienced significant
automation shocks (e.g., production and transportation in the routine occupation groups)
who would have been substituted by accumulated robots benefit from the tax, while the
others lose. In Appendix A.3.9, I discuss the effect of the robot tax on occupational
wages in detail. My model also allows the counterfactual exercise regarding robots trade
liberalization. As mentioned in Appendix A.3.10, I find that trade liberalization would
benefit all countries in the long-run. The benefit in the US appears immediately after the
reduction in the trade cost.
20For each occupation, the counterfactual evolution of robot stocks is similar to each other in percentage
and, thus, similar to the aggregate trend in percentage. This is not surprising since the robot tax is ad-valorem
and uniform across occupations.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the distributional and aggregate effects of industrial robots, empha-
sizing that robots perform specified tasks and are internationally traded. I make three
contributions. First, I construct a first dataset that tracks the number of robot arms and
unit values disaggregated by occupations that robots replace. Second, I develop a general
equilibriummodel that features the trade of robots in a large-open economy and endogenous
robot accumulation with an adjustment cost. When estimating the model, to identify the
occupation-specific EoS between robots and labor, I construct a model-implied optimal
instrumental variable from the average price of robots in my dataset.
The estimates of within-occupation EoS between robots and labor is heterogeneous
and as high as 4 in production and material moving occupations. These estimates are
significantly larger than estimates of the EoS of capital goods and workers, with a maximum
of about 1.5, revealing the susceptibility of workers in the occupations to robot adaptation.
These estimates imply that robots contributed to the wage polarization across occupations
in the US from 1990-2007. A commonly advertised robot tax could increase the US real
income in the short-run but leads to a decline in the income in the long run due to the small
steady-state robot stock. These findings indicate that the accumulated robots may have more
massive distributional impacts than is considered in the previous literature, and regulating
robots could have a positive effect from the aggregate perspective due to the trade of robots.
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Chapter 2
Robots and Employment: Evidence from
Japan, 1978-2017
2.1 Introduction
How does automation affect employment? Academic researchers, policymakers, and jour-
nalists alike all discuss this topic (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014, Ford, 2015, Frey and
Osborne, 2017, OECD, 2019). An example of automation is the use of industrial robots
(robots hereafter).1 This paper analyzes the effect of robot penetration on employment in
Japan, relying on a novel identification strategy enabled by a newly digitized data set of
robot shipments by destination industry and robot application (task, defined further below)
in quantity and sales values.
To estimate the impact of robot penetration on employment, we exploit the variation
in robot adoption due to heterogeneous changes in effective robot prices that differ by
the characteristics of robot adopters. As our methodological benchmark, Acemoglu and
Restrepo [2020] and Dauth et al. [2018] proxied the supply shock of robot to a domestic
industry by the robot penetration of the same industry in other developed economies.
The presumption is that the industry-level penetration of robots is similar within these
economies, because both economies face the same industrial shock to the robot supply, such
1Other examples include the use of information and communication technologies (ICT, Autor et al., 2003,
among others) and artificial intelligence (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2018). Research on automation in non-industrial
contexts is also emerging. Png [2019], for example, finds positive welfare effects on routine cashier workers
at supermarkets.
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as innovation in a new robot model that is demanded by both countries. We propose a new
identification strategy based on robot applications.
Robot applications are the tasks in the production process that the introduced robots are
supposed to do, such as welding and parts assembling. This study substantiates the source
of variation of robot adoption across industries by directly appealing to the differences in
robot applications in the production process across industries. Exploiting this inter-industry
technological variation, we construct a robot price index that each industry faces in each year
by averaging the robot price by application, weighted by industry-level application shares
of robots. We use this industry-year-level robot price index to estimate the impacts of robot
price on robot adoption and employment. Subsequently, we estimate the impact of robot
adoption on employment, using the price index as the instrumental variable (IV) for robot
adoption. The strengths of our methods in comparison to the literature are as follows. First,
our method does not require countries of comparison. Second, the regression coefficient
reveals gross factor (robot and labor) demand elasticities with respect to robot prices,
which are directly interpretable. Furthermore, our method has an additional benefit: The
construction of different robot price indices across industries enables us to examine the
experience of Japan, which has no comparable foreign counterparts, because robots were
adopted in the production process as early as the late 1970s, about 20 years earlier than
other developed countries.
We implement our identification strategy employing a new data set featuring a long
panel (1978-2017), quantity and sales values, and disaggregation by destination industry
and robot applications. Robot applications are the tasks in the production process that
the introduced robots are supposed to perform, such as welding and parts assembling.
We first demonstrate that various industries use robots in different production processes
by showing that the composition of robot applications is substantially different across
destination industries. For instance, welding robots and assembling robots consist of 46.3
percent and 7.1 percent of total shipments to the automobile industry, respectively, whereas
the values for the electronics industry are 3.0 percent and 76.2 percent, respectively, in the
years 1978-82. We next show that the unit price of welding robots fell consistently and
substantially between 1978 and 2017, whereas the price drop of other robots was not as
striking. Exploiting the heterogeneity of robot application intensity across industries and
the different price trends by robot application, we construct the aggregate robot price index
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by industry that changed differentially across industries. We take this price variation across
industries as the source of identification.
We find that robots are complementary to employment at both at the industry and
region levels. At the industry level, we show that a 1 percent decrease in robot price
increased robot adoption by 1.54 percent. Perhaps more surprisingly, we also find that a 1
percent decrease in robot price increased employment by 0.44 percent. This finding implies
that robots and labor are gross complements. Therefore, taken together, our two-stage least
squares estimates suggest that a 1 percent robot increase caused by price reduction increased
employment by 0.28 percent.
To show the credibility of our identification assumption, we conduct robustness checks
by dropping large robot-adopting industries and using different price measures. Robot
prices may be directly affected by large adopters. For instance, large adopters, such as the
automobile industry, may exert scale effects and reduce the prices of robots they purchase.
In this case, prices are endogenous for these adopters. To deal with the concern, we drop
these large industries and show that the results are qualitatively the same. To deal with
further concerns about using prices as a direct shifter of our IV, we also report the results
with alternative IVs based on measures of leave-one-out prices and prices demanded by
foreign purchasers. The results are also robust to these considerations.
We move to the commuting-zone (CZ) level analysis to better compare our results
with existing estimates in the literature. By constructing shift-share measures of robot
exposure, we conduct a two-stage least square estimation resembling the one by Acemoglu
and Restrepo [2020] but with our cost-based instrumental variable. Our result indicates
that one robot unit per 1,000 workers increased employment by 2.2 percent, corroborating
the finding that the robots and labor are gross complements. This contrasts with the finding
by Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020], whose corresponding estimate was -1.6 percent. The
difference of the results is not surprising, given the difference of the country and the time
period covered. Particularly, considering the export-oriented nature of the automobile
and electric machine sectors of Japan, robot adoption and its cost-reducing effect have
contributed to the expansion of exports and increased the labor demand. This scale effect
may well have dominated the substitution effect of robots for labor.
The CZ-level analysis enables us to conduct further analyses regarding spillovers from
the manufacturing sector to the non-manufacturing sector, as advocated by Moretti [2010].
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First, we find that the employment of non-manufacturing sectors neither increased nor
decreased upon robot adoption. This fact shows that within-region-across-industry real-
location from service to manufacturing did not happen, suggesting that an across-region
reallocation of workers (migration or lack thereof) happened. In other words, in the context
of the non-increasing population in Japan, robots might work like a magnet that keeps
workers from leaving for other regions. Second, we find that although the total employment
increased when robots were adopted, the hours worked per worker decreased. This find-
ing suggests that robots may have worked as work-sharing and time-saving technological
changes. In turn, this implies that the hourly-wage effect might be even more positive,
which we confirmed in our data.
Relative to the previous literature, for the first time, we propose and implement a
robot-cost based identification strategy to estimate the causal effect of robot penetration
on labor demand, drawing on newly digitized data covering the long period of 1978-2017
in Japan and the heterogeneous technology of robot use across industries. There is a
growing empirical literature studying the impacts of robots on employment [Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2020, Artuc et al., 2020, Bessen et al., 2019, Dauth et al., 2018, Graetz
and Michaels, 2018, Humlum, 2019, Koch et al., 2019]. The literature is finding mixed
evidence from different contexts. Among them, Graetz and Michaels [2018] reported that
robot penetration increased labor productivity as well as wages based on an Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) country-industry level analysis.
Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020] analyzed US regional labor markets and concluded that
robot penetration into a local labor market reduces the employment-to-population ratio and
the earnings of all workers regardless of skill levels, implying that all workers lose from
robot penetration. In contrast, Dauth et al. [2018] analyzed German regional labor markets
to find that the penetration of robots decreased employment in the manufacturing sector
but increased employment in the service sector, suggesting the coexistence of losers and
winners in local economies. These conflicting empirical results from two major economies,
in addition to the theoretical discussion byBerg et al. [2018] andCaselli andManning [2019]
that technological progress should benefit some workers under fairly standard assumptions,
warrant further empirical study on other major economies.
The existing literature on the impact of robots on employment does not use robot cost
as a robot demand shifter, because robot cost measures are not generally available. For
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example, the widely used data set compiled by the International Federation of Robotics
does not record the sales values at a fine disaggregated level. Thus the unit value per robot
is unknown. Graetz and Michaels [2018] is an exception, in that it reports the robot price
taken from a survey of a subset of robot producers and shows that the cost reduction was a
critical factor behind robot adoption. They did not, however, use the price information in
their formal regression analysis.
There is also an emerging literature that uses automation data with firm-level observa-
tions to study the margins of adjustment (Bessen et al., 2019, Koch et al., 2019). These
papers typically are not aimed at studying a particular machine, but instead, an abstract
“automation cost or technology.” In contrast, we study the role of a particular well-defined
machine, the robot, which makes a quantitative interpretation possible as opposed to a
qualitative one.
The use of equipment prices to estimate the elasticity of substitution between production
factors is not new.2 Our paper may be thought of as a contribution to this literature
in that it examines a particular type of capital, robots, that is expected to automate the
production process and substitute for labor. Recent examples from this literature include
Karabarbounis and Neiman [2014], who estimated capital-labor elasticity of substitution
using cross-country and time-series variations to study drivers behind recent declines in
labor shares in national income. Drawing on their arguments, our finding that robots and
labor may be gross complements implies that caution should be taken in interpreting that
the recent development in robot technology contributes to a decrease in labor shares.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section ?? reviews the necessary background for this
paper. This includes the standard shift-share IV-based identification method, cross-country
robot adoption trends, and robotics application classifications. Section 3.2.1 describes our
datasets, with particular emphasis on the critical raw trends of our newly digitized dataset on
robot adoption. Section 2.3 and 2.4 are the primary analysis sections of this paper, showing
two different and complementary empirical strategies of industry-level and commuting-
zone-level analyses, and their results. Section 2.5 discusses the efficiency adjustment over
the long-run robot adoption and ensures the robustness of our results when those adjustments
are accounted for. Section 2.6 concludes.
2See Antras [2004] for a list of papers.
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Figure 2.1: Trends of Robot Stock Units, by Country
Note: Authors’ calculation based on JARA and IFR data. The JARA data show the application-aggregated
robot shipment units from Japan to Japan between 1974 and 2017. We supplement the shipment during the
1974-77 period by type-aggregated units. We assume zero units before 1973. To calculate the stock units,
we assume eight (8) year immediate withdrawal method to match the stock unit trend of Japan observed in
the IFR. The IFR data show stock unit trends for selected countries and aggregated rest of the world (ROW)
between 1993 and 2016.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Trends of Robot Stock Units
To grasp the cross-country trends of robot stock units, we leverage two data sources: the
International Federation of Robotics and the Japan Robot Association (JARA). The IFR data
are from a country-industry-level panel of operational stock of robots for years 1993 to 2016.
This panel has been used intensively in the literature (Graetz andMichaels, 2018, Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2020, among others). The JARA data are based on an establishment-level
survey completed by Japanese robot producers, which we will detail in Section 2.2.3. The
JARA provides the statistics to IFR, and thus the Japanese series of the IFR is based on
JARA statistics. Remarkably, the dataset is available since 1978. Based on these datasets,
we construct the trends of robot stock units for each country in Figure 2.1.
In the figure, two colors are used to separate the data sources: one for JARA and the
other for IFR. Different line types indicate different countries. Note that the solid line
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represents the trend of Japan, and the trends for Japan overlap well between the IFR and
JARA datasets. This is not surprising, because the IFR creates its Japanese series based
on JARA data. The two series do not overlap perfectly due to minor adjustments. Several
findings stand out from Figure 2.1. First, Japan experienced a very different trajectory
than other countries. There is a rapid increase in the 1980s, and the trend has been stable
or even decreased from the 1990s and onward. Second, other large robot purchasers are
Germany and other European countries, South Korea, the US, and recently, China. All of
these countries increased the stocks rapidly in 1990s and 2000s. Although there are no data
available for these countries before 1993, the relative novelty of the robotics technology
suggest that the stocks before 1993would have not beenmore than those of 1993. Therefore,
Japan had a quite unique trend in introduction of robots.
Given that the standard regional shift-share IV (2.9) leverages the trends of similar
comparison countries, how to apply it in our context is not straightforward. To solve
the identification problem, we scrutinize robotics technology. In particular, we study the
robot applications in the next subsection. The application-level variation turns out to be
an additional source of variation that helps the identification in our context and with our
dataset.
2.2.2 Robots and Robot Applications
Given the difficulty of finding countries of comparison, we employ a new identification
strategy that is based on industry-level variation in the intensities of robot applications. To
understand what this entails, we begin with the definition of an industrial robot (ISO 8373):
“an automatically controlled, reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator, programmable
in three or more axes, which can be either fixed in place or mobile for use in industrial
automation applications.” Although well-defined, the definition is fairly broad and thus has
different functionalities depending on the particular applications.
In fact, different robot applications are used in different industries with varying inten-
sities. To understand this point better, consider an example task of spot welding (SW) in a
certain manufacturing production process. SW combines two or more metal sheets together
by applying pressure and heat to the weld area (spot). The task may be conducted in several
ways, including using human labor or robots. Furthermore, different industries input the
SW task differently. For instance, automobile industry intensively conducts SW, because it
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has thousands of metal parts that are combined together to make a car body. In contrast,
in textile industries such tasks are seldom needed. Therefore, if the automation proceeds
in SW task-intensive industries, it is likely that SW-application robots are adopted in such
industries.
Another example of a robot application in our paper is surface mounting (SM). SM
places surface-mount devices (SMDs) onto a printed circuit board (PCB). Since PCBs are
primary inputs to a majority of electric machines, the electric machine industry uses SM
robots intensively. Note that robots deployed for SM are different in the type or structure
from those used for spot welding (SW). SM requires quick and accurate movement along a
horizontal dimension formounting SMDs. For this purpose, a typical structure of SM robots
is called the Selective Compliance Assembly Robot Arm (SCARA), which is well suited
to horizontal movements. In contrast, SW requires intensive movements in any directions
within three-dimensional spaces. This feature helps welding the body sheets to assemble
a complex automobile body shapes without losing an efficiency of production. Therefore,
SW robots are typically structured as articulated robots, which are equipped with multiple
joints (typically six) that enable smooth movements along any direction.
The difference of mechanical structures by robot applications creates price variation by
robot applications. For example, the technological progress of the articulated robot reduced
the price of welding robots (including SW robots) relatively faster than that of Assembly
robots (including SM robots) in recent decades, as we will see in the data section.
Finally, we discuss the reasons behind robot adoption for such applications. Adoption
of robots eventually depends on the productivity of robots relative to human labor, and the
relative prices of robots and wages. For example, one of the first robot brands in Japan, the
Kawasaki-Unimate 2000, was reported to be quite efficient in SW tasks: “The unmanned
production line capable of spot welding 320 points per minute took over the work of 10
experienced welders. Including day and night shifts, it saved the labor of 20 people and as
a result, the use of such highly versatile robots freed workers from welding, one of Japan’s
so-called ‘3K’ (kitsui, or ‘hard’; kitanai, or ‘dirty’; and kiken, or ‘dangerous’) jobs.” [KHI,
2018] The time-saving nature of robots indicates that the hours worked for each worker may
decrease more than the headcount of workers when producers adopt robots. We consider
this point thoroughly in Section 2.5. This enhanced productivity of robots relative to human
labor and the decrease of the relative price of robots to labor explains robot adaptation.
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We combine several data sources; two of the most important ones are the robot variables
from the Japan Robot Association (JARA) and employment variables from the Employment
Status Survey (ESS) from the Japan Statistic Bureau. We also complement these sources
with data by Comtrade from the United Nations (UN), the Census of Manufacture, the
Survey of Overseas Business Activities, and the Commodity Distribution Survey from
Japan’s government surveys. We will detail these below.
2.2.3 JARA Robot Data
Data Source
Our primary data source for robot purchases is the Appendix tables to Survey Report on
CompanyConditions ofManipulators and Robots (survey tables, henceforth), obtained from
the Japan Robot Association (JARA, henceforth). The JARA is a non-profit organization
of robot-producing member companies. As of October 2019, the number of full member
companies is 53, and the associate member companies count 194.3
JARA sends an annual questionnaire to member companies and publicizes the survey
tables to their member companies.4 The survey is available starting from 1974, and we
focus on the years after 1978 in our main analysis, because the shipment disaggregation
by application became available from that year. The long period of coverage enables us
to analyze the long-run and potentially time-varying effects of robots on labor markets.
Furthermore, the sample period contains the year in which Japan introduced the industrial
robots most intensively, as we will see.
The JARA’s questionnaire asks for the unit and value of industrial robots that the
firm ship by each application, type, structure, and destination industry. We focus on
the disaggregation by applications in our main analysis, as we discussed in detail in the
previous section. Robot types refer to a robot categorization based on the mechanical
way in which robots work. Robot structures refer to a categorization based on the more
particular dimensions and directions along which each joint of robots moves. Given the
sophistication of robotic technologies, in 2004, the IFR and robot-producing companies
3See https://www.jara.jp/about/index.html. (In Japanese. Accessed on October 22, 2019)
4In 1996, the questionnaire was sent to 587 establishments and firms. Therefore, one establishment
corresponds to one firm. Among them, 445 answered (for a response rate of 76 percent). Among the
answering establishments, 231 actually produced robots in the year of the survey. Further details regarding
the coverage of data are discussed in Section B.3.1.
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Table 2.1: Classifications of Robots
Classification by Application Classification by Types
Classification
Handling operations/Machine tending (HO/MT) Manual manipulator
Welding and soldering (Welding) Fixed sequence robot
Dispensing Variable sequence robot
Processing Playback robot
Assembling and disassembling (Assembling) Numerical control robot
Others SAL control robot
Available years 1978-2017 1974-2000
Note: Authors’ aggregations based on consistently available classifications in JARA data for different years.
"SAL control robot" stands for Sensory-, Adaptive-, or Learning-control robot.
agreed that the structure categorization should take over the type categorization. The full
lists of the application and type categories are given in Table 2.1.5
Weworkwith 13 industry classifications (12manufacturing and one “others” aggregates)
that are consistent with the other datasets we describe below. The list of industries are:
Steel; Non-ferrous metal; Metal products; General machine (includes robot producers);
Electric machine; Precision machine; Transport machine; Food, beverages, tobacco, feed;
Pulp, paper, printing, publishing; Chemical, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, etc.; Ceramics
and earthwork products; Other manufacturing; and Non-manufacturing.
To do the long-run analysis, we construct a time-consistent aggregation of applications,
types, and structures. Interestingly, there is no clear pattern of robot sophistication between
the different applications while the robot types evolved as the technological frontier of
robot-producing industry expanded, as we will see when we discuss the descriptive statis-
tics. Therefore, the application-based classification is relatively stable for each destination
industry. This feature provides a justification for our focus on applications. In particu-
lar, since we take a weighted average of each category’s cost to construct industry-level
robot cost measures, it is desirable that the weight is invariant and different across indus-
tries. Furthermore, the application-based classification is available for a more extended
period, 1978-2017. For these reasons, our primary analysis hinges on the classification by
applications.
The dimensions of the summary tables differ by years. The application-destination
industry cross tables are available between 1978 and 2017. The details of the availability
5Each application is further discussed in Section B.1. The structure categorization is discussed in Section
B.3.2.
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are discussed in Section B.3.2.
Raw Trends
We overview some raw aggregate trends of the JARA data to highlight three novelties of
our data: the length of the sample period, the availability of the unit value measures, and
the availability of data by applications (and types up to 2000). To smooth the year-level
volatility, we average observations with five-year bins by taking five-year observations prior
to each year (e.g., the observation in 1982 is the simple average of those from 1978 to 1982).
Further discussions and descriptive statistics are in Section B.3.3.
We first describe who buys robots from Japan. Figure 2.2 shows the industry decom-
position of the aggregate sales of robots. The left panel 2.2a shows the decomposition into
export and domestic sales, while the right panel 2.2b shows the disaggregation of domestic
sales into destination industries. From Figure 2.2a, one can see that the growth of robot
adoption within Japan expanded during 1980s, while the trend is stagnant afterward. Then
starting around 1990s, the export trend expanded rapidly. This finding corroborates the
trend from IFR data shown in Figure 2.1. Although the structural break before and after
1990 is an interesting phenomenon per se, our focus is on the domestic adoption trend and
its industrial variation.
Figure 2.2b tells us that, within such domestic sales, electric machine and transportation
machine (including automobiles) industries are significant purchasers of robots. These two
industries represent 68.2 percent of the domestic absorption in 2017. This feature of the
data leads our empirical strategy and indicate cautions in the identifications at the same
time. Namely, our idea of the empirical strategy is driven by the salient differences in
applications between the big buyers. At the same time, since these buyers are large, they
might have market powers that affect observed unit values. We argue the first point in the
next paragraph and address the concern in detail when discussing the empirical results.
At the same time, we also note that robot adoption was widespread in all manufacturing
industries during the 1980s and was not concentrated in particular industries like electric
and transportation machines. We confirm this point in a different slice of raw trends in
Section B.3.3.
Next, Figure 2.3a shows the application-expenditure shares for the large robot purchasers,
electric machines, and transportation machinery (including automobiles). We also show
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Figure 2.2: Industry Decomposition
(a) Export and Domestic Sales (b) Within Domestic Sales
Note: Authors’ calculation based on JARA data. The left panel compares the sales of exports (black) and
aggregated domestic industries (dark gray). The right panel shows the decomposition of aggregated domestic
industries into three categories: electric machine (Elec. mach.), transportation machine (Transp. mach.), and
aggregated other domestic industries (Others).
the share trend for the other aggregated domestic industries. We highlight two empirical
regularities. First, there is significant across-industry variation. The electric machine
industry, for example, intensively purchased robots for assembling and disassembling, while
the transportation machinery industry bought a significant amount of robots for welding
and soldering. In particular, welding robots consisted of 46.3 percent of the total shipments
to the transportation machinery industry in years 1978-82, whereas assembling robots
consisted of 7.1 percent. In contrast, welding robots consisted of 3.0 percent of the total
shipments to the electric machine industry, whereas assembling robots consisted of 76.2
percent during the same period. Second, within-industry patterns of expenditure shares
are fairly stable.6 These points suggest that industries engage in different tasks for which
they demand robots. Therefore, the initial composition of applications and the different
unit-value evolution afterward had differential effects on robot purchases across industries.
We formalize this idea in the following sections.
6The only exception is the decrease in assembling robots and the increase of other robots shipped for
the electric machinery industry. The reason is due to the classification. In the electric machine industry,
the assembling process was integrated with the measuring and testing process and thus these robots became
classified as other robots.
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Figure 2.3: Application Trends
(a) Expenditure Shares by Industries (b) Unit-Value Trends by Applications
Note: Authors’ calculation based on JARA data. The left panel shows the application-expenditure shares for
the three industry aggregates: electric machine (Elec. mach.), transportation machine (Transp. mach.), and
aggregated other domestic industries (Others). The right panel shows the aggregated unit-value trends for
each application. The y-axis is scaled by the natural logarithm. The application list is discussed in the main
text and shown in Table 2.1.
To see how the unit values evolved, Figure 2.3b shows the trends of the unit values for
each application, aggregated across industries. The trends vary across applications. For
example, robots for welding and soldering show the stable decline in the unit value for a
broad set of industries. This suggests that the production technology for welding-soldering
robots grew consistently over the sample period. More importantly, combined with the
fact found in Panel (a), the decrease of the unit value of welding-soldering robots was
differentially enjoyed by the transportation machinery industry, since the industry uses the
welding-soldering robot intensively. These observations suggest that the heterogeneous
reduction of robot-application price generates differential impacts across industries because
of the heterogeneous composition of applications across industries.
The rapid drop of the unit price of welding robot is the key for identification and it is
worth while to document the potential reasons why the welding robots became cheaper.
The majority of welding robots is classified as the playback robot, a robot that repeats the
same sequence of motions in all its operations, as a robot type. Figure 2.4a tabulates the
relationships between the robot type and the robot application between 1982-1991 and the
table shows that almost all of the welding robot consists of the playback robot.7 Figure
7The type-application cross-tabulation tables are only available between 1982 and 1991. Further details
of the JARA dataset is discussed in Appendix B.3.
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Figure 2.4: Robot Type Trends, 1982-1991
(a) Expenditure Shares by Robot Type (b) Unit-Value Trends by Robot Type
Note: Authors’ calculation based on JARA data. The left panel shows the type-expenditure shares for the
five robot type aggregates: fixed sequence robot, variable sequence robot, playback robot, numerical control
robot, intelligent robot. The right panel shows the aggregated unit-value trends for each robot type.
2.4b shows evolution of the unit price by robot types and we see that the unit price of the
playback robot monotonically decreased. This monotonic price decline of the playback
robot makes sharp contrast to the price trends of other robot types and reduced the price of
welding robots. As a caveat we note that the price trends presented here do not adjust for
the quality of robot and the price increase of intelligence robot may well reflect the quality
improvement. We will discuss the issues related to quality adjustment in Section 2.5.
There are technological reasons behind the robot price decline concentrated in the
welding robot or the playback robot. We reviewed the articles of Nekkei Telecom data
base, a portal website collecting articles whose sources include domestic and international
newspapers and magazines, between 1975 and 1985 and found two important technological
developments during the period: the adoption of numerical control technology and the
substitution of hydraulic actuator by electronic motor actuator [Nikkei, 1982, 1984]. These
two developments presumably made the welding robot (or the playback robot) cheaper and
gave Japanese manufacturers cost advantage.
In Section B.3.3, we examine the unit-value trends for each industry to find a relatively
small variation across destination industries within an application. This suggests that the
robot prices are not solely driven by demand shocks of particular industries, but by the
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technology for producing robots. Section B.3.3 further shows detailed descriptive statistics
of JARA data and discuss the pre-trend before 1978, the distribution by robot types instead
of applications, and some raw correlation between prices and quantities for each application.
In this section, we discuss the efficiency adjustment. This is motivated to address
another interpretation of our primary findings in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. Note that our sample
covers a very long period, 1978-2017. Therefore, it is likely that the unit efficiency of robots
grew over that period, as we discussed in Section ??. This may cause time series-variation
based bias, as follows. Suppose the unit efficiency in later robots is higher than in earlier
ones. This may have further set of tasks displaced by robots from labor due to relative cost
efficiency [Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018c]. In the later years, observed robot adoption
units are smaller (even when efficiency-unit robot units grew), while at the same time, labor
is displaced and employed less. This generates a spurious positive correlation between
robots and employment that is not caused by gross complements, but by (gross) substitution
and unit-efficiency growth.
To alleviate this concern, we estimate robot unit efficiency. Following and extending










where '08C is the robot stock of application 0 in industry 8 in year C, ]̃08 is the expenditure share
parameter reflecting the applicability of application a in each industry i, _08C is unobserved
quality, and f>0 is the elasticity of demand substitution. The cost-minimizing demand for
robot application a is then solved as
'08C = ( ]̃08)f _f−108C A−f0C Af−18C '8C ,
where A0C is the robot price of application 0 in year C, and A8C =
∏
0 (A0C) ]̃08 . Taking logs, we
obtain
ln '08C = −f ln A0C + U08 + U8C + [08C ,






and [08C = (f − 1) ln (_08C). Regressing ln '08C
on ln A0C and fixed effects U08 and U8C gives f̂ and the residual [̂08C . Thus, we obtain the
efficiency estimate _̂08C = exp ([̂08C/(f̂ − 1)).
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Several discussions follow in terms of our model choice. First, we model quality as the
application-augmenting shocks. We view this is as a natural interpretation in the case of
robotics, because robot quality may be conceptualized by the speed of task performance
relative to that of old types of robots or human hands. Second, our extended specification
(2.2.3) nests the Cobb-Douglas case. Namely, with f → 1 and _08C = 1, we revert to





, with ]̃08 = ]08. Third, relative to Khandelwal et al.
[2013], we have an additional expenditure share term ]08, because we have a clear pattern
of applicability for each industry. Finally, compared to the IFR’s quality adjustment, our
treatment of the efficiency estimation is more systematic and based on a standard demand
theory. Recall that Graetz and Michaels [2018] also reports quality-adjusted prices. In
their data source, quality adjustment is not backed up based on a demand function. Instead,
the method is called a “production-cost mark-up” method, which is “subjective but with a
certain amount of knowledge through experience” [IFR, 2006].
With the unit efficiency estimate, we augment the application-level robot quantity mea-
surement from '08C to _̂0C'08C and construct the industrial robot stocks. Using such ameasure
of efficiency-augmented robot stocks, we rerun the industry-level regression (2.2). Table
2.2 reports the 2SLS result. The column structures remain the same as in Table 2.5. The
first-stage IV -statistic is somewhat weaker, especially in the specification without control
variables.8 The estimated coefficients are similar with and without quality adjustments of
robots after conditioning on the control variables. In our preferred specification of column
4, we still find a significant positive effect of robot adoption on employment. Therefore, we
conclude that our results are robust to the efficiency adjustment.
2.2.4 Other Data
For the employment-side variables, we take the Employment Status Survey (ESS) ad-
ministered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC). The ESS has
8The first-stage regression results are reported in Section B.8.2. The reason for the weaker first stage
in column 1 of Table 2.2 than column 1 of Table 2.5 is mechanical. The quality adjustment factor _08C
is estimated by the residual of the regression of ;='08C on ln A0C and fixed effects, U08 and U8C . By this
construction, the adjustment factor ln_08C is orthogonal to the application price ln A0C . The price aggregate,
which is the weighted average of ln A0C , is thus orthogonal to the quality adjustment factor. Therefore, using
the log of the quality-adjusted robot as the dependent variable in the first stage is adding a factor orthogonal
to the instrument variable to the dependent variable and reduces the first-stage -Statistics. Conditioning on
the control variables mitigates this mechanical relationship.
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Table 2.2: Industry-level, 2SLS, Efficiency-adjusted Quantity
Dependent variable:
ln(!8C)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln('̃8C) 2.587 0.297∗∗∗ 0.219∗ 0.378∗∗
(2.739) (0.099) (0.121) (0.183)
Industry FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Globalization Controls X X
Technology Controls X
IV F-stasitic 0.855 14.131 8.195 5.860
Observations 104 104 104 104
R2 −0.440 0.981 0.986 0.980
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between log efficiency-adjusted robot stock measure and log employment across industries and
years, with the instrument of log efficiency-adjusted robot cost measure. The employment measure includes
the employment of robot-producing plants. Efficiency adjustment is performed by the method described in
the main text. All columns control the industry and year fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by
purchase values of robots in each year. The standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. Columns 1 shows
the result without other control variables. Column 2 includes the demography controls. Demography
controls include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates, share of female
workers, share of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. Column 3
includes the logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA.
Column 4 includes logarithm stock value measures for ICT capital, innovation capital, competition capital
from the JIP database. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
conducted the survey as of October 1979 and in every five years that end with digit 2 or
7 since 1982. It samples roughly one million persons who live in Japan and are age 15 or
above, which is roughly one percent of this population in Japan.
We obtain the regional and industrial employment and population variables for each
demographic group. In particular, the ESS asks for basic demographic information, such as
physical address, age, gender, education attainment, and employment status. For workers,
we also obtain the industry classification of the workplace, hours worked, and income. For
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details of these variables, see Section B.6.
Our main datasets are made from the JARA and the ESS.We relate robot adoption taken
from the JARA to employment and other labor-market variables from the ESS. In addition
to these, we supplement the main dataset with the Census of Manufacture (CoM), the Basic
Survey on Overseas Business Activities (BSOBA), and the Japan Industrial Database (JIP).
These are used mainly to construct control variables. The details are provided in Section
2.3.3.
The CoM, which is conducted by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
(METI), is an annual survey of manufacturing establishments in Japan. Depending on the
year, it takes the universe of establishments. The strength of the dataset is the fine industry
coding employed. The ESS surveys the 4-digit Japan Standard Industry Classification
(JSIC) for each establishment. Furthermore, the survey asks each respondent for their
major products and product codes. Thus, for each establishment, we can observe the
intensity of production for each product. This allows us to obtain a fairly accurate measure
of employment in robot production. We report some of the results with the employment
variable net of such robot-producing workers, as it helps clarify the mechanism. We will
come back to this issue whenwe discuss the regression results. See Section B.7.1 for details.
TheBSOBA,which is also administered by theMETI, is an annual survey of the universe
of Japanesemultinational enterprises (MNEs). For allMNEs, all children and grandchildren
subsidiaries must be reported. For each of these headquarters and subsidiaries, information
on basic variables, including financial variables from balance sheets, are recorded. This
dataset enables us to measure the offshore sales variables for each industry and headquarters
location. Since offshoring was a concurrent phenomenon that changed the labor demand
in Japan (see, for example, Hummels et al., 2014), we control it with variables constructed
from the BSOBA. Section B.7.2 provides the details.
The JIP, which is administered by Japan’s Research Institute of Economy, Trade and
Industry (RIETI), releases long-run industrial data for the Japanese economy starting from
1970, assembled from several sources of administrative data [Fukao et al., 2008]. The
industrial data contain KLEMS variables and variables regarding trade. We use the gross
export and import variables to further control the labor-market impacts of offshoring, trade,
and technological changes. Detailed discussions about constructing the variables based on
the JIP are relegated to Section B.7.3.
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2.3 Industry-level Analysis
We first analyze the robot impacts at the industry level. By so doing, we discuss the effect
with minimal data transformation and explore a proper empirical specification. We then
move on to a region-level analysis in the next section, which aims to identify regional
implications and provide better comparison to the literature. We find qualitatively similar
results between these two approaches.
The similar findings are appealing, given the recent development of econometric theo-
ries. For instance, Borusyak et al. [2018] discuss the identification assumptions behind the
shift-share instrumental variables (SSIVs) based on exogeneity of the "shift" component
and show that the identification variation is at industry level (and time level). Adao et al.
[2019b] shows that in the presence of cross-regional correlations, the standard SSIV esti-
mators over-reject the null of no effects. Our industrial results indicate that our findings are
robust to these concerns, because our findings are robust to the use of industrial variations.
2.3.1 Robot Aggregation
In this section, we describe the method for constructing the cost indicators for each industry.
We will employ the cost indicator as an exogenous shifter of the robot introduction to each
industry.
We begin by constructing stock measures of robots. Recall that the JARA data have
only the flow shipment variable, whereas we are concerned about the stock of robots and the
impact on employment. To construct the robot stock, we follow the immediate withdrawal
method, which is also applied by the IFR [IFR, 2018]. In particular, we aggregate the
robot of a particular application for 12 years to obtain the robotś capital stock of the robot.
The assumption is that the robot begins to perform the capital service immediately upon
purchase and depreciates completely in 12 years. The choice of 12 years is within the range
of conventions. We discuss the robustness to other choices of stock measure construction
in the robustness section below.
Suppose each industry 8 produces with labor and robots as primary factors. We assume
that the robots are aggregated across applications 0 and perform service for production in
each industry. We then consider the substitutability between labor and robots. Motivated
by the observation that the expenditure shares are roughly constant across applications for
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major industries, such as the electric machine and transportation machine industries (Figure





where ' denotes the quantity of the robots, 8 indicates industry, C indicates the year, and
0 indicates the robot application. The aggregation weight ]08 is assumed to be constant
over time. Furthermore, given that the variation of trends of unit values are similar across
industries within applications (Figure B.4), we assume that the robot market for each
application is competitive and sets the same price A0C for all buyer industries 8. Section
B.8.1 discusses the case without this assumption. Then the price indicator for robots in





To measure A0C in the data, we simply sum the values and quantities across all industries










is the sales value of application 0 to industry 8 in year C. Furthermore, given the
idea that the initial expenditure share is the exogenous source of variation of price changes,
we obtain ]08 by the expenditure share on application 0 for each industry 8 in year 1982, our





2.3.2 Effect of Robot Adoption on Employment
We consider the following regression specification:
ln (!8C) = U8 + UC + V ln ('8C) + -′8CW + Y8C , (2.2)
where !8C is employment of industry 8 in year C, '8C is the stock of robots in industry 8 in year
C and -8C is the vector of control variables explained in Subsection 2.3.3. Our coefficient
of interest is V, the gross elasticity of robot adoption on the employment at industry level.
To capture the robot production shock that is not correlated to error term Y8C , we instrument
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ln ('8C) with ln (A8C), a measure of exogenous change in robot price for each industry in each
year. The coefficient of interest does not have a direct structural interpretation, but it makes
possible a high-level interpretation of the employment impacts of robots.
The first-stage and reduced-form equations of the two-stage least square (2SLS) estima-
tion of the model (2.2) are:
ln ('8C) = U(8 + U(C + V( ln (A8C) + -8CW( + Y(8C , (2.3)
ln (!8C) = U'8 + U'C + V' ln (A8C) + -8CW' + Y'8C , (2.4)
respectively, where -8C’s are control variables described in Subsection 2.3.3. If the
robot producers’ technological innovation drove the cost reduction, then our cost measures
and robot purchase in quantity would be correlated negatively; thus V( is expected to be
negative in (2.3). The reduced form (2.4), in contrast, expresses the relationship between
the robot price and employment, conditional on fixed effects and control variables.
We assume that the variation in A8C is exogenous to demand industries. Note that the
8-level variation comes from the initial share ]08 = B08C0 across industries. Our identification
assumption is thus that the initial applications shares are uncorrelated with unobserved
labor-market factors after conditioning on fixed effects and control variables. In other
words, the endogeneity of A0C does not give industry 8-level variation [Goldsmith-Pinkham
et al., 2018], which alleviates the concern about using application prices as shifters of the
instrument. We also conduct a robustness check using several price measures that are less
endogenous to robot adopters, such as leave-one-out robot prices and export robot prices in
the following section.
Interpreting A8C as an exogenous price indicator of robots, the first-stage and reduced-
form regressions also have an interpretation relevant to the conditional gross own-price
elasticity and the conditional gross cross-price elasticity. In this sense, one may view the
first-stage (FS) and reduced-form (RF) regressions as giving “low-level” interpretations.
Note that standard factor demand theory does not make a particular restriction on these
elasticities, because they are a mix of the substitution effect and scale effect [Cahuc et al.,
2014].
Note that all the elasticity estimates in equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) are gross concepts.
Namely, they contain both the displacement effect, keeping the scale of output constant, and
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the scale effect, due to the productivity gain made possible by robot adoption. As we show
in Section B.2, the displacement effect is mechanically negative, while the productivity
effect is positive if robot adoption improves the overall productivity and the output demand
is not perfectly inelastic. Although it would be informative if one could separate the gross
estimates into each mechanism, there are few methods for such a purpose to date.9 For
this purpose, we would need to have an exogenous determinant of production scale apart
from the exogenous source of robot price variation. For instance, a standard SSIV method
by Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020] also estimates the gross effect of robots. The gross
effect, however, is still informative for policy makers that are concerned about the total
labor market effects of robot adoption. Therefore, we stick to our estimation method and
leave addressing this problem as a future work.
2.3.3 Control Variables
We discuss potential confounders and how we deal with them. First and most importantly,
recall that we control for industry-specific time-fixed characteristics and aggregate shocks
common across industries. As further possible industry- and time-varying explanations for
industrial employment changes, we consider demographics, globalization, and technology,
as follows.
First, demographic dynamics change the labor-supply conditions that may correlate with
robot adoption incentives for producers and employment at the same time. In particular,
in Japan, labor shortages due to aging and low population growth rates have been an acute
problem that partly pushes firms to adopt robots [Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018b]. This may
bias the 2SLS estimates downward. To alleviate this concern, we control for detailed de-
mographic variables, including education (high-school/4-year university graduate shares),
sex ratio (female share), and the age distribution (age under 35/over 50 shares). All of these
variables are taken from the ESS.
Second, concurrent globalization alters both the labor demand and robot adoptions.
Given the complexity of modern manufacturing production, it is likely that easier access to
foreign markets of both outputs and inputs may alter the incentive to adopt new technology
and workers (see, for instance, Fort et al., 2018). Depending on the substitutability (e.g.,
9Dekle [2020] sets up a general equilibrium model and suggests the decomposition of the total effect into
the displacement effect, the scale effect, and the general equilibrium income effect.
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foreign cheap workers replaces the necessity of adopting robots and labor domestically) or
complementarity (e.g., high availability of foreign cheap energies enhance the efficiency of
robots), the bias may go upward or downward. To alleviate this concern, we control for
offshoring, import competitions, and outsourcing. In particular, we take the total import
values of each sector from the JIP database. This variable controls for the role of import
competition (e.g., Autor et al., 2013) and outsourcing (e.g., Hummels et al., 2014). From
the BSOBA data, we take the total gross sales value for each industry. This variable controls
the changes in labor demand due to global sourcing (e.g., Antras et al., 2017) or export
platforms (e.g., Arkolakis et al., 2018).
Third and finally, technological changes other than robots, such as increases in ICT
adoptions [Autor et al., 2003], may also alter the labor demand and robot adoptions simulta-
neously. In fact, robots need to be programmed rather than human-operated; as such, robots
and ICT adoptions are complementary. Since our interest is the direct impact of robot-based
automation on employment, we control for other technological progress. We do so by using
intangible capital stock values from the JIP database. In fact, all explanatory variables
(i.e., robot, globalization, and technology) are positively correlated. These variables are
explained in detail in Section B.7.3.
2.3.4 Main Results
With the industry-level aggregate robot service measure and cost indicators, we proceed to
the analysis of the effect of robots on employment at the industry level. Several past studies
focus on region-level analysis. We conduct a industry-level analysis for two reasons. First,
our result is not driven solely by the increased observations by constructing the local-level
outcomes by allocating the industry-level variables with fewer observations [Adao et al.,
2019b, Borusyak et al., 2018]. Second, we devote the section to discuss the preferred
specifications in several dimensions. We then stick to the preferred specification in the
CZ-level analysis. Other specification results can be found in the Appendix.
Table 2.3 shows the first-stage result of regression (2.3). Four columns show results with
alternative sets of control variables. Column 1 controls only industry and year fixed effects,
column 2 adds demographic controls, column 3 globalization, and column 4 technology.
The sample size is 104, interacting 13 industries and eight 5-year periods (quinquennially
from 1982 to 2017). We report the first-stage IV F-statistics, indicating that those in the
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Table 2.3: Industry-level, First Stage
Dependent variable:
ln('8C)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(A/
8C
) −1.413∗∗∗ −1.852∗∗∗ −1.322∗∗∗ −1.542∗∗∗
(0.469) (0.557) (0.400) (0.377)
Industry FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Globalization Controls X X
Technology Controls X
IV F-stasitic 9.1 11.047 10.912 16.703
Observations 104 104 104 104
R2 0.971 0.979 0.984 0.986
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between log robot cost measure and log robot stock measure across industries and years. All
columns control the industry and year fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by purchase values of
robots in each year. The standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. Columns 1 shows the result without
other control variables. Column 2 includes the demography controls. Demography controls include share of
high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates, share of female workers, share of workers under
age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. Column 3 includes the logarithm import values
from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA. Column 4 includes logarithm stock
value measures for ICT capital, innovation capital, competition capital from the JIP database. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
specifications from columns 2 to 4 exceed 10, a conventional value for checking weak
instruments. In all specifications, we find consistently negative and significant estimates.
This result is not surprising, given that the price reductions made by different application
compositions drive increases in demand. Our preferred specification is column 4, because
it includes all potential confounders discussed in Section 2.3.3 and has the highest first stage
F-statistics among the four specifications. According to column 4, controlling for fixed
effects and other factors, a one-percent decline in robot prices drive a 1.54 percent increase
in robot adoption.
Table 2.4 shows the reduced-form result of regression (2.4). Each of the four columns
controls fora different set of control variables, as in Table 2.3. Again, in all specifications,
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Table 2.4: Industry-level, Reduced Form
Dependent variable:
ln(!8C)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(A/
8C
) −0.853∗∗∗ −0.465∗∗∗ −0.272∗ −0.437∗∗
(0.130) (0.144) (0.151) (0.171)
Industry FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Globalization Controls X X
Technology Controls X
IV F-stasitic 9.1 11.047 10.912 16.703
Observations 104 104 104 104
R2 0.975 0.984 0.985 0.987
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between log robot cost measure and log employment measure across industries and years. The
employment measure includes the employment of robot-producing plants. All columns control the industry
and year fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by purchase values of robots in each year. The standard
errors are shown in the parenthesis. Columns 1 shows the result without other control variables. Column 2
includes the demography controls. Demography controls include share of high school graduates, share of
4-year university graduates, share of female workers, share of workers under age of 35, and share of workers
above age of 50 from ESS. Column 3 includes the logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm
offshoring value added from SOBA. Column 4 includes logarithm stock value measures for ICT capital,
innovation capital, competition capital from the JIP database. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
we find consistently negative and significant estimates, though specification in column 3
shows statistical significance at only the 10 percent level. To clarify, the negative coefficient
implies that the fall of the effective robot price induced employment growth, implying that
robots and employment are gross complements. Our preferred estimate from column 4
indicates that a one percent decrease in robot price increases employment by 0.44 percent.
Table 2.5 shows the 2SLS result of regression (2.2). Four columns control different sets
of control variables. Given the results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, it is not surprising that we find
positive and significant point estimates in the four specifications. This confirms that robots
and employment are gross complementary. Again, our preferred specification (column 4)
indicates that a one-percent increase in robot adoption, caused by a drop in the robot prices,
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Table 2.5: Industry-level, 2SLS
Dependent variable:
ln(!8C)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln('8C) 0.716∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.206∗ 0.283∗∗
(0.154) (0.071) (0.105) (0.108)
Industry FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Globalization Controls X X
Technology Controls X
IV F-stasitic 9.1 11.047 10.912 16.703
Observations 104 104 104 104
R2 0.941 0.986 0.988 0.988
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between log robot stock measure and log employment across industries and years, with the
instrument of log robot cost measure. The employment measure includes the employment of
robot-producing plants. All columns control the industry and year fixed effects. All regressions are weighted
by purchase values of robots in each year. The standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. Columns 1
shows the result without other control variables. Column 2 includes the demography controls. Demography
controls include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates, share of female
workers, share of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. Column 3
includes the logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA.
Column 4 includes logarithm stock value measures for ICT capital, innovation capital, competition capital
from the JIP database. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
increases employment by 0.28 percent.
Validating Identification Since the novelty of this paper is the new identification method
based on robot prices, we argue that our choice of robot price IV is appropriate. In this
section, we discuss two robustness exercises: other price measures and dropping big robot
buyers. The first robustness check partly addresses the concern about the endogenous initial
industry share of robot applications, as we will discuss.
First, we consider other price measures that do not depend on the own industries’ robot
prices. Although in the previous section we explained that the source of identification
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comes from initial application share variations for each industry, our IV does depend on the
actual aggregate trends of prices of robots. If the initial application share is endogenous,
however, the endogeneity of actual price trends may add bias to our estimates [Goldsmith-
Pinkham et al., 2018]. To alleviate this concern, we consider the following two alternative
price measures. The first measure leaves out the own industry from the calculation of robot








Then we construct the industrial price index based on equation (2.3.1). This measure is
supposed to take the variation that is external to each industry.
Since we have 12 manufacturing industries, however, the leave-one-out price measure
may contain feedback bias (dropping one industry in turn affects the price of own industry).






Then we aggregate to the industrial price index by equation (2.3.1). This measure is
supposed to take the variation that is further external to each domestic industry, while the
concern is that the relevance of IV may be attenuated, because it takes different prices
than the actual price each domestic industry faces. We report the results based on these
prices in Table 2.6. Column 1 shows the baseline estimates (thus the same as Table 2.5,
column 4). Columns 2 and 3 are based on leave-one-out prices (2.5) and export prices (2.6),
respectively. We find that the estimates are robust to these price measures. Therefore, the
endogeneity of the actual price measure poses minimal threat to our identification strategy.
Furthermore, the robust findings also support our identification idea, the exogenous initial
application shares. This is because of the discussion in Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. [2018]–if
initial application shares are exogenous, the choice of price measures merely changes the
weighting of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), affecting the precision of the
estimates but not the consistency. This prediction is consistent with our robust findings in
Table 2.6.
Second, we drop large robot buyer industries. The endogeneity of robot prices may be
most severe to big robot buyers, such as the transportation industry and electrics, because
63




ln('8C) 0.283∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗
(0.108) (0.101) (0.139)
Industry FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Globalization Controls X X X
Technology Controls X X X
Price Measurement Industry Aggregate Leave-one-out Export
Observations 104 104 104
R2 0.988 0.987 0.987
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between log robot stock measure and log employment across industries and years, with the
instrument of log robot cost measure. The employment measure includes the employment of robot-producing
plants. All columns control the industry and year fixed effects, demography controls, the logarithm import
values from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA, logarithm stock value measures
for ICT capital, innovation capital, and competition capital from the JIP database. Demography controls
include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates, share of female workers, share
of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. All regressions are weighted by
purchase values of robots in each year. The standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. Column 1 shows
the result with the instrumenal variable of industry-aggregate robot prices (benchmark). Column 2 shows the
result with the instrumenal variable of leave-one-out robot prices. Column 3 shows the result with both the
instrumenal variable of export robot prices. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
they may have market power and affect robot prices (recall Figure B.3). If their output
demand surges, it may enhance both robot and labor demands. The increase in robot
demand decreases prices due to market power. In this case, there is a spurious negative
correlation between robot price and labor. While this concern is already addressed by using
an arguably exogenous price series in the above analysis, to address this concern in a more
direct way, we drop the two large industries, transportation and electrics. The resulting
sample is made from smaller industries, whose robot prices are thus less endogenous to
robot demand-side shocks. Table 2.7 shows the 2SLS estimates of these regressions. In
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Table 2.7: Industry-level, 2SLS, Dropping Major Industries
Dependent variable:
ln(!8C)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln('8C) 0.283∗∗ 0.283∗∗ 0.579∗∗ 0.351∗∗
(0.108) (0.118) (0.270) (0.146)
Industry FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X
Globalization Controls X X X X
Technology Controls X X X X
Industries All Net Elec. Net Transp. Net E&T
Observations 104 96 96 88
R2 0.988 0.989 0.979 0.988
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between log robot stock measure and log employment across industries and years, with the
instrument of log robot cost measure. The employment measure includes the employment of robot-producing
plants. All columns control the industry and year fixed effects, demography controls, the logarithm import
values from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA, logarithm stock value measures
for ICT capital, innovation capital, and competition capital from the JIP database. Demography controls
include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates, share of female workers, share
of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. All regressions are weighted by
purchase values of robots in each year. The standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. Column 1 shows
the result with the full sample (benchmark). Column 2 and 3 show the results with the electronic machine
industry and transportation machine industry dropped, respectively. Column 4 shows the result with both the
electronic and transporation machine inustry dropped together. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
column 1, we show the baseline estimate. Columns 2-4 show the dropping of each of the
large buyers: Column 2 drops electrics, column 3 drops transportation, and column 4 drops
both. We find that the positive results are consistent across columns. The finding suggests
that the concern about endogeneity due to market powers of demand industries is minimal.
2.3.5 Heterogeneity
Howdoes our aggregate findingmask heterogeneous impacts to different groups of workers?
To see this, we consider our main empirical specification (2.2) with several subgroups of
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workers as outcome variables. Table 2.8 shows the results. In column 1, we show our
baseline estimate (the same as Table 2.5, column 4). We then consider the impacts of robots
on the employment of high-school graduates (column 2), four-year university graduates
(column 3), female workers (column 4), young workers (less than or equal to 35 years
old, column 5), and elder workers (more than or equal to 50 years old, column 6). Perhaps
surprisingly, our finding of the positive labor-market implications of robots is robust to all of
these subgroups. Moreover, the sizes of the estimated coefficients do not differ substantially
across demographic groups.
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Table 2.8: Industry-level, 2SLS, Effects on Subgroups
Dependent variable:
ln(!8C) ln(!(8C ) ln(!8C ) ln(!4<8C ) ln(!*358C ) ln(!$508C )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln('8C) 0.283∗∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.303∗∗ 0.278∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.107) (0.117) (0.115) (0.114) (0.125)
Industry FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X X
Globalization Controls X X X X X X
Technology Controls X X X X X X
Group of Worker All High School 4-year Univ. Female Age ≤ 35 Age ≥ 50
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104
R2 0.988 0.987 0.989 0.994 0.988 0.986
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, CoM, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the relationship between log robot stock
measure and log employment across industries and years, with the instrument of log robot cost measure. The employment measure includes the
employment of robot-producing plants. All columns control the industry and year fixed effects, demography controls, the logarithm import values from
JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA, logarithm stock value measures for ICT capital, innovation capital, and competition
capital from the JIP database. Demography controls include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates, share of female workers,
share of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. All regressions are weighted by purchase values of robots in each year.
The standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. Column 1 shows the result with the outcome variable of all workers (benchmark). Column 2 and 3 show
the results with the outcome variables of high-school graduates and 4-year university graduates (and more), respectively. Column 4 shows the result with
the outcome variable of female workers. Columns 5 and 6 show the results with the outcome variable of workers with age equal or lower than 35, and with
age higher than 50, respectively. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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2.3.6 Further Robustness Checks
We briefly discuss additional robustness checks. In particular, we consider (i) netting out
of robot-producing workers, (ii) industry-specific robot prices, and (iii) alternative stock
measures. All of these results suggest the validity of our main definitions above.
First, we net out robot-producing workers from employment. Although our primary
interest is the robots’ gross impact on employment, it may mask a heterogeneity of impacts.
As Acemoglu and Restrepo [2018c] clarifies, robot innovation is likely to increase the set
of tasks that are input in production. One such example is clearly the robot-producing
workers themselves. By measuring the number of such workers, we may gain more insights
from our positive estimates found in Section 2.3.4. Section B.7.1 discusses in detail how to
generate robot-producing worker employment and regression results when robot producers
are netted out of the outcome variable.
Second, we consider industry-specific robot prices A08C ; in the main specification (2.1),
the robot prices are aggregated and not industry-specific. We also consider industry-specific
A08C , calculated by E08C/'08C . The use of this variable can be viewed as a robustness check
that complements the main specification; the industry-specific prices are likely to reflect
the actual prices to each industry. We do not, however, consider it as a main specification.
Recall the above discussion regarding the endogeneity concern. The industry-specific-price
specification is more vulnerable to this concern, because it varies across industries by
definition. In fact, as shown in Section B.8.1, it is less robust to the inclusion of control
variables, suggesting a negative bias due to negative correlations between industry-specific
prices and the unobserved component of employment.
Third and finally, we check several measures of robot stocks. Recall that our data come
with purchase of robots, which is a flow quantity and monetary values. Robots are durable
investment goods, however, and thus the flow values may understate the actual robot stock
active in production. To construct the stock variable, our main specifications follow the
literature and IFR suggestion and aggregate the 12-year flows of robots, which we call the
immediate withdrawal method (IWM). As several authors argue, it is also natural to follow
the standard perpetual inventory method (PIM) that is also used in capital formation in
National Accounts [Artuc et al., 2020, Graetz and Michaels, 2018]. We thus create the
robot stock variables based on different-year IWM and PIM with some depreciation rates.
When we use alternative measures, we find that the variation in the definition of stock
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variables has minimal impacts on the regression results. We discuss further details and
empirical results in Section B.5.
Note that the invariance of results with respect to alternative stock measures provides
further support for our empirical strategy. The invariance suggests that industry-level robot
adoption variation ismore significant than time-level variations. Recall that, in our empirical
specification, the main identifying variation does not come from the one in application-year
prices A0C , but instead from that of the initial application shares ]08C0 . Since we take a stand
that the latter variable is more exogenous than the former, the invariance to stock measures
indicates our method has a minimal concern regarding endogeneity. Section B.5 discusses
the detailed construction of variables and regression results.
2.4 Region-level Analysis
Our industry-level analysis reveals that at the national level, robots and employment are gross
complements in our context. In this section, we consider converting the data and regression
analysis to the region level. We do so for three purposes: (i) to discuss robots’ impacts on
subnational and local economies, (ii) to make better comparisons to the literature, and (iii)
to delve into spillover effects.
In particular, as the definition of local labormarkets, we employCommutingZones (CZs)
developed by Adachi et al. [2020], who defined CZs following the method employed in,
among others, Tolbert and Sizer [1996].10 CZs made via this method have several strengths.
First, they represent the local labor-market delineation better and contain more observations
than administrative divisions, such as prefectures. Second and more importantly, they
partition the overall national area in a mutually exclusive and exhaustive manner. This point
is in contrast to city-level delineations, such as MSAs.11 This point is especially relevant
in our study, because the impacts of robots may not be constrained in urban areas, but
also penetrate into rural ones. Rural areas may by overlooked by non-exhaustive regional
delineations, such as MSAs.
Based on the industrial robot adoption and price measures and region definitions, we
10In particular, the hierarchical agglomerative clustering method with average linkages and dissimilarity
measures based on bilateral flows of commuters and populations.
11A famous regional classification based on city-level density inhabited districts (DIDs) in Japan is
proposed and popularized by Kanemoto and Tokuoka [2002].
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where 2 is commuting zones. Following Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020], we call this
variable robot exposures. To construct CZ-level IVs, we use C0 ≡ 1979 as the base year and
similarly generate the shift-share measures but based on price changes:
Δ ln (A2C) =
∑
8
;28C0Δ ln (A8C) .
With these region-level variables, we then study the following specification:
Δ.2C = U
/
2 + U/C + V/Δ'2C + -2CW/ + Y/2C , (2.7)
where Δ'2C is instrumented by Δ ln (A2C). Note that in the region-level specification, we
measure changes in robot adoption and prices. We do so for the following two purposes.
First, the fixed effect in specification (2.7) controls the differential growths trends in each
location. This is more flexible than just controlling for level differences, and it is preferable
when studying regional differences, given that the various regions experience different trends
in labor-market characteristics (e.g., Diamond, 2016). Second, it makes the specification
more comparable to the ones in the literature, such as Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020]. Note
that our specification also allows differential trends across CZs, because we access many
(in particular, seven time-first differences) time periods.
Table 2.9 shows the first-stage results. Each column shows the results with a different
set of control variables: Column 1 controls only fixed effects, column 2 adds demographic
controls, column 3 adds globalization, and column 4 adds technology. The results show
a statistically significant and negative correlation between robot price changes and robot
exposures, both with and without the covariates. The F test indicates that the use of our
price measure passes the test of weak instruments. From now on, we focus on our preferred
specification with full controls, the one in column 4.
Table 2.10 shows the 2SLS results of specification (2.7).12 All columns report the
preferred specification with the full set of our control variables. The standard deviation
12Since the reduced-form results are redundant, they are not reported but are available upon request.
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Table 2.9: CZ-level, First Stage
Dependent variable:
Δ'2C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ΔA/2C −30.074∗∗∗ −30.928∗∗∗ −27.330∗∗∗ −21.179∗∗∗
(1.864) (1.846) (1.763) (1.424)
CZ FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Globalization Controls X X
Technology Controls X
IV F-statistics 260.305 280.586 240.268 221.249
Observations 1,466 1,466 1,466 1,466
R2 0.938 0.941 0.949 0.971
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between shift-share logarithm robot prices and shift-share measures of changes in robot stock
per thousand workers. All regressions are weighted by initial-year population. The standard errors are
shown in the parenthesis. Column 1 controls the industry and year fixed effects. Column 2 controls the
demographic variables: share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates, share of female
workers, share of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. Column 3
controls the logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA as
well as control variables in Column 2. Column 4 (baseline specification) controls logarithm stock value
measures for ICT capital, innovation capital, and competition capital from the JIP database in addition to the
controls in column 3. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
of robot exposure measures is 5.25 at the raw level and 2.17 when residualized. For
columns 1-6, the outcome variables are log manufacturing employment (column 1), log
total employment (column 2, baseline estimate), log total population (column 3), (non-log)
employment-to-population ratio (column 4, the main outcome variable of Acemoglu and
Restrepo, 2020), log non-manufacturing employment (column 5), and log non-working
population (column 6), respectively. First, as our primary interest, column 2 tells us that
overall employment increased in CZs that were exposed to robots, confirming the findings in
Section 2.3, even in the first difference-based specification (2.7) with two-way fixed effects.
Perhaps surprisingly, column 1 shows that the impacts to manufacturing employment are
even stronger and positive. This may suggest that the scale effects of robot adoption rather
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than the substitution effects that drive the labor-market impacts.
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Table 2.10: CZ-level, 2SLS
Dependent variable:
Δ ln(!"#.2C ) Δ ln(!2C) Δ ln(%2C) Δ
!2C
%2C
Δ ln(!('.2C ) Δ ln(%%2C )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ'2C 4.658∗∗ 2.203∗∗ 2.003∗∗ 0.133 1.101 1.617
(2.062) (1.017) (0.929) (0.230) (1.036) (1.103)
CZ FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X X
Globalization Controls X X X X X X
Technology Controls X X X X X X
Observations 1,413 1,466 1,466 1,466 1,466 1,466
R2 0.619 0.817 0.811 0.732 0.831 0.768
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the relationship between shift-share measures of
changes in robot stock per thousand workers and log difference of outcome variables multiplied by 100. All regressions control demographic variables,
globalization controls, and technology controls as well as the industry and year fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by initial-year population. The
standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. The demographic variables include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates,
share of female workers, share of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. The globalization controls contain the
logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA. The technology controls include logarithm stock value
measures for ICT capital, innovation capital, and competition capital from the JIP database. The outcome variables are manufacturing employment, total
employment (baseline), total population, (non-log) employment-to-population ratio, non-manufacturing employment (!('2C ), and non-working
population (!%2C ) in columns 1-6, respectively. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Turning to columns 3 and 4, we discuss the relationship with the estimates obtained in
the literature and the mechanism. In column 4, we do not find a statistically significant
effect on the employment-population ratio. This can be understood from column 3 (and
column 2): The population positively responded to robot exposure. Thus, both employment
(column 2) and population (column3) receive positive effects, cancelling the impacts to
the ratio by increasing both the numerator and denominator. This finding, however, is in
contrast to part of the literature. In fact, using their similar-country shift-share IV strategy,
Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020] found -0.388 with the standard error of 0.091 for column
(4).13
Note that our findings in columns 2-4 may be regarded in consistent with the findings in
“local multiplier” literature [Moretti, 2010]: An increase in demand for a group of people
positively spillovers to other group of people in a locality. Indeed, Moretti [2010] discusses
the positive spillover of local manufacturing labor demand on service labor demand, such
as local restaurants, and bars worker demands for manufacturing workers there. In contrast,
our results indicate that the increase in labor demand in general even has an implication for
increasing the local population in general, such as housekeepers for general employees.
To further compare our results with the literature and highlight the relevance of our
price-based instruments, we also conduct an analysis based on a similar country. We
choose Germany as the country of comparison and take the robot adoption trends from the
IFR. As Table B.9 shows, the regression results are imprecise. This is not surprising, given
the discussion in Section ??: Even compared with a close innovator of robots, Germany,
the trend of robot adoptions in Japan has been very unique. Therefore, the conventional
identification method in the literature is not applicable in our context. In contrast, our
cost-based identification method is robust to contexts.
Finally, columns 5 and 6 show suggestive evidence on spillover effects. Column 5 takes
non-manufacturing employment (labeled as “!('” as abbreviation for service), defined
as total employment (cf. column 2) net of manufacturing employment (cf. column 1) as
the outcome variable. Column 6 takes the non-working population (labeled as “%%” as
abbreviation for dependent), defined as the total population (cf. column 4) net of employed
population (cf. column 2), as the outcome variable. These results show insignificant
effects on non-manufacturing employment or non-employed population and suggest the
13See their Table 7, panel A, column 3. They also report the effect on changes in log employment in the
Appendix. The point coefficient is -1.656 with a standard error of 0.411.
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following. First, we find little evidence of spillover effects to demand for these groups of
people. Second, given that there are negative effects to demand for these groups, there is no
evidence about reallocations within CZ across sectors. If this was the case, the reallocation
happened across CZs.14
So far, our main outcome variables have been regarding headcounts of people, such
as employment and population. Given that robot technology is characterized by the time-
saving nature of routine tasks (e.g., spot welding), it is possible that the impacts on hours
worked may be different from the headcount impacts. Furthermore, such hour effects may
have implications for hourly wages, which reflects the hourly productivity of workers. We
explore these dimensions in Table 2.11. In column 1, we show the baseline result (cf.
Table 2.10, column 2), which takes log employee headcounts as the outcome variable. For
columns 2 and 3, we take per-capita hoursworked and hourlywages as the outcome variables,
respectively. Column 2 reveals that the average hours worked decreased dramatically due to
the adoption of robots. In contrast, and partly as a result of hour-reducing effects, column 3
shows that hourly wages increased due to robot adoption. These findings suggest that robots
enable work-sharing or time-saving technological changes, which enhance the hour-unit
productivity of employed workers.
Finally, we conduct the CZ-level analysis by subgroup of workers. We overview the
takeaways, as follows. Robot-exposed regions increased the employment of both edu-
cated (more than four-year university) and non-educated (high-school graduates) workers,
increased female workers more than male workers, and increased middle-aged workers
(workers aged between 35 and 49) more than the other age groups of workers. Regarding
wages and hours, robot-exposed regions increased wages and decreased hours worked of
workers with all educational backgrounds. The impacts of robot adoption were homoge-
neous as found by Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020] but in the opposite direction; in Japan in
1978-2017, robot adoption improved working conditions of workers across the board while
it was opposite in the US in 1992-2007. Detailed regression results are reported in Section
B.9.
14Since the first and second implications contrast their predicted sign of the effect (positive spillover effects
and negative reallocation effects), we acknowledge the possibility that both effects worked but canceled each
other out.
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Table 2.11: CZ-level, 2SLS
Dependent variable:
Δ ln(!2C) Δ ln(ℎ2C) Δ ln(F2C)
(1) (2) (3)
Δ'2C 2.213∗∗ −1.963∗∗∗ 4.117∗∗∗
(1.000) (0.585) (0.913)
CZ FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Globalization Controls X X X
Technology Controls X X X
Variable # Workers Average Hours Average Hourly Wage
Observations 1,453 1,453 1,453
R2 0.818 0.827 0.948
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between shift-share measures of changes in robot stock per thousand workers and log difference
of outcome variables multiplied by 100. All regressions control demographic variables, globalization
controls, and technology controls as well as the industry and year fixed effects. All regressions are weighted
by initial-year population. The standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. The demographic variables
include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates, share of female workers, share
of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. The globalization controls
contain the logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA.
The technology controls include logarithm stock value measures for ICT capital, innovation capital, and
competition capital from the JIP database. The outcome variables are total employment (baseline), average
weekly hours, and average hourly wages in columns 1-3, respectively. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
2.5 Discussion
As background for our research, we overview a standard identification approach using shift-
share instruments, raw trends of robot stock units by country, and the description of robots
and robot applications.
By showing cross-country raw trends, we not only convey the significance of our context
as the users of robots, but also show why a new identification strategy is needed. Namely,
since Japan has a very distinct trajectory in introducing robots for industrial production,
it is hard to find similar countries of comparison that would be necessary to construct the
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shift-share-type instrumental variable prevailing in the literature.
We then move on to describe robots and robot applications. There are two reasons
for providing this description. First, it gives readers an understanding of the technolog-
ical context of our research. Second, by so doing, we introduce a core idea behind our
novel identification strategy–an industrial variation in the intensity of different tasks, or
applications of robots. Throughout the paper, we use the terms tasks and applications
interchangeably.
2.5.1 Standard Identification Method–Shift-share Instrument
Although we do not employ the standard shift-share identification method in this paper,
it is worth mentioning it to highlight the features of our method. When estimating the
effect of robots on employment, one confronts a classical identification problem: Observed
robot absorption is endogenous to employment. Consider a standard model that attempts to
identify the impact of robot adoption in commuting zone (CZ) 2 in year C on the employment
of the industry in the year:
ln (!2C) = U2 + UC + V ln ('2C) + -′2CW + Y2C , (2.8)
where !2C is the employment in CZ 2 in year C, '2C is the stock of robots in CZ 2 in year C,
and -2C is the set of time-varying control variables in CZ 2 in year C.
The challenge of estimating this equation is the endogeneity of '2C , as the unobserved
product demand shock to the CZ included in Y2C is correlated with '2C . For example, the
depreciation of JPY disproportionately increases the product demand in Toyota city, where
factories of Toyota Motor Co. are located, which increases both the employment and robot
stock of the area. A typical workaround to this problem is to construct a region-level










where 2 is a region (e.g., commuting zone), C is year, 8 is industry, ;28C0 is base-year (C0)
industrial employment share in (2, C), 'comparison countries
8C
is the operational robot stock in
(8, C) of comparison countries, and !8C is total employment in (8, C). A researcher should
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use the stock value in comparison countries rather than the country of interest, because
the observed robot stocks in the country of interest are subject to endogeneity problem;
for example, the increase in the robot stock may be due to a demand boom in (8, C), which
raises the industrial labor demand at the same time. In this case, the unobserved error term
is positively correlated with the robot stock variable. By using values from comparison
countries and assuming that the industrial demands in these countries are uncorrelated, the
researcher can take an exogenous source of variation, such as robotics technological growth.
It is not obvious which countries of comparison should be selected. An intuitive method
is to take countries that are similar on some measure. Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020], for
example, takes Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden as comparison countries for
the US, based on the similarity of robot absorption trends, while Dauth et al. [2018] takes
Spain, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, and Sweden for Germany. To
see potential comparison countries, the next subsection reviews the trends of robot stock
units in several countries. This will demonstrate the difficulty in finding natural comparison
countries in our research context.
2.6 Conclusion
How does automation affect labor demand? We study this question by focusing on a
context with a long tradition in robot adoption, Japan 1978-2017. We develop a cost-
based identification method for studying the impact of robots on employment, given the
difficulty of applying a conventional identification method, and a newly digitized data of
robot adoption. The data are characterized by three novelties: (i) a long panel covering
1978-2017 that suits the study of our context, (ii) adoption units and total values that
allow systematic calculation of robot unit costs, and (iii) disaggregation of these by robot
applications. Armed with these unique features, our identification hinges on industry-level
application share variations during the initial period of robot adoption. We conduct a
industry-level analysis and a region-level analysis. The industry-level analysis suggests that
robots and labor are gross complements. Our preferred estimates mean that a one-percent
decrease in robot price increased labor demand by 0.44 percent, which implies that robots
and labor are gross complements. This thus implies that a one percent increase in robot
adoption made by the robot price reduction increased employment by 0.28 percent. We
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show that these results are robust to other definitions of price measures and dropping major
robot purchasers, indicating the validity of our cost-based IV. The CZ-level shift-share
regressions confirm this, which shows a clear distinction from the findings in the literature
and suggest across-region reallocations and time-saving technical changes.
We suggest a potential reason why we find a different result than the one in the literature:
the differences in scale effects. To see this, note that our context might have been unique in
strong robot demands. This may be seen, for example, in a biography of a robot innovator,
Kawasaki Heavy Industry, as the incentive for producing robots: “Japan’s rapid economic
growth increased demands for automobiles and factories faced serious labor shortages”
[KHI, 2018]. If the demand for the robot-intensive industry is strong due to either domestic
or international demands, then robot adoption may invoke the scale effect to the industry,
mitigating the displacement effect found in, among others, Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020].
We leave testing this hypothesis or other potential explanations as a future work.
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Chapter 3
Multinational Production and Labor
Share
3.1 Introduction
A growing body of evidence suggests that in recent decades, the labor share of national
income has decreased in several developed countries [Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2013],
raising concerns both for policymakers and economists. For policymakers, the decrease
might be interpreted as an increase in income inequality between capital holders and
laborers. For economists, it challenges one of the stylized facts of growth models [Kaldor,
1961].
The broad question of the current paper is what drove the decrease in the labor share.
Several potential explanations have been proposed in the literature, including the role of
bias in technological change [Oberfield and Raval, 2014], for if changes in productivity
augment capital more than labor, then the total payment to labor will decrease relative to
capital. Although this is a theoretically coherent and straightforward explanation, there
are several potential mechanisms behind such factor-specific augmentation. For example,
the production processes are fragmenting across the world [Johnson and Noguera, 2012,
2017]. If international direct investment and employment of foreign labor by multinational
enterprises (MNEs) complements capital in the source country, there can be a relative
increase in the demand for capital relative to labor. In this paper, we formalize this idea
and ask if and to what extent it may explain the labor share trend in the source country of
80
Figure 3.1: Net Outward Multinational Sales and Labor Share
Note: The authors’ calculation using data from Karabarbounis and Neiman [2013] and UNCTAD. Details of
the construction of the data are discussed in Section C.1.5. The horizontal axis is the change in the average
sums of bilateral net outward multinational sales between 1991-1995 and 1996-2000. The vertical axis is the
change in labor share from 1991 to 2000. Singapore was dropped because it has an outlier value for outward
multinational sales.
foreign direct investment (FDI).
This surge in MNE international factor employment has been brought about by a wide
range of changes in the economic environment, including technological change, policy
and institutional reform, and growth of developing economies. For example, better global
communication technologies, removal of political barriers regarding international direct
investment and employment of foreign labor, and increasing demand by external economies
all may have increased the availability and productivity of foreign factors. We take these
events as exogenous augmentations of foreign factors for MNEs and study the effects on the
labor share of the source country.
As first-pass evidence, Figure 3.1 shows a significant negative ralationship between the
change in net MNE sales and labor share among countries. Although we do not suggest
that the correlation is causal, this negative relationship is consistent with the idea that the
outward activities of MNEs complement capital demand more than labor in the source
country.
To formally answer the question if and howmuch foreign factor augmentation decreased
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the labor share in the source country, we proceed in three steps. First, we develop a general
equilibriummodel that features heterogeneous and non-parametric production functions that
include the employment and exogenous augmentations of the foreign factors. In the model,
the factor market-clearing wages are the key endogenous variables determining labor share,
and we show that to the first order, the elasticity structure of factor demand is critical to the
the direction and size of the change in labor share. This first order approximation is robust
across several existing models of multinational production and many factors, including
models of offshoring (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 1997) and multinational production with
export platforms (e.g., Arkolakis et al., 2017). We then show how the key elasticities may
be identified given the foreign augmentation shocks, describing the moment conditions and
explaining how to back out the structural errors that depend on the elasticity matrix which
contains our parameters of interest.
As our baseline model spans broad production technologies, we discuss the example of
homogeneous nested CES production in order to provide the intuition behind the theoretical
results and some guidance for the empirical application. Out of the specified model, our
key theoretical results are twofold. First, the difference in the elasticities of substitution
between nests is key to the impact of foreign factor augmentation on home labor share.
Namely, if home labor is more substitutable with the foreign factor than home capital,
then foreign factor augmentation implies a reduction in the home labor share. Intuitively,
if foreign factor augmentation occurs, both home labor and capital are substituted away
for a given level of output. But if the substitution is larger for labor, so is the relative
decline in home labor demand, causing the labor share to decrease. One of the challenges
is to identify the novel parameter of our model, the foreign factor-home factor elasticity
of substitution. To proceed, we assume the existence of an exogenous change in foreign
factor productivity. Our second key theoretical result is that the shock-induced derivative
of home-foreign employment with respect to the shock is informative of the key parameter.
Armed with these theoretical results, we estimate the model empirically by applying
it to the 2011 Thailand Floods. These floods, which extended throughout the latter half
of 2011, causing 65 of 76 provinces to be declared disaster zones, affecting more than 13
million people, and creating an estimated 1,425 trillion baht (USD 46.5 billion) in economic
losses (World Bank), were a severe negative foreign factor productivity shock to Japanese
MNEs operating in the flooded regions.
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To study this unique event, we employ and combine firm- and establishment-level
microdata sourced from the Basic Survey on Japanese Business Structure and Activities
(BSJBSA), the Basic Survey on Overseas Business Activities (BSOBA), and the Orbis
database from Bureau van Dĳk (Orbis BvD). First, we calibrate the capital-labor substi-
tutability by the first order condition and a shift-share-type instrumental variable [Raval,
2019]. Consistent with the previous literature, we find that capital-labor are gross comple-
ments. Second, by regressing the log-home employment on the log-foreign employment
(with the instrumental variable relating the intensity of the flood damage) and a firm-level
fixed effect, we obtain a two-stage least squares estimate which indicates that home labor
and foreign labor are gross substitutes, in keeping with our theory. This result is based on
our homogeneous nested CES specification.
Given the home labor-foreign labor substitutability implied by our estimate, we find that
foreign factor augmentation (from the perspective of Japan) did contribute to a decrease
in labor share in Japan. We thus have shown that foreign factor augmentation decreases
home labor share. To quantify this, we exploit the nested CES specification to back out
the aggregate evolution of foreign factor-augmenting productivities. Applying our implied
elasticities of substitution, we find that foreign factor augmentation alone explains 59 percent
of the decrease in Japan’s labor share between 1995 and 2007.
We also derive an elasticity estimate from a more general production function based on
the method of moments. As in the nested CES case, the result shows that foreign factor
augmentation increases the relative demand for capital, which implies that the relative labor
wage decreases, as does the labor share.
The paper is structured as follows. After discussing the related literature below, Section
3.2 provides some of the motivating facts about labor share and MNEs. Section 3.3 then
provides the conceptual framework modeling labor share and foreign factor augmentation,
presenting both a general foreign factor demand model and a nested CES specification.
Section 3.4 discusses the empirical setting, data, specification and reduced-form estimates,
while Section 3.5 shows the derived structural parameters and estimation under both the
general and nested CES models. Section 3.6 concludes the paper.
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3.1.1 Related Literature
This paper relates to two strands of literature: research concerning the recent decreasing
labor share (or increasing capital share) of production, and studies on MNEs and their
impact on the source country’s labor market.
Changing Factor Shares
Seminal research on changing factor shares that empirically finds a decreasing labor share
includes Elsby et al. [2013] in the U.S and Karabarbounis and Neiman [2013], whose
comparable cross-country data show a declining labor share in many developed countries
in particular, which Piketty and Zucman [2014] have suggested leads to expanding within-
country income inequalities. However, there are several conceptual qualifications and labor
share measurement issues that raise concerns about these empirical findings. For instance,
Bridgman [2018], Rognlie [2016, 2018] stress that the treatment of capital depreciation and
the self-employee income allotment to each factor entails strong assumptions. Making a
different argument, Koh et al. [2018] claim that the decline in the labor share in the U.S is
attributable mainly to the capitalization of intellectual property, while Cette et al. [2019]
discuss a similar effect regarding the accounting of real estate income. In our view, even
after taking these qualifications into account, Japan’s labor share between 1995 and 2007
still decreased, as discussed further in Section C.1.2.
There are several possibilities suggested in the literature as to why the labor share is
decreasing, including bias in technological change. For instance, Oberfield andRaval [2014]
emphasize the role of “technology, broadly defined, including automation and offshoring,
rather than mechanisms that work solely through factor prices”, and Elsby et al. [2013]
conclude that the offshoring of labor-intensive activities within the supply chain is “the
leading potential explanation of the decline in the U.S. labor share over the past 25 years.”
On the technology side, automation technology may have contributed to the labor share
decrease, as reviewed in Acemoglu and Restrepo [2019] for the example of industrial robots.
To these, we add globalization as a partial explanation, particularly in our context of Japan
from 1995-2007. We offer evidence based on a particular mechanism that features the role
of MNEs, providing a novel identification strategy and empirical evidence from the 2011
Thailand Floods.1
1Other potential explanations for declining labor share include lower capital and increasing risk premiums,
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An increase in market power (and thus profit) by dominant corporations has also been
proposed as a reason for decreasing labor share, as market power can emerge both in the
goods market [Autor et al., 2017a,b, Barkai, 2017, De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017] and
in the labor market [Berger et al., 2019, Gouin-Bonenfant et al., 2018].2 Although market
power is not our main focus, we explore its potential role to help validate our mechanism.
Applying the method of De Loecker and Eeckhout [2017] to our Japanese data, we find that
the markup did not increase as much in Japan as in the U.S.
Our contribution to this literature is adding multinational enterprises (MNEs) to the
discussion of potential reasons for the observed decrease in labor share. Among this
growing literature, we regard our work to be closest to Oberfield and Raval [2014] who,
as mentioned above, emphasize the role of biased technological change in the production
function as opposed to the factor-price story of Karabarbounis and Neiman [2013]. For
this purpose, they employ plant-level microdata in the U.S. and estimate the capital-labor
substitution elasticity by estimating the first order condition for factor demand with a Bartik-
type instrument. They find that since the 1970s, the aggregate capital-labor elasticity
has been constant at around 0.7, which indicates that capital and labor are indeed gross
complements, while a capital cost decline like that emphasized by Karabarbounis and
Neiman [2013] would imply an increasing labor share. Our analysis draws upon and
extends Oberfield and Raval [2014], first applying their method of estimating capital-labor
elasticity to firm- and plant-level data in Japan to confirm that the elasticity is below one.
We depart from their analysis to the extent that we explicitly incorporate the foreign factor
employment of home firms in our model in order to consider the effect of foreign factor
augmentation on the home labor share. Section 3.3.1 explains how our production function
nests that of Oberfield and Raval [2014].
Labor Market Impact of MNEs
This paper also relates to a second line of research that examines the impact of foreign
production on the source country’s labor market [Boehm et al., 2020, Desai et al., 2009,
Ebenstein et al., 2014, Harrison and McMillan, 2011, Kovak et al., 2017, Muendler and
as discussed in detail in Section C.1.4.
2Berger et al. [2019], however, argue that labor market concentration contributed in the opposite direction,
if at all, as the U.S. local labor market concentration has been decreasing since the 1970s.
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Becker, 2010].3 Notably, as does the current paper, this literature explicitly uses exogenous
variation that changes the profitability from engaging in foreign production. For example,
Desai et al. [2009] take the source country’s economic indicators and construct a shift-
share-style instrumental variable, whereas Kovak et al. [2017] use a change in bilateral tax
treaties between the U.S. and other countries to construct the IVs. Bernard et al. [2018]
study the effect on firms’ occupational organization using a shift-share-type instrument from
a detailed set of firm-specific variables regarding changes in import share, while Setzler
and Tintelnot [2019] use the geographic clustering of MNEs as the source of exogenous
variation and find that when foreign MNEs enter the U.S., there are two effects on local
wages: a direct foreign MNE premium on worker wages and an indirect wage-bidding-up
effect on incumbent domestic firms. Our contribution to this literature is both empirical and
theoretical. Empirically, our approach adds another piece of evidence based on a negative
productivity shock resulting from an unexpected natural disaster that affects firms’ foreign
production and domestic employment decisions.4
More importantly, unlike these studies, we are able to provide a clear structural inter-
pretation of the shock and its impact on employment by specifying the foreign production
model in Section 3.3. As will be clear, this is indeed the key to identifying the model pa-
rameters.5 Specifically, both Desai et al. [2009] and Kovak et al. [2017] find positive causal
effects of foreign employment on home employment, which is consistent with our finding
that the decrease in employment in the foreign country due to flooding is accompanied by
a decrease in home employment. Our model further implies that this positive association
caused by an exogenous shock to foreign productivity can be interpreted as home labor and
foreign labor being gross substitutes.
Although the literature on the relationship between MNEs and factor intensities is
3Earlier observational studies include Brainard and Riker [1997], Head and Ries [2002], Slaughter [2000].
4Kato and Okubo [2017] study the same event to learn about the loss of vertical linkages in the destination
country, while Boehm et al. [2018] study another dimension of the impact of a shock on multinational firms.
While they consider the effect of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake in Japan on the Japanese HQ and its subsequent
impact on foreign (U.S.) affiliates, this paper is interested instead in the impact of a foreign shock on foreign
affiliates in Thailand and its impact on domestic headquarters in Japan.
5For example, while Desai et al. [2009] use a Bartik shockwith GDP growth rates as the ’shift’ component,
if we do not know whether the GDP growth is due to increased consumer demand or firm productivity in the
short-run, then it is not clear how to interpret their coefficients. On the other hand, Kovak et al. [2017] employ
the enforcement of a bilateral tax treaty, which is arguably a supply-side shock. However, their approach does
not permit backing out substitution parameters, as they use a different sourcing model and therefore do not
estimate the 2SLS specification but only an event-study regression.
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not extensive, different factor intensities across firms may have quantitative implications
for labor shares through the reallocation of factors across firms. Like Sun [2020], who
studies the differential capital intensities between MNEs and other firms, we also study
heterogeneous factor intensities by firm-level MNE data and provide some evidence as to
the role of the heterogeneity. While Sun [2020] focuses on host countries, our focus is
on the labor share of the source country of FDI. Furthermore, Sun [2020] does not focus
on estimating the elasticity between home and foreign factors, but calibrates his model of
export platforms to global affiliate data using the cross-section variation. In contrast, we use
a natural experiment to formally identify the elasticity between factors in the MNE-source
and destination countries.
Lastly, our paper is related to the literature which argues that automation may displace
labor demand and thus reduce labor share. Our goal is to establish that instead of techno-
logical changes in automation, MNE activities play a substantial role in decreasing labor
share. However, it is difficult to separate the effect of globalization from that of technolog-
ical change, both conceptually and empirically [Fort et al., 2018]. To partially address the
concern, in Section C.1.4, we provide evidence that the growth in automation technology
in Japan during the 1990s and 2000s was not rapid relative to other countries.
3.2 Motivating Facts
In this section, we provide further evidence that suggests that a surge in MNE growth was
behind the decrease in labor share in recent decades. For this purpose, we focus on our
context of Japan from 1995-2007, as reviewed in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2.1 we describe
the major data source for our analysis and then, using this data, we show relevant facts in
Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 Data Sources
This study utilizes four main datasets, the first being the Basic Survey on Japanese Business
Structure and Activities (BSJBSA), an annual survey of large firms in Japan administered
by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI).6 BSJBSA has a detailed set of
6On March 31st each year, all firms with more than 50 employees and assets of JPY 30 million (USD 0.3
million) are asked to complete the questionnaire.
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variables providing Japanese firm-level information such as the firm’s address, division-
level employment distribution, holding relationships, balance sheet components, itemized
sales by goods, costs by type, export and import by region, outsourcing, research and
development, technology and patents, among others. The data spans the years from 1995-
2017.
In order to match foreign production information to the BSJBSA, we employ a second
dataset, the Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities (BSOBA), another annual survey
administered since 1995 by METI in which all (i.e. both private and public) Japanese
MNEs are asked about their domestic and foreign business information as of March each
year.7 The BSOBA is comprised of a Headquarter File and a Subsidiary File, and this study
employsmostly the Subsidiary File which asks for information about all child and grandchild
foreign subsidiaries of each MNE.8 The questions consist of the destination country, local
employment and sales, which are allocated to the following destination categories: Japan
(home country), Asia, Europe, and America. To check the quality of its employment
and labor compensation data, we compare the variables to those obtained from PWT, as
discussed in Section C.1.7.
Although the BSOBA contains the country in which each subsidiary is located, it does
not provide a detailed address. As we saw in Section 3.4.1, while the Thai floods caused
extensive damage, it was mainly concentrated in Ayutthaya and Pathum Thani provinces,
which we define as the flood-affected regions, following JETRO (2012). The exact location
in Thailand of the Japanese MNE subsidiaries is thus necessary to properly assign treatment
status. To do this, we use the address variable from the Bureau van Dĳk Orbis database.
Finally, as the above datasets do not share firm IDs, we matched the firm names,
locations, and phone numbers using a firm-level dataset collected by private credit agency
Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR). The match rate from BSOBA is 93.0%. Because the scope
of BSOBA is exclusively Japanese MNEs, we interpret each firm in TSR as an MNE if
and only if the firm also appears in BSOBA for that year. The details of the matching
7BSOBA defines MNEs and foreign activities as the following: A firm is defined as an MNE if it has a
foreign subsidiary, which can be either a “child subsidiary” or “grandchild subsidiary”. A child subsidiary
firm is a foreign corporation whose Japanese ownership ratio is 10% or more, while a grandchild subsidiary
is a foreign corporation whose ownership ratio is 50% or more by the foreign subsidiaries whose Japanese
ownership ratio is 50% or more. Therefore, the definition of foreign production is not limited to greenfield
investment but also includes purchases of foreign companies such as M&A.
8We drop subsidiaries located in tax-haven countries, following the Gravelle [2015] definition. We thank
Cheng Chen for kindly sharing the code for the sample selection.
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process can be found in Section C.1.7. Since TSR access is limited only back to 2007, the
BSJBSA-BSOBA match can occur only for years 2007-2016.
3.2.2 Time-series of Labor Share and Multinational Activities
Armed with these data, we provide the negative time-series correlation between labor share
and multinational activities in Japan from 1995-2007, which will guide us in developing
the model of labor share and multinational activities in the following sections.
Figure 3.2 shows trends in Japan’s labor share and aggregate payment to foreign em-
ployees. The red line shows the overall decreasing labor share in Japan since 1995.9 As
outlined above, the current paper aims to explain such a decrease by foreign factor aug-
mentation from the perspective of Japan, which potentially increases both factor prices
and employment, as detailed in the section describing our model. Therefore, one of the
augmentation measures is the aggregated payment from Japanese multinational enterprises
(MNEs) to foreign workers. The blue line shows this trend since 1995, which is the first
year of our dataset. As can be seen, the trend increased rapidly, at least partly indicating the
augmentation of the foreign factor. Given this finding, the current paper asks if, how, and
under which conditions is there a logical link between foreign factor augmentation and labor
share, and quantitatively what portion of the observed labor share decline can be attributed
to this foreign factor augmentation.
Due to the space constraint, we relegate robustness checks to the Appendix. Section
C.1.2 shows that the decrease in labor share is robust to other measures discussed in the
literature. To provide another perspective on the role of MNEs, we also compare trends in
labor share among MNEs and non-MNEs, and the composition of MNEs in Section C.1.3.
To provide partial evidence about other mechanisms discussed above, we show in Section
C.1.4 that (i) the increase in the stock of industrial robot is likely to have happened before
the period of our analysis, and (ii) market power in Japan was low and relatively constant
during 1995-2007.
9A figure since 1980 is shown in Section C.1.1.
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Figure 3.2: Labor Share and Payment to Foreign Employment, Japan
Note: The authors’ calculation based on Japan Industrial Productivity (JIP) Database 2015 from Research
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) and the Basic Survey on Overseas Business Activities
(BSOBA) 1996-2008. The labor share is calculated by the share of the nominal labor cost in the value added
of JIP market economies in nominal terms. The compensation for foreign labor is the sum of compensation
to workers in foreign subsidiaries of all Japanese multinational corporations in BSOBA.
3.3 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we set up our conceptual framework for the estimation and quantification
that follows. First, in Section 3.3.1, we develop a general framework that features foreign
production which has the same first order implications for labor share as several offshoring
[Feenstra and Hanson, 1997] and MNE models (among others, Arkolakis et al. 2017,
Ramondo andRodríguez-Clare 2013). This framework contains foreign factor augmentation
representing a reduction in the cost of multinational production, and factor market clearing
conditions to discuss labor share. A detailed discussion of the relationship between these
models is in Section C.2 of theAppendix. Section 3.3.2 discusses the implications of foreign
factor augmentation on labor share to the first order. Out of this section, readers will know
which statistics from the model are necessary to qualitatively and quantitatively understand
the impact on labor share. In Section 3.3.3, we construct amethodology for identifying these
statistics given a foreign factor augmentation shock, and then in the estimation section, we
apply this methodology to the 2011 Thailand Floods. In Section 3.3.4, we discuss a specific
version of our general model; namely, a homogeneous nested CES production function.
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This setup allows us to discuss the solution to the labor share in a closed form, the necessary
statistic in the form of constant parameters, and the identification through a simple linear
regression. By doing so, we aim to offer a simpler intuition of the mechanisms of our model
and guide our estimation and quantitative exercise, as we discuss later.
3.3.1 Setup
The environment is static, with two countries  and . There are no trade costs but factors
cannot move between countries. Firms originate from both countries and produce firm-
specific output 8 ∈ . Each good 8 is contestable and so firms are perfectly competitive
in the output market. Country  is small-open in the sense that the set  of firms from
country  constitutes zero measure among all firms  and the total demand is determined
by  demand. Next, we describe the consumption setup, production setup, and equilibrium
in turn. The representative consumer has a CES preference across all goods 8 ∈ . Hence









1−Y 38 is the ideal price index. Since  is small-open, % and & are
determined exogenously to country . Firm 8 in  may hire intermediate inputs <8.
Note that foreign inputs are so general that they may entail foreign-produced intermediate
inputs (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 1997) or foreign factors of production (e.g., Arkolakis
et al., 2017, Helpman et al., 2004, Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare, 2013). A firm 8 from
 produces a firm-specific output with domestic factors :8 and ;8, and foreign inputs <8






where :̃8 ≡ 0 8 :8, ;̃8 ≡ 0!8 ;8, and <̃8 ≡ 0"8 <8 are the augmented factors. We assume
 is increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable (so that Young’s










Below, our theoretical interest is the effect of changes in foreign factor augmentation 0"
8
.
In particular, in our comparative statics, we are concerned about positive log-augmentation
3 ln 0"
8
> 0, whereas in our identification argument and empirical application, we consider
a negative log-augmentation. Onemay interpret the foreign factor augmentation as policy or
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institutional changes that reduce the cost of firms’ multinational activities, or technological
or economic growth in country  that increases the productivity of the factors.10
Factors from country  are hired competitively in each factor market. As we will see,
capital and labor markets in country  clear at prices A and F respectively, but ’s factor
prices are given to small-open country . Firms solve the augmented factor demands by the
standard cost-minimizing problem given the quantity @8 in terms of augmentation-controlled










the augmentation-controlled factor prices. Given CES world demand (3.1), we have the
quantity @8 that depends on firm 8’s price ?8. Given perfect competition, ?8 further depends
on augmentation-controlled factor prices ?̃ 5
8




in the cost-minimizing factor demand, we have the reduced factor demand functions that




















The factor prices are determined by market clearing. The small-open  assumption implies











. In , capital and labor are supplied inelastically at level  
























Hence, the small-open equilibrium is
(
{:8, ;8, <8}8∈ , A, F
)
that satisfies (i) the factor
demands given by (3.2) and (ii) the factor prices solving (3.3).
Under the environment with continuous demand and supply functions like ours, it is
routine to show the existence of an equilibrium. Furthermore, as consumers are homoge-
neous (since  is small-open), the uniqueness of the equilibrium can be proven (see Section
C.2.1 of the Appendix). Given this unique equilibrium, the following subsections discuss
the first-order properties of labor share and identification, and then provide an example in
10Sun [2020] conducts a counterfactual analysis of bilateral multinational production cost, but notes that
the calibration strategy does not identify bilateral productivity. Thus, this counterfactual analysis corresponds
to our study in that either a decline in multinational production cost or productivity growth in the foreign
country may induce a change in equilibrium, including the labor share.
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the form of a nested CES specification.
3.3.2 Labor Shares
With a unique equilibrium, we can analyze the implication of a foreign productivity shock
to labor share as follows. Labor share is defined as
!( ≡ F!
F! + A . (3.4)
Note that the endogenous variables in expression (3.4) are F and A , so the solution to the
model should transform the endogenous expression into an exogenous one. Taking the
log-first order approximation of labor share definition (3.4) gives us
3!( = !(0 (1 − !(0) (3 lnF − 3 ln A) . (3.5)
Thus, the labor share increases if and only if the Home wage grew more than the Home
rental rate. To study this, we revisit the factor market clearing condition (3.3) and take the
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≡ A:8/A (resp. B!8 ≡ F;8/F!) is the capital (resp. labor) employment share of
































is the weighted Home factor elasticity matrix. If Σ is negative definite, then
























It is worth noting the relationship between our general equilibrium setup and the off-
shoring and multinational production models in the literature. Specifically, our general
equilibrium model nests modified versions of models of offshoring [Feenstra and Hanson,
1997] and multinational production (e.g., Arkolakis et al., 2017) in terms of the first order
approximation of factor prices (3.6). This equivalence is formally shown in Section C.2.2
of the Appendix. Consequently, for our purposes, we may turn away from these detailed
models of international trade and multinational production to focus exclusively on the suf-
ficient statistics of the elasticity matrix given by equation (3.7). We discuss how to identify
these elasticities in the following section.
3.3.3 Identification
In this section, we discuss our identification strategy by formally introducing a foreign
factor-augmenting negative productivity shock to a measure-zero subset of firms.11 In
Section 3.4.1, we apply the model to empirically estimate the effect on labor share of the
devastating 2011 Thailand Floods. To begin, first assume that there exists an instrumental
variable /8 that correlates with the Foreign productivity shock 3 ln 0"8 but not with Home
productivity shocks 3 ln 0 
8
and 3 ln 0!
8











11This simplifying assumption is helpful because otherwise the equilibrium effect on factor prices(
A, F , F!
)
would emerge and complicate the analysis. This assumption is realistic because the set of
Japanese firms hit by the flooding is small relative to the population. Having said that, mulitnational firms
are larger and comprise a significant portion of factor employment both theoretically (Arkolakis et al., 2017,
Helpman et al., 2004 among others) and empirically [Ramondo et al., 2015], so a quantitatively relevant
extension is to allow the shock to extend to a positive-measured set of firms for identification.
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To obtain the structural productivity shocks 3 ln 0 
8
and 3 ln 0!
8
, consider the following
model inversion. By factor demand functions (3.2), we have
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) ª®®®¬ . (3.11)
Therefore, conditional on parameter restrictions, we may identify two elasticity param-
eters from elasticity matrix (3.10) given moment condition (3.9). The empirical details are
discussed in Section 3.4.
At this point, we discuss the nature of our identification strategy. A typical method for
identifying labor demand-side elasticity such as our Σ8 is to use labor-supply side elasticity
such as a short-run surge in migration. In fact, the idea that a labor supply shock can identify
the supply elasticity is through the change in wages exogenous to producers [Ottaviano and
Peri, 2012]. The benefit of our approach is that we do not need to have such exogenous
changes observed, since our approach does not rely on factor price changes but instead
on the change in effective factor prices, which are specific to firms. This implies that
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our identification method is free of any assumptions about labor market delineation or
competition structure within the labor market.
3.3.4 Example: Nested CES
In this section, we discuss a special case of our non-parametric and heterogeneous framework
presented in Section 3.3.1. This clarifies the intuition of our general setup and simplifies
the identification strategy. We rely on this example to calibrate some aspects of the general
model in later sections.
Setup In this example, wemaintain the same setup for countries and consumer preferences
but assume that there is a homogeneous set of firms. We continue denoting  as the set
of firms in any country and  as that from country . To achieve a different elasticity
of substitution between the foreign factor and home factors, we assume a parsimonious
nested CES production function. Namely, each firm produces output @ with nested CES
production function:





















where _ > 0 is a lower elasticity substitution. Note that the special case of _ = f implies
the single-nest CES production function. Finally, suppose factor supplies ( , !, ") are
fixed. Factor market clearing : =  , ; = !, and < = " gives the factor prices F2 and A,
and the labor share is given by equation (3.4).
Several discussions follow. First, to relate our production function choice with the one
in Oberfield and Raval [2014], note that firms need not hire foreign factor < in reality. If












. On the other hand, Oberfield and Raval [2014] consider
the CES production function with heterogeneous augmentation 0 and 0! at the firm level.
Note also that firms need not hire the foreign factor, which guides us to the restriction that
labor and the foreign factor are gross substitutes, or _ > 1.
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As for further potential parameter restrictions, to the extent that typical firms hold some
form of capital to produce output, we have an educated guess that capital and aggregate
labor are gross complements, or f < 1. Because the parameter restrictions so far turn
out to be useful for some of the theoretical arguments, we formalize these as the following
assumption:
Assumption 2. _ > 1 > f > 0.
In what follows, we show that under Assumption 2, foreign labor (log-)augmentation
3 ln 0"
8
> 0 implies that the reduction in labor share 3!( < 0. As explained in Section
3.1.1, Oberfield and Raval [2014] indeed estimate that f is well-below unity using U.S.
plant-level microdata. In our empirical and quantitative exercise, we apply this method,
modified to our nested CES assumption and with Japanese firm- and plant-level data, and
confirm that f < 1 is also the case in Japan. Moreover, our identification method applied
to the natural experiment- based IV estimate reveals that, in fact, _ > 1. Therefore, we
find that Assumption 2 holds empirically. Notwithstanding this, a number of results in the
following section do not depend on a particular parameter restriction 2.
Labor Share Our proof in Section C.2.3 of the Appendix shows that under our setting,


























is the aggregate value of the factor supplies to country  measured by function (3.12). Note
that - is increasing in 0" . Hence, if _−1 − f−1 < 0 or _ > f, !( is decreasing in 0" .
Intuitively, if within the lower nest the factors are more substitutable, then the increase in the
productivity of the offshoreworker relatively strongly substitutes away domestic labor. More
specifically, note that cost-minimizing factor demand (C.50) implies 3 ln ! = ,("0 3 ln 
"




is the aggregate share of payments to
foreign labor within the total payments to home and foreign labor. Throughout the paper,
97
subscript 0 denotes the variable at the base year. Hence,("0 is the base-year value of the
aggregate share of payments to foreign labor.
It is worthwhile to highlight the role of the simplifying assumptions, homogeneous
nested CES and fixed foreign factor supplies, in deriving the closed form equation (3.13).
Note that wage rate F and capital rental rate A are endogenous objects that may be solved
according to factor market clearing conditions. With homogeneous and nested CES struc-
tures, we may solve these relative factor prices analytically. Furthermore, the assumption
that the foreign factor market clears with the foreign factor supply fixed at " plays a crucial
role in deriving the closed form in exogenous terms. Namely, without it, the lower aggregate
term ! contains the foreign factor supply " , which is endogenous and needs to be solved
as other exogenous elements in the model.
With these assumptions, other exogenous variables being fixed, the first order approxi-
mation with respect to 3 ln 0" implies









,("0 3 ln 0
" . (3.14)
Therefore, it is again crucial to know the relative values of _ and f to learn the sign of the
effects of foreign labor augmentation on labor share. Thus, our informed guess in Section
3.3.1 establishes the following formal result.
Lemma 1. Under assumption 2, foreign factor augmentation 3 ln 0" implies 3!( < 0.
One implication is that, in a special case, the single-nest CES production function _ = f
would not permit a discussion of the effect of foreign factor augmentation on home labor
share. In other words, this is one of the manifestations of the restrictive implication of inde-
pendence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) that the CES function features. Namely, since
the foreign factor is an irrelevant alternative to home capital and labor, the augmentation
does not affect the relative factor demands of home capital and labor. Thus, we need the
nested structure in the production function in our simplest setting.
Quantitatively, identifying the value of _−1 − f−1 is critical to understanding the labor
share implication. In what follows, we obtain an even stronger result for identification – we
identify the absolute value of _ and f – by employing a shift-share instrument to identify
f [Oberfield and Raval, 2014, Raval, 2019]. In contrast, the foreign negative productivity
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shock is used for identification of _ as described below.
Since the homogeneous nested CES case is a special case of the general setup in Section
3.3.1, we may also relate the theoretical implications in terms of the general substitution
elasticity matrix (3.10). This is discussed in Section C.2.5 of the Appendix.
Identification We then show the identification result given the foreign factor augmentation
shocks as in Section 3.3.3. In Section C.2.4, we prove the following equations:
3 ln ; =
[




3 ln 0" , (3.15)
3 ln< =
[




3 ln 0" . (3.16)
These equations mean that the elasticities of the foreign factor-augmenting productivity
shock are summarized by three parameters _, f, Y and constants ,("0 and (
"
0 . The
intuition is as follows. A negative foreign factor-augmenting productivity shock has both
direct and indirect effects on factor employment. The direct effect speaks to the biasedness
of the factor-augmenting shock, such as when the shock is biased to foreign factor demand,
or _ > 1, whereby the lower nest features gross substitutes, as formalized in Assumption
2.12 It then has the force to decrease foreign factor demand given the negative shock by the
elasticity of _ − 1. On the other hand, the indirect effect is as follows. To the first order,
a one percent decrease in the foreign factor-augmenting productivity shock increases the
lower nest aggregate cost by ,("0 percent and the marginal cost by (
"
0 percent. These
increases have the effect on the total demand through the elasticities governed by the nested
CES structure, _−f and f−Y, respectively. Due to the CES production function, this effect
applies to labor demand ; and foreign factor demand < alike. Therefore, the direct effect
matters for foreign labor employment, whereas the indirect one matters for the demand for
all factors.
However, it is not trivial to observe the size of the foreign factor-augmenting productivity
shock 3 ln 0" empirically. Therefore, we consider the elasticity of foreign labor with respect
to domestic labor given the arbitrary size of the shock 3 ln 0" .13 Namely, if elasticityf;<,0"
12A detailed discussion of factor augmentation and bias is given in Acemoglu [1998].
13Although here we consider the foreign factor-augmenting productivity shock that does not change any
domestic productivities, in estimation, we conjecture it is possible to relax this assumption and consider more




3 ln ;/3 ln 0"
3 ln</3 ln 0"
, (3.17)
then by equations (3.15) and (3.16), we have
f;<,0" =
(_ − f),("0 + (f − Y) (
"
0




In equation (3.18), readers might wonder why an increase in _ would result in a decrease in
shock-induced elasticity f;<,0" . To clarify, we discuss an extreme case when _ < 1, which
means that the foreign factor augmentation is biased to country- labor. In such a case, the
negative foreign factor-augmenting productivity shock would increase hiring of the foreign
factor. This is because the home and foreign factors would be gross complements, which
in turn means that the foreign factor compression would result in the need to replenish the
physical foreign factor rather than substituting for it. Therefore, relative to the case _ > 1,
the denominator of equation (3.18) would be small, which would result in a large value of
f;<,0" , so long as −_ + (_ − f),("0 + (f − Y) (
"
0 > 0.
To summarize the discussion, by equation (3.18), we can identify _ given the knowledge






, and other parameters (f, Y). We discuss how to obtain
these constants and parameters in detail in the following sections as well as how to identify
and estimate f;<,0" . Finally, in the following sections, we use the identification arguments
based on both equations (3.9) and (3.18).
3.4 Empirical Application–the 2011 Thailand Flood
Given our theoretical result of identification in Section 3.3, we next discuss how we may
obtain Σ8 in equation (3.10). Finding a plausibly exogenous shock to the multinational
activities of MNEs is not trivial. For example, there are challenges that emerge from
the small number of MNEs relative to the total number of firms. In particular, Boehm
et al. [2020] mentions “the notorious difficulty to construct convincing instruments with
sufficient power at the firm level.”14 In this paper, our approach is to focus on a unique natural
experiment, the 2011 Thailand Floods. We first describe the event and the interpretation for
14Such difficulty is reaffirmed in Section C.1.11 by analyzing substitution parameter _ by means of
shift-share instruments in the manner of Desai et al. [2009] and Hummels et al. [2014].
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our purpose in Section 3.4.1, and then discuss how the firm- and plant-level data described
in Section 3.2.1 capture the event.
For our main empirical results, we rely on the homogeneous nested CES specification
and identify parameters of interest based on the moment condition (3.18). Section 3.4.2
details the process. Section 3.5.3 discusses the alternative general approach based on the
moment condition (3.9).
3.4.1 Background
Between July 2011 and January 2012, massive flooding occurred along the Mekong and
Chao Phraya river basins in Thailand, which caused numerous factories in the area to halt
operation. The magnitude of this shock to the production economy was extraordinary,
causing an estimated $46.5 billion in economic damage, which was then the fourth costliest
disaster in history (World Bank, 2011).15 To the extent that the firms could not anticipate the
flooding beforehand, we take this event as an exogenous shock. Section C.1.7 describes the
results of a balancing test to confirm that there are not large systematic differences between
the Japanese MNEs that had subsidiaries located in the flooded regions and those that did
not.
Next, we argue that the flood can be interpreted as a negative foreign productivity shock
for Japanese MNEs. First, as to whether or not it can be seen as a productivity shock,
it is worthwhile to confirm that the shock was local. Thailand is subdivided into several
provinces, and among them, Ayutthaya and Pathum Thani provinces along the flood-prone
Chao Phraya river suffered severely from the flood. In these areas, the flood inundation
reached its peak in October 2011. Adachi et al. [2016] find in their survey of local firms that
in Ayutthaya and Pathum Thani provinces, the maximum days of inundation were 84 and
77, respectively, with maximal depth of flooding of 6 and 4 meters. In contrast, no firms
from regions outside of Ayutthaya or Pathum Thani provinces claimed any days or height
of inundation due to the 2011 floods.
In the severely damaged localities of Ayutthaya province and Pathum Thani province,
15To the extent that the economic damage includes the values of property damaged, natural disasters in
developed countries are likely to be costlier. In fact, the three disasters whose economic damage surpassed
the 2011 Thailand Floods at that time were the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and tsunami (Japan), the 1995 Great
Hanshin Earthquake (Japan), and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina (U.S.). Given the extent of the economic
damage, the physical shock to a developing country like Thailand should be regarded as even larger.
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there were seven industrial clusters where roughly 800 factories were located [Tamada
et al., 2013].16 A large proportion of firms in these industry clusters are engaged in the
automobile and electronics industries [Haraguchi and Lall, 2015]. Therefore, the flood
shook local regions within Thailand that are intensively involved in industrial production,
particularly automobile and electronics.
To further provide suggestive evidence that the flood was shock on the production side of
the economy, we observe that, after the Floods, Thailand experienced a decrease in exports
but not in imports. The observed pattern can be seen as evidence that the production side
was hit by a shock rather than the demand side, as Benguria and Taylor [2019] argue in
their interpretation of the shock origin of the global financial crisis of 2008. Section C.1.6
of the Appendix discusses this in detail.
What makes this event unique for our study is that although it hit localized regions of
Thailand, it can be considered to be a sizable foreign productivity shock from the perspective
of JapaneseMNEs. To see this, we describe the close relationship between the two countries
as investment destination and source country. Among the roughly 800 factories in the heavily
flood-inundated industrial clusters, roughly 450 are Japanese subsidiaries.17 Section C.1.7
describes the industrial patterns of factories that are subsidiaries of Japanese MNEs from
our dataset, and the flood indeed created a large negative shock for Japanese producers. In
Section C.1.7, we also show from our dataset that Thailand is a major destination country
of Japanese MNEs.
Recall that our dataset in Section 3.2.1 covers the information well needed to study the
impact of the flooding shock on factor employment. BSJBSA contains comprehensive data
on firms, with domestic factor employment including employment, labor compensation,
fixed assets and net income. BSOBA includes data on the universe of factories worldwide
of Japanese MNEs. The plant-level variables contain the plant name, the parent firm name,
employment, labor compensation, and net income. Orbis provides the exact addresses
of these overseas plants, and TSR data facilitates the matching of these datasets since it
contains the universe of Japanese firms. Together, these datasets allow us to analyze the
16Reinsurance broker Aon Benfield reported on the flood area and the locations of the inundated in-
dustrial clusters. Exhibit 16 of the report (available at http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/
Documents/20120314_impact_forecasting_thailand_flood_event_recap.pdf) shows the relevant
map.
17Exhibit 15 of the Aon Benfield report mentioned above shows a photo of the inundated Honda Ayutthaya
Plant, which is located in Rojana Industrial Park, one of the seven severely flooded industrial clusters.
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flood shock that hit a subset of firms in our analysis sample by micro-econometric methods.
The Thai Floods and Aggregate Trends
In this section, we provide the first-pass evidence of the effect of the floods on Japanese
MNEs from our combined dataset described in Section 3.2.1. Figure 3.3 shows the relative
trends for total employment (Panel 3.3a) and number of subsidiaries (Panel 3.3b) in the
flooded regions versus the rest of the world, excluding Japan. In both panels, the solid line
shows the trend for the flooded region and the dashed line shows that for the other regions
excluding Japan (labeledROW).Both trends are normalized at one in 2011. One can see that,
for both statistics, the ROW trend is increasing over the sample period. This reflects the fact
that more firms are entering the pool of MNEs, investing in Thailand, opening subsidiaries
and hiring local workers, while MNEs already with Thai subsidiaries are expanding and
hiring more local workers. When we turn to the flooded regions, however, the pattern is
noticeably different. While the trend until 2011 is similarly rapid or even slightly faster than
the ROW, indicating that those flooded regions had taken measures to attract foreign capital
before the floods, the 2011 floods abruptly stopped this trend, creating a peak that year or
with a year lag, after which both variables declined in magnitude.
What is further noteworthy is the persistence of the decrease. Even though the flood
itself had subsided by early 2012, the decline in both total employment and number of
subsidiaries continued at least up to 2016. A potential explanation can be found in news
articles and academic discussions. Because the one-time event was large enough for firms
to update their risk perception regarding future flooding, companies “move[d] to avoid
potential supply chain disruptions” (Nikkei Asian Review, 2014). Similar arguments can be
found in academic discussions of the negative effects of policy uncertainty on international
trade and investment [Handley and Limão, 2017, Pierce and Schott, 2016, Steinberg et al.,
2017]. See Section C.1.7 for other trends in investment and intermediate purchases beyond
those discussed here.
Given the findings in Figure 3.3, we regard the elasticity findings below as the medium-
to long-run elasticities as opposed to short-run. We return to this issue when we set out our
empirical specification.
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Figure 3.3: Relative Trends of Aggregate Variables in Flooded Regions
(a) Total employment (b) Count of subsidiaries
Note: Authors’ calculation from BSOBA 2007-2016. “Flooded” shows the evolution of total employment
in factories located in the flooded area of Ayutthaya and Pathum Thani provinces. “ROW” shows that from
outside the flooded area. Both trends are normalized to 1 in 2011.
3.4.2 Estimation
For our main empirical results, we apply the identification strategy based on a linear
regression (3.18). Specifically, we first calibrate the standard parameter values f, Y and
constants (0 and,(

0 as discussed in Section 3.4.2. Given these values and the reduced-
form parameter of f;<,0" , we may back out _ from equation (3.18). Section 3.4.2 discusses
how we identify and estimate f;<,0" .
Step 1: Calibration under Homogeneous Nested CES
We first discuss how we back out f and Y from the data and then how to obtain _ from
equation (3.18). As for the capital-aggregate labor elasticity f, we employ the method
developed in recent studies [Oberfield and Raval, 2014, Raval, 2019]. Specifically, the cost-


















Based on this estimation equation, if we can obtain the coefficient on the log-relative factor
price term, we can back out the substitution parameter f. To operationalize the first-
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order condition relationship (3.19) to the data, we use the location <-level variation of
each plant 8, or < (8). Because local regions constitute labor markets due to commuting
immobility, wages vary across <’s. Moreover, these variations are empirically persistent,
so the coefficient obtained by this variation reveals the medium- to long-run elasticity of
substitution. Note that the location-level variation in wage can be sourced from many
shocks. Oberfield and Raval [2014], Raval [2019] let the location-level wage vary by a











+ -812 + 48, (3.20)
with a shift-share instrument I< =
∑
9∈J #" l< 9,−106 9 , where -8 is a plant-level control
variable, 9 is an industry, J #" is the set of non-manufacturing industries, l< 9,−10 is the
employment share of industry 9 in location < in the ten-year prior to the analysis period,
and 6 9 is the leave-<-out growth rate of national employment in industry 9 over the ten
years that preceded the analysis year.
We apply this method to Japan’s Census of Manufacture plant-level data, selecting only
firms that do not have international factories, as the estimation equation (3.19) applies to
non-MNEs. We define the unit of location < as the municipality.18 There are several
sources of municipality-level wage data, including the Japan Cabinet Office (CO) which
providesmunicipality-level averagewages. In addition, theBasic Survey onWage Structures
(BSWS) administered by Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare offers national
survey-based estimates of average municipal wages for each industry. Therefore, we have
three alternatives for the F< variable, and details of the estimation procedure are discussed
in Section C.1.8.
The estimation results for our main specification are shown in Table 3.1. Depending on
the choice of regressors, our estimates imply a lower substitution parameter f ≤ 0.2 than
Oberfield and Raval [2014] (see Section C.1.8 of the Appendix for detailed comparison of
this estimate to the values in the literature). The low substitution parameter would imply
a larger effect of 3 ln  on 3!( according to equation (3.14). We take the conservative
18The total number of municipalities was roughly 1700 as of 2005. This is a fairly small definition of the
local labor market, resembling counties in the U.S., of which there are roughly 3000. Another potential choice
for local labor markets in Japan are commuting zones recently used by Adachi et al. [2019], following the
seminal method introduced and popularized by Tolbert and Sizer [1996]. In 2005, there were 331 commuting
zones in Japan.
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Table 3.1: Estimates of f − 1
IV, CO IV, BSWS, all IV, BSWS, manuf.
log(F<(8)) −1.15 −1.24 −0.88
(0.18) (0.18) (0.13)
Num. obs. 51477 51477 51477
Notes: CO indicates that the wage data is from the Cabinet Office."BSWS, all" indicates that the wage variable
is taken from all industries from the Basic Survey on Wage Structures (BSWS), while "BSWS, manuf."
indicates that the wage variable is taken from only manufacturing industries from the BSWS. All regressions
include industry FE and multiunit status indicators. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
result by choosing the upper bound f = 0.2 in the following quantitative exercise.
As for the demand elasticity Y, we again employ Japan’s 2011 Census of Manufacture.
Following Oberfield and Raval [2014], we back out Y by Y = </(< − 1) , where < ≡
B0;4B/2>BC is the measured markup.19 The measured markup distribution is shown in
Figure C.17. The implied average markup implies Y ∈ [3.98, 4.88], depending on the
treatment of extreme values. This lies well within the range of the demand elasticity
estimate using firm-level markups. For a conservative impact on the labor share, we choose
the low-end Y = 4, which is within the range of demand elasticities of different industries
in the U.S. reported in Oberfield and Raval [2014].
To obtain the value for the foreign labor cost share of total cost(" ≡ ?"</
(
A: + F; + ?"<
)
,
we use the 2011 BSOBA survey data. Since our purpose is to back out _ from our estimate




;∈ 5 ;>>343 total payroll;5 ,2011∑
;∈F>A;3 total cost;5 ,2011
,
where 5 ;>>343 is the set of locations that were hit by the Floods. The definitions of total
payroll and total cost are provided in Section C.3.1. We then obtain the 2011 firm-level
average value of (" = 2.4% (see Figure C.18 for the complete (" distribution). Ac-
cordingly, we obtain the 2011 average value of,(" = 4.0% by replacing the denominator
of ("
8
with the sum of payrolls at all locations ; in the world. Section C.1.8 provides
estimation results for Y and (" .
19Note that we use the 2011 survey because equations (3.15) and (3.16) should be evaluated at the time of
the shock, which is 2011 in our case.
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Step 2: Estimating _ by Natural Experiment
For obtaining _ by Equation (3.18), our goal is to estimate the left-hand side parameter
f;<,0" . In our empirical application, we specify  = %# and  = '$, . We measure
foreign factor employment <8C by total foreign labor employment since in our data, the
quantity of factor employment is only available for labor. We thus specify the factor
substitution between country  and  in the model as the substitution of labor across
countries. As discussed further below, our result is robust to other choices for measuring
<8C . Hence, we use the notation ;%# as employment in Japan and ;'$, as employment in
the rest of the world, measuring factor employment in the rest of the world.




















is the log factor employment in the rest
of the world, 08 and 0C are firm- and year-fixed effects, and 48C is the error term.
It is critical to control these rich fixed effects. In fact, controlling firm fixed effects
restricts ourselves to leverage within-firm variations, since high-productivity firms are
likely to hire workers in the ROW (or conduct FDI and become an MNE, as in Helpman
et al., 2004). On the other hand, controlling for year fixed effects enhances the validity
of our analysis given the economic environment in which an increasing number of firms
become MNEs and hire more local workers in foreign countries, as we saw in Figure 3.3.





can emerge from many
sources, one of which is the firm-specific exchange rate that occurs through demand shocks
or total factor productivity. Since we look for a foreign factor-augmenting productivity
shock in equation (3.17), we construct an instrumental variable (IV) based on the 2011
Thailand Floods. For this purpose, note that the flooding was local, it occurred during one
limited period of time relative to the coverage of our dataset and, most importantly, it was
unexpected. We construct an IV that interacts in the Thailand location before the flood
and the year after the flood. Because the shock was unexpected, the IV is exogenous to
firms’ foreign production decisions, after controlling for the firm and year fixed effects. To





caused by this foreign productivity shock, an IV of a
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× 1 {C ≥ 2012} , (3.22)
where ; 5 ;>>343
8,2011 is firm-8’s total employment in the flooded regions in year 2011, right before
the flooding. This measure captures how much each MNE 8 relies on employment in the
flooded region. Namely, if a firm hires a relatively large number of workers in the flooded
region immediately before the flood, the firm is likely to be hit by the flood severely, thus
receiving a large negative (firm-8) foreign factor-augmenting productivity shock.











= 08 + 0C + 1/8C + 48C . (3.24)






and /8C conditional on the fixed effects. Given the validity of the first stage, we
interpret
1̂+ = f;<,0" .
As shown in Section 3.4.1, the floods had medium- to long-run effects rather than short-run
effects on employment, so coefficient 1̂+ or, in turn, _ as meduim- to long-run elasticity
rather than short-run. Specifically, we relate the decline in employment found in aggregate











. This point is crucial when
we move on to the quantitative exercise, because our concern is a relatively long-run change
in labor share. In the discussion below, we conduct a robustness check of the long-difference
specification and extension to the event-study regressions.
Table 3.2 shows the estimation result from the 2SLS specification (3.23) and (3.24), with
the robust standard errors reported in parentheses. All columns show that the coefficients
are statistically significant at the two-sided one-percent level.
Column 1 shows the result of the OLS specification without any fixed effects; that is,
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Table 3.2: Estimating f;<,0"

















Observations 5,563 5,563 5,563 5,563 5,563
Model OLS FE 2SLS 2SLS-1st 2SLS-reduced
Firm FE - YES YES YES YES
Year FE - YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
under the restriction 08 = 0C = 0 for all 8 and C, column 2 the fixed effect specification, and
column 3 the instrumental variable specification in equation (3.22). Comparing Columns
1 and 2, we see that while both coefficients are positive, the coefficient magnitude becomes
small after controlling for fixed effects as to heterogeneity in the productivity of firms.
Column 3 shows that a one-percent decrease in employment in the rest of the world
due to the 2011 Thailand Floods caused Japanse MNEs to decrease home employment by
0.192 percent. Although this coefficient is a composite of model parameters as shown in
equation (3.18) without any meaningful interpretation by itself, it is produced by the 2SLS
first stage and reduced-form regressions shown in columns 4 and 5. Column 4 shows that
a firm that did not rely on employment in the flooded region in 2011 would have reduced
its employment in the rest of the world by 72.8 percent had it relied completely on the
employment there.20 Given that a few firms resumed operations relatively quickly after
the flooding subsided, a reduction less than 100 percent is reasonable. As mentioned in
Section 3.3.3, this number is proportional to the composite direct and indirect effect of
the flood shock, related to equation (3.16). More interestingly, column 5 reveals that the
same hypothetical increase in the reliance in Thailand employment would cause the firm to
reduce employment in Japan by 14.0 percent. Again, this cross effect of a foreign factor-
augmenting productivity shock on home employment is indicative of the indirect effect
20The standard deviation of our IV is 0.157, so a one standard deviation increase in our IV translates to an
11.4% decrease in employment in foreign countries.
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described in equation (3.15). Thus, the fraction of these two coefficients, 0.192 in column
3, indicates the direct effect of the flood, or the implied elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign labor inputs. Since the sign of the regression coefficient in column 5 is
the key to the sign of the 2SLS estimate and thus the value of _, we conduct a robustness
check in Section C.1.10.
Before turning to the backing out of our parameter of interest _, it is worthwhile to note
that the column 3 estimates of foreign employment are higher than in column 2. This is due
to the difference in the source of identifying variation and is indicative of the benefit of our
natural experiment approach. Namely, in the 2SLS specification, the source of variation is
the offshore productivity shock, so the coefficient reflects only the structural interpretation
(i.e. the function of structural parameters). However, the fixed effect specification does not
identify any structural parameters. For example, if the underlying variation is an increase
in wages in the offshore country relative to Japan caused by, for example, TFP growth in
the offshore country, then the substitution from offshore labor to Japanese labor (so-called
inshoring) would have a negative correlation between offshore labor and Japanese labor.
This potentially explains why the coefficient for the fixed effect specification would be
smaller in magnitude than that for 2SLS.
Based on the calibrations of f and Y from Section 3.4.2, equation (3.17) implies that
_ = 1.4. Since Y;<,0" has a valid standard error from the 2SLS estimation, we can obtain
the standard error of _ as 0.13 by the Delta method, indicating that we reject the gross-
complementary home and foreign labor _ ≤ 1 at the 0.1 percent significance level, as
discussed in detail in Section C.1.9. Therefore, our calibrations f = 0.2 and _ = 1.4 imply
that Assumption 2 is satisfied empirically. Applying Lemma 1, we conclude that a positive
foreign factor augmentation causes a qualitative decrease in labor share. To proceed to the
quantitative implication, in what follows we back out the foreign factor augmentation from
the aggregate data.
In Section C.1.10 of the Appendix, we discuss a number of robustness checks, including
use of other measures of MNEs like foreign operation at extensive margins and subsidiary
sales, choice of control groups, and the role of Tohoku Earthquake and tsunami. In Section
C.1.11, we also show some extension exercises, such as the use of widely-used shift-share
instruments, event study-style regression analysis, substitution between Thailand and other
third countries, and industry-specific effects.
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3.5 Discussions
3.5.1 Quantitative Implication of Foreign Factor Augmentations
In Section 3.4, we discussed how we backed out the elasticity of labor share with respect to
the foreign factor augmentation. To derive the implication quantitatively, we need to know
how much foreign factor-augmenting productivity grew over the period of interest. For this
purpose, we invert the factor demand functions (C.49) and (C.50) in the aggregate. We
proxy the quantity of employment of foreign factors " by the foreign employment !'$,
and accordingly the foreign factor prices by labor wage F'$, . We apply  = %# and















Therefore, given the measures of aggregate employment and average wage in the home and
foreign countries, and the backed-out elasticity between home and foreign labor, we can
obtain the implied relative productivity in the rest of the world. The intuition behind the
relationship is as follows. Suppose, as we calibrated, _ > 1, or factor augmentation is biased
to that factor. Then given the wage structure in the rest of the world and Japan, relatively
large employment in the rest of the world implies relatively augmentingly productive labor
in the rest of the world. On the other hand, given the employment structure, a relatively
high wage in the rest of the world also reflects relatively augmentingly productive labor in




by BSOBA. In particular, we calculate
!'$, by aggregating all foreign employment in all countries except for Japan and F'$,





the JIP database, a Japanese project for assembling KLEMS database.
To obtain the absolute productivity 0" as opposed to the relative productivity 0"/0! ,
we calibrate Japan’s labor-augmenting productivity growth by JIP database’s Quality of
Labor measure. The JIP measure reflects changes in the composition of workers–gender,
age, education, employment status–which is standard representation of factor augmentation.
21It is an important extension to consider a multi-country version of our model and its empirical imple-
mentations. Section C.1.7 reviews the country-level aggregate trends.
22Note our qualification _ > 1. In fact, if _ < 1, then the discussion in the text reverses, which means
that an observed increase in foreign employment and wages would imply decreasing relative foreign factor
augmentation. To the extent that such a decrease is implausible, this observation is more supporting evidence
for _ > 1. Section C.3.1 shows the implication to '$, when it is nonetheless assumed that _ < 1.
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Figure 3.4: Quantitative Implications
(a) Foreign Factor Augmentation 3 ln  (b) Actual and Counterfactual Labor Share
We argue that this affects the efficiency units of labor, thereby Japan’s labor-augmenting
productivity. Given this trend, we can separate the trends of factor augmentation in Japan
and the rest of the world. As a result, in Figure 3.4a, the left panel shows the trend of the
evolution of 3 ln 0"C ≈ ln 0"C − ln 0"1995, with our base year 1995, while Figure C.22 shows
the growth in Japan’s labor augmentation.
We emphasize the relative importance of 3 ln 0"C and 3 ln 0!C . By comparing the H-axes,





= 3 ln 0" − 3 ln 0! in equation (3.25). This could be interpreted
as due to at least two factors. First, the relative augmentation was fast in the rest of
the world relative to in Japan. This is plausible given that our BSOBA-based measure
of !'$, and F'$, , the ingredients in equation (3.25), comes from employment data
in many rapidly expanding economies including Thailand. Second, globalization may
contribute to the relative importance of 3 ln 0" , comprising declining transportation and
communication costs as well as the removal of political barriers to investment. These
imply higher employment in the rest of the world by Japanese MNEs given the factor costs,
according to our estimated elasticity of substitution _ = 1.4.
With these calibrations, we may learn the evolution of the effect of foreign factor
augmentation on labor share. We calculate,("0 as the fraction of total payment to foreign
labor taken from BSOBA over the sum of that and the total payment to workers in Japan
in the base year, which gives ,("0 = 0.8%. In Figure 3.4b, we show the counterfactual
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labor share had there been only the foreign augmentation from equation (3.14). Again, we
set the base year to 1995, the first year of the BSOBA data. The solid line shows the actual
evolution, whereas the dashed line shows the counterfactual one, and we see that foreign
factor augmentation played a substantial role in explaining the observed labor share decline
from 1995-2007. Quantitatively, it explains 59 percent of the decline during the period.
Discussion One might naturally ask whether this large effect is an artifact of our choice
of sample period. We chose a baseline final year of 2007 for our analysis both because
the Great Recession would complicate the interpretation and also because the international
System of National Accounts (SNA) changed drastically after 2008. However, Section C.3.2
shows the corresponding results for a more recent trend in labor share up to 2015,23 and
we find that 58 percent of the decrease in labor share from 1995 to 2015 may be attributed
to our mechanism of increased foreign productivity. Our mechanism is also successful in
explaining the countercyclical component of labor share trend in the data.
We also conduct the same quantitative analysis from peak to peak to further control for
potential effects of business cycle. We take peak years, 1997, 2000, and 2008, from the
Cabinet Office of Japan. When we conduct the quantitative analysis from 1997 to 2008 and
2000 to 2008, our mechanism could explain the decrease in the labor share by 77 percent
and 112 percent. The reason we obtain large values for the recent waves of the business
cycle is that the actual decrease in the labor share was small, especially between 2000 and
2008, so the fraction that our mechanism explains becomes large.
Finally, we investigate how our quantitative results may differ given the error in the
estimate of our key parameter, _. To do this, we use the standard error estimate B4(_) = 0.13
that we derive in Section C.1.9 of the Appendix. In particular, we conduct the same
quantitative analysis with values of _ one standard error smaller and larger. The results
indicate that the quantitative magnitude relative to the observed decrease in the labor share
varies between 48 percent to 83 percent depending on the value of _. Although there is an
uncertainty in the exact size of the impact, we conclude that there was clearly a significantly
negative effect on the labor share in Japan due to foreign factor augmentation.
23As a reservation, the quantitative result is sensitive to our parameter values, in particular the estimate of
f. Section C.3.1 shows different results under several parameter values of _ and f.
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3.5.2 Role of Firm Heterogeneity
Our estimation and quantitative implications have relied on the homogeneous production
function derived in Section 3.3.4. An implication of this restriction is the coincidence of
micro- and macro-elasticities [Oberfield and Raval, 2014]. However, since we observe rich
heterogeneity at the firm level, foreign factor augmentation could potentially reallocate
factor resources from one firm to another. Since factor prices clear the factor markets, such
heterogeneity and reallocation may matter for the relative wage, which through equation
(3.5) affects the labor share. To examine this effect clearly, we consider a modified version
of the model in Section 3.3.4; a general equilibrium with the same nested CES production
function but with firm-level heterogeneous augmentations. To facilitate the comparison,
we also consider a case with the same foreign factor augmentation across firms, 3 ln 0"
8
=
3 ln 0" for any 8. This is consistent with the interpretation that the foreign factor augments
because policy and institutional changes or technological progress in country  affects all
firms in country  alike.
In Section C.2.6, we prove that the change in the relative wage in this case may be solved
as
3 lnF − 3 ln A ∝
[



























To interpret the terms in equation (3.26), note that the first term reflects the differences
in the elasticities in the upper f and lower nest _. If _ > f, then the increase in foreign
productivity substitutes labor in country  relatively more than capital in country , which
results in a downward pressure to the wage relative to capital return and, in turn, the labor
share. This effect depends on the average wage payment share to the foreign factor ,("
;
.
These arguments do not involve the firm heterogeneity and appear in the homogeneous
model as well. We call this term the substitution effect.











matters. To understand this term, suppose that (i) demand
elasticity Y is so elastic that Y > f, and (ii) the foreign factor share distribution is more





Note that assumption (ii) is consistent with the finding by Sun [2020] that “multinational
firms are on average larger firms and larger firms on average use more capital-intensive
technologies.” Given these two assumptions, the increase in the foreign factor productivity
results in a reduction in the marginal cost of production, which causes high demand if Y
is large. Across firms, this is moreso for firms that use relatively more foreign factors. If
such firms are more capital intensive than Home labor intensive, the aggregate demand for
capital increases more than that for Home labor. This causes the capital return to increase
more than the Home wage, which results in a reduction in the labor share. We call this effect
the reallocation effect. Note that the argument above crucially depends on the heterogeneity
in firms’ factor intensities. Indeed, if firms are homogeneous, the weight of the weighted




= (" −(" = 0. Therefore,
when there is no heterogeneity in firm factor intensity, there is no reallocation effect and
the effect on the Home relative wage only emerges as the substitution effect.
To measure the size of the substitution and reallocation effects, we employ our matched
dataset. BSJBSA data contains the variable of cost of labor compensation in the domestic
firms and net operating surplus. We take these measures as F;8 and A:8, respectively. From
BSOBA, we can obtain the total compensation of MNEs in each foreign plant, which we






that are relevant in equation (3.26). The matched data is available for 2007-2016.
With values _ = 1.4, f = 0.2, Y = 4, we plot the size of the substitution and reallocation
effects according to data from each year (Figure 3.5).
Figure 3.5 provides two takeaways. First, both the substitution and reallocation effects
are negative for most years. Indeed, except for the reallocation effect in 2015, all effects
head to the negative side. This implies that when foreign factor productivity increases,
the relative Home wage decreases, which pushes down the Home labor share. Moreover,
introducing heterogeneity into the model strengthens the negative effect of a given increase
in the foreign productivity due to the reallocation effect. Note that the substitution effect
is negative because _ > f. The reallocation effect is mostly negative both because (i)




in the data. Second, in many years,
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Figure 3.5: Relative Size of the Effects
Note: The 2007-2016 trend of the relative size of the reallocation effect and substitution effects among the
drop in the labor share. The reallocation effect is the component due to firms’ heterogeneous factor inputs,
and the substitution effect shows the capital-labor substitution given the relative factor price changes within a
firm. See the main text for the detail.
the reallocation effect is smaller than the substitution effect in absolute value. Therefore,
although the reallocation amplifies the negative substitution effect, it does not contribute to
the overall effect in a dominant way.24 Combining these two observations, we conclude that
firm heterogeneity and the reallocation effect does not alter our conclusion that foreign factor
augmentation worked as a force that decreased the labor share in Japan from 1995-2007.
3.5.3 Method of Moments Estimation
In this section, we apply the estimation method based on the general moment conditions
(3.9). For this purpose, we take a two-step approach. First, we separate the set of parameters
estimated by equation (3.9) and other nuisance parameters.25 We then fix the nuisance
parameters by the method based on the nested CES specification discussed so far. Second,
given these parameters, we identify and estimate the parameters of our interest.
In particular, given the elasticity matrix discussed in Section C.2.5, for all 8, we set
f
:̃ Ã ,8













24One may see relatively high volatility of the reallocation effect. This is due in part to the fact that we
measure the capital payment by accounting net operating surplus which is volatile.
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+ (f − Y) ("
8
, where f and
_ are constants reflecting the substitution parameters under nested CES, ( 5
8
are firm 8’s
factor- 5 cost share for 5 =  , !, " , and,( 5
8
are firm 8’s factor- 5 payment share between




from our firm-level Japanese MNE data,
and calibrate _ = 1.4, f = 0.2, and Y = 4.
We then estimate the remaining parameters, elasticities of country- capital and labor
demand with respect to foreign factor prices. We employ the method of moments (3.9)
and the flood-based instrumental variable. In particular, first, to have restrictions on f<̃Ã,8
and f<̃F̃,8, note that by the symmetry of the Hessian matrix of the cost function, demand
structure (3.1), and Shephard’s lemma, we have
("8 f<̃Ã,8 = (
 
8 f:̃ ?̃" ,8, (3.27)
("8 f<̃;̃,8 = (
!
8 f̃; ?̃" ,8 . (3.28)
Proof of these equations is given in Section C.2.7. Finally, to implement the estimation, we









for all 8 ∈  .
Given this setup, we implement the method of moments estimation based on equation
(3.9) as follows.
















and generate implied firm-level
elasticity matrix Σ(=) based on equation (3.10) and our set of partial identification




















based on equation (3.11).
2. Remove the year fixed effects from the factor augmentation and instrumental variables
/8C .
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3. Evaluate the sample-analog of the moment condition (3.9).
4. If a closed-form solution is not obtained, update =, go back to process 1 and iterate
until convergence.
Out of the above algorithm, we obtain
f
:̃ ?̃"
= −0.20 (std. err. 0.13), (3.29)f̃
; ?̃"
= −0.09 (std. err. 0.04). (3.30)




, suggests that a
negative cost shock (or positive factor augmentation) increases the demand for Home capital
relatively more thanHome labor. Given that capital demand is more negatively elastic to the
capital rental rate and labor demand is to wage, the capital rental rate must increase while
the wage for labor must decrease to restore the factor market clearing conditions (3.3).
Note that the last part of this logic is reminiscent of the celebrated Stolper-Samuelson
theorem: Consider a two-factor economy. If the factor demand increases differentially for
one factor, then the relative wage of that factor increases (more than the increase in the
factor demands) while the wage of the other decreases. In the Stolper-Samuelson setup,
the factor demand increase is caused by an exogenous change in the terms of trade. On the
other hand, in our setup, what drives the changes in factor demands in  is the combination
of foreign factor augmentation and (total) elasticity with respect to it of factors in . If
(same-sized) foreign factor augmentation elastically increases the relative demand for one
factor (in our empirical case, capital relative to labor), that means that the demand for the
factor increases differentially, or the factor is complementary to the foreign factor that was
augmented.
3.6 Conclusion
What impact does increased employment of foreign factors of production by an MNE have
on labor share in the home country? To address this question, we proceeded in three steps.
First, we developed an equilibriummodel of production featuring augmented employment of
foreign factors with varying elasticities of substitution. From this theory, we then pinpointed
the key elasticities relevant to labor share: the relative size of labor, and capital substitution
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with foreign factors, and showed how a foreign factor-augmenting productivity shock to
a small set of firms may help to identify these elasticities. Armed with these theoretical
results, we then applied the theory to the 2011 Thailand Floods, which was experienced as
a large negative foreign factor productivity shock for a subset of Japanese MNEs. Using
firm- and plant-level data from Japan, we estimated the reduced-form parameter with the
instrumental variable related to the flood shock, finding that home and foreign labor are gross
substitutes. This estimate, combined with the estimates of capital-labor elasticity based on
our Japanese plant-level data, indicates that foreign factor augmentation contributed to the
decline in the labor share in Japan from 1995-2007. Our further quantitative counterfactual
analyses show that 59 percent of the observed labor share decline in the period can be
attributed to foreign factor augmentation.
There are at least three different directions for extending the model. First, we may
incorporate rich heterogeneity at the firm level as discussed in Section C.2.6 and at the
destination country level as we empirically suggest in Section C.1.7. Second, our production
model could potentially generalize an influential model of factor offshoring such as Feenstra
and Hanson [1997], which would tighten the connection with the literature. For this
purpose, we suggest a generalized production function in Section C.2.2. Finally, while
our model extends to a more complete general equilibrium with factor supplies and a
large open economy, all of the results of this paper in terms of identification, empirical
application, and quantification depend on the specific model choice, so this is another
theoretical development left for future study.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Data Appendix
A.1.1 Data Sources in Detail
I complement data from JARA data and O*NET data by the ones from IFR, BACI, IPUMS
USA and CPS. IFR is a standard data source of industrial robot adoption in several countries
(e.g., Graetz and Michaels, 2018; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020, AR thereafter), to which
JARA provides the robot data of Japan. I use IFR data to show the total robot adoption
in each destination country as opposed to the import from Japan. I use Federal Reserve
Economic Data (FRED) to convert JARA variables denominated in JPY to USD. BACI
provides disaggregated data on trade flows for more than 5000 products and 200 countries
and is a standard data source of international trade [Gaulier and Zignago, 2010]. I use
BACI data to obtain the measure of international trade of industrial robots and baseline
trade shares. IPUMS USA collects and harmonizes US census microdata [Ruggles et al.,
2018]. I use Population Censuses (1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000) and American Community
Surveys (ACS, 2006-2008 3-year sample and 2012-2016 5-year sample). I obtain occupa-
tional wages, employment, and labor cost shares from these data sources. To obtain the
intermediate inputs shares, I take data from the World Input-Output Data (WIOD) in the
closest year to the initial year, 1992.
I use the match score from the O*NET Code Connector that contains detailed textual
descriptions of 4-digit occupations. The match score is an output of the weighted search
algorithm used by the O*NET Code Connector, which is the internal search algorithm
120
developed and employed by O*NET and since September 2005. Since then, the O*NET
has continually updated the algorithm and improved the quality of the search results.
Morris [2019] reports that the updated weighted search algorithm scored 95.9% based on
the position and score of a target best 4-digit occupation for a given query.
I followedAutor et al. [2013] for Census/ACS data cleaning procedure. Namely, I extract
the 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 Censuses, the 2006-2008 3-year file of American Community
Survey (ACS), and the 2012-2016 5-year file of ACS from Integrated Public Use Micro
Samples. For each file, I select all workers with the OCC2010 occupation code whose age
is between 16 and 64 and who is not institutionalized. I compute education share in each
occupation by the share of workers with more than “any year in college,” and foreign-born
share by the share of workers with BPL (birthplace) variable greater than 150, or those
whose birthplace is neither in the US nor in US outlying areas/territories. I compute hours
worked by multiplying usual weeks worked and hours worked per week. For 1970, I use
the median values in each bin of the usual weeks worked variable and assume all workers
worked for 40 hours a week since the hour variable does not exist. To compute hourly wage,
I first impute each state-year’s top-coded values by multiplying 1.5 and divide by the hours
worked. To remove outliers, I take wages below first percentile of the distribution in each
year, and set the maximum wage as the top-coded earning divided by 1,500. I compute
the real wage in 2000 dollars by multiplying CPI99 variable prepared by IPUMS. I use the
person weight variable for aggregating all of these variables to the occupation level. Figure
A.1 shows the occupational employment distribution for each sector, a variable used for
creating the occupational China shock in equation (1.2).
To estimate themodel with workers’ dynamic discrete choice of occupation, I further use
the bilateral occupation flow data following the idea of Caliendo et al. [2019]. Specifically,
I obtain the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the CPS since 1976.
For each year, I select all workers with the 2010 occupation code for the current year
(OCC2010) and the last year (OCC10LY) whose age is between 16 and 64 and who is not
institutionalized, and treated top-coded wage income, converted nominal wage income to
real one, and computed labor hours worked, education, foreign born flag variable with the
same method as the one used for Census/ACS above. When computing the occupation
switch probability, note that the 4-digit occupations are too disaggregated to precisely
estimate with the small sample size of CPS-ASEC, as pointed out by Artuç et al. [2010].
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Figure A.1: Occupational Employment Distribution
(a) Employment size !B,>,C0 (b) Employment share ;B,>,C0
Note: The author’s calculation from the 1990 US Census. The axis on the left indicates the 5 occupation groups defined in Section 1.4.1, and the one on the right shows sectors (roughly 4-digit
for manufacturing sectors and 2-digit for the non-manufacturing). The left panel shows the size of employment, and the right one indicates the occupation share for each given sector.
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Figure A.2: Examples of Industrial Robots
(a) Spot Welding (b) Material Handling
Sources: Autobot Systems and Automation (https://www.autobotsystems.com) and PaR Systems (https://www.par.com)
Therefore, I assume that the occupations do not flow between 4-digit occupations within the
5 groups defined in Section 1.4.1, but do between the 5 groups. I assume that workers draw
a destination 4-digit occupation occupation from the initial-year occupational employment
distribution within the destination group when switching occupations. With these data and
assumptions, I compute the occupation switching probability by year.
A.1.2 Details in Industrial Robots
Definition and Examples
As defined in Footnote 1, industrial robots are defined as multiple-axes manipulators. More
formally, following International Organization for Standardization (ISO), I define robots
as “automatically controlled, reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator, programmable
in three or more axes, which can be either fixed in place or mobile for use in industrial
automation applications” (ISO 8373:2012). This section gives a detailed discussion about
such industrial robots. Figure A.2 shows the pictures of examples of industrial robots that
are intensively used in the production process and considered in this paper. The left panel
shows spot-welding robots, while the right panel shows the material-handling robots. The
spot welding robots are an example of robots in routine-production occupations, while the
material-handling robots are that in routine-transportation (material-moving) occupations.
It is also worthwhile to give an example of technologies that are not robots according to
the definition in this paper. An example of a growth in technology in the material-handling
area is autonomous driving. Mehta and Levy [2020] predicts that such automation will
grow strong and result in the reduction of total number of jobs in this area in eight to ten
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years since 2020. However, since autonomous vehicles do not operate multiple-axes, they
are not treated in this paper at all. A similar observation applies for computers or artificial
intelligence more generally.
JARA Robot Applications
In addition to applications in Section A.1.2, the full list of robot applications avaliable in
JARA data is Die casting; Forging; Resin molding; Pressing; Arc welding; Spot welding;
Laser welding; Painting; Load/unload; Mechanical cutting; Polishing and deburring; Gas
cutting; Laser cutting; Water jet cutting; General assembly; Inserting; Mounting; Bond-
ing; Soldering; Sealing and gluing; Screw tightening; Picking alignment and packaging;
Palletizing; Measurement/inspection/test; and Material handling.
Can robots be classified as one of these applications? If one is familiar with the history of
industrial robots, (s)he might wonder that robots are characterized by versatility as opposed
to older specified industrial machinery [KHI, 2018]. Although it is true that a robot may
be reprogrammed to perform more than one task, I claim that robots are well-classified
to one of the applications listed above since the layer of dexterity is different. Robots
might be able to adjust a model change of the products, but are not supposed to perform
different tasks across the 4-digit occupation level. To support this point, recall that “SMEs
are mostly high-mix/low-volume producers. Robots are still too inflexible to be switched
at a reasonable cost from one task to another” [Autor et al., 2020]. These technological
bottlenecks still make it hard for producers to have such a versatile robot that can replace a
wide range of workers at the 4-digit occupation level even today, all the more for the sample
period of my study.
Details in Application-Occupation Matching
Concrete examples of the pairs of an application and an occupation that are close are spot
welding and material handling. On the one hand, spot welding is a task of welding two
or more metal sheets into one by applying heat and pressure to a small area called spot.
In contrast, O*NET-SOC Code 51-4121.06 has the title “Welders, Cutters, and Welder
Fitters” (“Welders” below). Therefore, both spot welding robots and welders perform the
welding task. On the other hand, Material handling is a short-distance movement of heavy
materials. It is another major application of robots. In comparison, ONET-SOC Code 53-
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Figure A.3: Examples of Match Scores
(a) Spot Welding (b) Material Handling
Note: The author’s calculation from the search result of O*NET Code Connector. The bars indicate match scores for the search query
term “Spot Welding” in panel (a) and “Material Handling” in panel (b). Occupations codes are 2010 O*NET SOC codes. In each panel,
occupations are sorted descendingly with the relative relevance scores, and the top 5 occupations are shown. See the main text for the
detail of the score.
7062.00 has the title “Laborers and Freight, Stock, and Material Movers, Hand” (“Material
Handler” below). Therefore, both material handling robots and material handlers perform
the material handling task.
Figure A.3 shows examples of the O*NET match scores for spot welding and material
handling. On the left panel, welding occupations are listed as relevant occupations for spot
welding. In contrast, on the right panel, a material-moving laborer is a top occupation in
terms of the relevance to the material-handling task, as I described above.
Examples of Robotics Innovation
In the model, I call a change in the robot task space 0>,C as the automation shock, and that in
robot producer’s TFP '
;,>,C
as the cost shock to produce robots. In this section, I show some
examples of changes of robot technology and new patents to facilitate understandings of
these interpretation. An example of task space expansion is adopting Programmed Article
Transfer (PAT, Devol, 1961). PAT was machine that moves objects by a method called
“teaching and playback”. Teaching and playback method needs one-time teaching of how
to move, after which the machine playbacks the movement repeatedly and automatically.
This feature frees workers of performing repetitive tasks. PAT was intensively introduced
in spot welding tasks. KHI [2018] reports that among 4,000 spot welding points, 30% were
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done be human previously, which PAT took over. Therefore, I interpret the adoption of PAT
as the example of the expansion of the robot task space, or increase in 0>,C . Note that AR
also analyze this type of technological change.
An example of cost reduction is adopting Programmable Universal Manipulator for
Assembly (PUMA). PUMA was designed to quickly and accurately transport, handle and
assemble automobile accessories. A new computer language, Variable Assembly Language
(VAL), made it possible because it made the teaching process less work and more sophis-
ticated. In other words, PUMA made tasks previously done by other robots but at cheaper
unit cost per unit of task.
It is also worth mentioning that introduction of a new robot brand typically contains both
components of innovation (task space expansion and cost reduction). For example, PUMA
also expanded task space of robots. Since VAL allowed the use of sensors and “expanded
the range of applications to include assembly, inspection, palletizing, resin casting, arc
welding, sealing and research” [KHI, 2018].
A.1.3 Trade of Industrial Robots
To compute the trade shares of industrial robots, I combine BACI and IFR data. In particular,
I use the HS code 847950 (“Industrial Robots For Multiple Uses”) to measure the robots,
following Humlum [2019]. I approximate the initial year value by year of 1998, when the
this HS code of robots is first available. To calculate the total absorption value of robots in
each country, I use the IFR data’s robot units (quantities), combined with the price indices
of robots occasionally released by IFR’s annual reports for selected countries. These price
indices do not give disaggregation by robot tasks or occupations, highlighting the value
added of the JARA data. Figure A.4 the pattern of international trade of international
robots. In the left panel, I compute the import-absorption ratio. To remove the noise due
to yearly observations and focus on a long-run trend, I aggregate by five-year bins 2001-
2005 and 2011-2015. The result indicates that many countries import robots as opposed
to produce in their countries. Japan’s low import ratio is outstanding, revealing that its
comparative advantage in this area. It is noteworthy that China largely domesticated the
production of robots over the sample period. Another way to show grasp the comparative
advantage of the robot industry is to examine the share of exports as in the right panel of
Figure A.4. Roughly speaking, the half of the world robot market was dominated by EU and
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Figure A.4: Trade of Industrial Robots
(a) Robot Import-Absorption Ratio (b) World Robot Export Share, 2001-2005
Note: The author’s calculation from the IFR, and BACI data. The left panel show the fraction of import in the total absorption value. The
import value is computed by aggregating trade values across origin country in the BACI data (HS-1996 code 847950), and the absorption
value is computed by the price index and the quantity variable available for selected countries in the IFR data. The data are five-year
aggregated in 2001-2005 and 2011-2015, and countries are sorted according to the import shares in 2001-2005 descendingly. The right
panel shows the export share for 2001-2005 aggregates obtained from the BACI data.
one-third by Japan in 2001-2005. The rest 20% is shared by the rest of the world, mostly
by the US and South Korea.
A.1.4 Trends of Robot Stocks and Prices
I will show that different occupations experienced different trends in robot adoption. Figure
A.5 shows the trend of US robot stocks at the occupation level. In the left panel, I show
the trend of raw stock. First, the overall robot stocks increased rapidly in the period, as
found in the previous literature. The panel also shows that the increase occurred in many
occupations, but at differential rates. To highlight such a difference, in the right panel, I
plot the normalized trend at 100 in the initial year. There is significant heterogeneity in the
growth rates, ranging from a factor of one to eight.
For example, I color in the figure two occupations, robots that correspond to “Welding,
Soldering, and Brazing Workers” (or “Welding”) and “Laborers and Freight, Stock, and
Material Movers, Hand” (or “Material handling”). On the one hand, welding is an occupa-
tion where the majority of robots were applied continuously throughout the period, as can
be confirmed in the left panel. However, the growth rate of the stocks is not outstanding, but
within the range of growth rates of other occupations. On the other hand, material handling
was not a majority occupation as of the initial year, but it grew at the most rapid pace in the
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Figure A.5: US Robot Stocks at the Occupation Level
(a) Level (b) Normalized
Notes: The author’s calculation based on JARA and O*NET. The figure shows the trend of stocks of robots in the US for each
occupation. The left panel shows the level, whereas the right panel shows the normalized trend at 100 in 1992. In both panels, I highlight
two occupations. “Welding” corresponds the occupation code in IPUMS USA, OCC2010 = 8140 “Welding, Soldering, and Brazing
Workers.” “Material Handling” corresponds the occupation code OCC2010 = 9620 “Laborers and Freight, Stock, and Material Movers,
Hand.” Years are aggregated into five-year bins (with the last bin 2012-2017 being six-year one) to smooth out yearly noises.
period.
These findings indicate the difference between the automation shocks each occupation
received. Some occupations were already somewhat automated by robotics as of the initial
year, and the automation process continued afterward (e.g., welding). There are a few
occupations where robotics automation was not achieved initially, but the innovation and
adoption occurred rapidly in the period (e.g., material handling). I propose a model that
incorporates this heterogeneity and discuss how to exploit it in estimation in the following
sections.
Figure A.6 shows the trend of prices of robots in the US for each occupation. In addition
to the overall decreasing trend, there is significant heterogeneity in the pattern of price falls
across occupations. For instance, although the welding robots saw a large drop in the price
during the 1990s, the material handling robots did not but increased the price over the
sample period.
A.1.5 Robots from Japan in the US, Europe, and the Rest of theWorld
I review the international comparison of the pattern of robot adoption. I generate the
growth rates of stock of robots between 1992 and 2017 at the occupation level for each
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Figure A.6: Robot Prices at the Occupation Level
Notes: The author’s calculation based on JARA and O*NET. The figure shows the trend of prices of robots in the US for each occupation.
I highlight two occupations. “Welding” corresponds the occupation code in IPUMS USA, OCC2010 = 8140 “Welding, Soldering, and
Brazing Workers.” “Material Handling” corresponds the occupation code OCC2010 = 9620 “Laborers and Freight, Stock, and Material
Movers, Hand.” Years are aggregated into five-year bins (with the last bin 2012-2017 being six-year one) to smooth out yearly noises.
The dollars are converted to 2000 real US dollar using CPI.
group of destination countries. The groups are the US, the non-US countries, (namely, the
world excluding the US and Japan), and five European countries (or “EU-5”), Denmark,
Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden used in AR. To calculate the stock of robots, I employ
the perpetual inventory method with depreciation rate of X = 0.1, following Graetz and
Michaels [2018].
Figure A.7 shows scatterplots of the growth rates at the occupation level. The left panel
shows the growth rates in the US on the horizontal axis and the ones in non-US countries
on the vertical axis. The right panel shows the same measures on the horizontal axis, but
the growth rates in the set of EU-5 countries on the vertical axis. These panels show that
the stocks of robots at the occupation level grow (1992-2017) between the US and non-US
proportionately relative to those between the US and EU-5. This finding is in contrast to
AR, who find that the US aggregate robot stocks grew at a roughly similar rate as those did in
EU-5. It also indicates that non-US growth patterns reflect growths of robotics technology
at the occupation level available in the US. I will use these patterns as the proxy for robotics
technology available in the US. In Section 1.3 and on, I take a further step and solve for the
robot adoption quantity and values in non-US countries in general equilibrium including
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Figure A.7: Growth Rates of Robots at the Occupation Level
(a) Comparison between the US and non-US
(b) Comparison between the US and EU-5
Notes: The author’s calculation based on JARA, and O*NET. The left panel shows the correlation between occupation-level growth rates
of robot stock quantities from Japan to the US and the growth rates of the quantities to the non-US countries. The right one shows the
correlation between growth rates of the quantities to the US and EU-5 countries. Non-US are the aggregate of all countries excluding the
US and Japan. EU-5 are the aggregate of Denmark, France, Finland, Italy, and Sweden used in Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020]. Each
bubble shows an occupation. The bubble size reflects the stock of robot in the US in the baseline year, 1992. See the main text for the
detail of the method to create the variables.
the US and non-US countries.
It is worth mentioning that a potential reason for the difference between my finding and
AR’s is the difference in data sources. In contrast to the JARA data I use, AR use IFR data
that include all robot seller countries. Since EU-5 is closer tomajor robot producer countries
other than Japan, including Germany, the robot adoption pattern across occupations may
be influenced by their presence. If these close producers have a comparative advantage
in producing robots for a specific occupation, then EU-5 may adopt the robots for such
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occupations intensively from close producers. In contrast, countries out of EU-5, including
the US, may not benefit the closeness to these producers. Thus they are more likely to
purchase robots from far producers from EU-5, such as Japan.
A.1.6 Further Analysis about Fact 2
Figure A.8 plots the correlation between the changes in robot measures and the changes
in log labor market outcomes in the US at the occupation level, weighted by the size
of occupation measured by initial the employment level. The top two panels take the
occupational wage as a labor market outcome on the y-axis, while the bottom two take the
occupational employment. The left two panels take log monetary value of robot stock in
non-US countries as a robot measure on the left panel, and the right two take the log Japan
robot shock k>,C1 .
First, I offer a piece of evidence that robots have replaced workers at the occupation
level. To control the demand factor in the US, Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020] used the robot
stock changes in the other countries that show a similar trend of robot stocks as a proxy
for the robot technological change and find the negative impact on the US regional labor
market. Following this approach, using the changes in robot stocks in non-US countries (all
countries except for the US and Japan), I find that the robot penetration measure negatively
affects and labor market outcomes of wages and employment by occupation.1 This result
provides direct evidence of the substitution of robots for workers who perform the same
task as robots, as well as corroborating the finding of Acemoglu and Restrepo [2020].
Furthermore, it also implies the reallocation of workers across occupations due to
technological changes in robotics. Namely, suppose that an occupation experiences a rapid
adoption of robots and workers in the occupation switch to other occupations that did not
experience the adoption. This mechanism also works as a force that makes the negative
correlation found in Figure A.8. In Section 1.3, I model these points by considering the
dynamic occupation choice by workers. The characterizing parameter is the occupation
switch elasticity q, which is one of the target elasticity in estimation.
Figure A.9 shows the results of a set of robustness checks with an emphasis on the
1In Section A.1.5, I show that the robot stock growths are similar between the US and the non-US
countries by occupations. In contrast, the occupation-level trend in the five countries Acemoglu and Restrepo
[2020] used as comparison (Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden) is less similar to the US trend than
the non-US countries.
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correlation between the wage changes and the changes in robot measures. Figures A.9a
and A.9b show the wage correlation after residualizing the demographic control variables
(initial-year female share, college graduates share, age 35-49 share, age 50-64 share, and
foreign-born share in each occupation) for the robot stock and robot prices, respectively.
Figures A.9c and A.9d show the correlation with the robot measures in the rest of the
world (namely, world excluding the US and Japan) after residualizing the demographic
control variables. The motivation of this exercise follows the intuition of AR–using the
technological change proxied by the rest-of-the-world change in robot measures to move
away from the occupational demand shocks since US occupational robot adoption may be
affected by occupational demand shocks such as occupational productivity changes. Figure
A.9e shows the result with the measurement of the robot stock by quantities of machines as
opposed to monetary value, which follows the approach in the past literature such as AR.
Figure A.9f shows the result of correlation using quality-adjusted robot prices, where the
method of quality adjustment follows the spirit of Khandelwal et al. [2013]. Namely, I fit









+ 0'>,C + 4'8,>,C ,
from which I obtain the fixed effect 0'>,C , which absorbs the occupation-> specific log sales
component that is not explained by the prices. I then proxy the quality change by the change






− Δ0'>,C . All the results are robust to these considerations–wage growths
are negatively correlated with stock growths, and positively correlated with price growths,
both across occupations.
To examine if the positive correlation between the US wage would be unaffected absent
of the Japan robot shock, I examine the pre-trend correlation between them. To do so, I take
the 20-year difference of occupational wage since 1970 to 1990 as the outcome variable
and run regression (1.3). The result is shown in Figure A.10. As expected, there is no
significant relationship between (lagged) wage change and robot cost reduction.
To further check the correlation systematically, I run the following regressions and report
the results in Table A.1:
Δ ln (H>) = 0'Δ ln ('>) + (->)> a + 4>,
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Figure A.8: Correlation between Wages and Robot Measures
(a) Wage vs Robot Stock
(b) Wage vs Robot Price
(c) Employment vs Robot Stock (d) Employment vs Robot Price
Note: The author’s calculation based on JARA, O*NET, and the US Census/ACS. The figures show the scatterplot, weighted fit line, and
the 95 percent confidence interval of the changes in log robot measures and changes in log labor market outcomes. On the y-axis, the top
figures take occupational wages, while the bottom figures take occupational employment. The left panels take the change in log robot
stocks (measured in monetary value) on the x-axis, while the right panels take the change in log robot average prices on the x-axis. Each
bubble represents a 4-digit occupation. The bubble size reflects the employment in the baseline year (1990, which is the closest Census
year to the initial year that I observe the robot adoption, 1992).
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Figure A.9: Correlation between Occupational Wage and Occupational Robot Measures
(a) Residualizing Control Variables, Stocks (b) Residualizing Control Variables, Prices
(c) ROW Stocks (d) ROW, Prices
(e) Stock Quantity (f) Quality-adjusted prices
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Figure A.10: Correlation between Occupational Wage and Occupational Robot Measures
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Table A.1: Regression Result of Labor Market Outcome on Robot Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

















Female share 0.0366 0.0391 0.0383 0.0361 -0.0658 -0.0663 -0.0563 -0.0616
(0.0320) (0.0340) (0.0328) (0.0335) (0.175) (0.178) (0.175) (0.181)
Col. grad. share 0.399*** 0.379*** 0.401*** 0.399*** 0.114 0.113 0.119 0.107
(0.0684) (0.0673) (0.0707) (0.0691) (0.284) (0.285) (0.281) (0.287)
Age 35-49 share -0.768* -0.594 -0.697* -0.672* 0.399 0.449 0.325 0.427
(0.395) (0.405) (0.405) (0.404) (1.281) (1.331) (1.308) (1.320)
Age 50-64 share 0.778** 0.797** 0.787** 0.765** -1.636 -1.650 -1.541 -1.576
(0.345) (0.345) (0.365) (0.376) (1.166) (1.134) (1.208) (1.170)
Foreign-born share -0.0905 -0.0250 -0.0241 -0.00227 -0.255 -0.221 -0.322 -0.197
(0.225) (0.213) (0.230) (0.221) (1.142) (1.073) (1.074) (1.044)
Observations 324 324 324 324 324 324 324 324
R-squared 0.467 0.344 0.398 0.367 0.138 0.104 0.199 0.106
Notes: The author’s calculation based on JARA, O*NET, and US Census/ACS. Observations are 4-digit level occupations, and the sample is all occupations that existed throughout 1970 and
2007. In each country 8 ∈ {*(, '$, },  '
8
stands for the 2000-dollar value of the robot stock in the occupation and ?'
8
stands for the average price of robot transacted in each year. All
time differences (Δ) are taken with a long difference between 1990 and 2007. All demographic control variables are as of 1990. “Col. Grad. Share” stands for the college graduate share. Robust
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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where H> is labor-market outcome of occupation > (wage and employment), '> is the
measure of robots (stocks and prices), -> are the demographic control variables, 4> is the
regression residual, and Δ indicates the long-difference between 1990 (1992 for Δ ln ('>))
and 2007. The coefficient of interest is 0'–I expect negative 0' if I take robot stocks as the
explanatory variable, while I expect positive 0' when I take robot price as the right-hand
side variable.
A.1.7 Robot Price Trends by Occupation Groups
In this section, I examine the facts discussed in Section 1.2.3 for each occupation group
described in Section 1.4.1. First, Figure A.11 shows the plot of the trend of the robot price
distribution since 1992 for each occupation group, a version of Figure 1.1a, disaggregated
by occupation groups. The top three panels show the trends for routine occupations, namely,
from the left, routine-production, routine-transportation, and routine-others. The bottom
two panels show the trends for service occupations and abstract occupations, from the left.
All these panels show the overall decreasing trend of robot prices, and the dispersion of
prices within each occupation group. Having such a dispersion is important because in
Section 1.4 when I estimate heterogeneous EoS between robots and labor, I use the price
variation within each occupation group. Next, Figure A.12 shows the correspondent of
Figure A.8 for each occupation group. The alignment of occupation groups is the same as
Figure A.11. Interestingly, the positive correlation between occupational wage changes and
occupational robot price changes, robustly found in Figure A.8 and Section A.1.6, is seen
only in the group of production occupations and transportation occupations. Given that
strong positive correlation yields a high elasticity of substitution, the finding in this figure is
consistent with the heterogeneous elasticity of substitution between robots and labor found
in Table 1.2b.
A.1.8 Initial Share Data
Since the log-linearized sequential equilibrium solution depends on several initial share data
generated from the initial equilibrium, I discuss the data sources and methods for measuring
these shares. I define C0 = 1992 and the time frequency is annual. I consider the world
that consists of three countries {*(, %#, '$,}. Table A.2 summarizes overview of the
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Trade shares of goods and robots BACI, IFR
G̃$
8,>,C0
Occupation cost shares IPUMS







Robot expenditure shares BACI, IFR, WIOT
U8," Intermediate input share WIOT
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Figure A.11: Robot Price Trends by Occupation Groups
(a) Routine, Production (b) Routine, Transportation (c) Routine, Others
(d) Service (e) Abstract
139
Figure A.12: Correlation between Wage and Robot Prices by Occupation Groups
(a) Routine, Production (b) Routine, Transportation (c) Routine, Others
(d) Service (e) Abstract
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Figure A.13: Robot Trade Share Trends
(a) Exports
(b) Imports
Note: The author’s calculation of world trade shares based on the BACI data. Industrial robots are measured by HS code 847950
(Industrial robots for multiple uses).
variable notations, descriptions, and data sources.
I take matrices of trade of goods and robots by BACI data. As in Humlum [2019], I
measure robots byHS code 847950 (“Industrial Robots ForMultipleUses”) and approximate
the initial year value by year of 1998, in which the robot HS code is first available. Figure
A.13 shows the trend of export and import shares of robots among the world for the US,
Japan, and the Rest Of the World. The trends are fairly stable for the three regions of the
world, except that the import share of the US has declined relative to the ROW.
To obtain the domestic robot absorption data, I take from IFR data the flow quantity
variable and the aggregate price variable for a selected set of countries. I then multiply these
to obtain USA and JPN robot adoption value. For robot prices in ROW, I take the simple
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Figure A.14: Comparison of US Price Indices between JARA and IFR
Note: The author’s calculation of US robot price measures in JARA and IFR. The JARA measures are disaggregated by 4-digit
occupations, and the figure shows the 10th, 50th (median), and 90th percentiles each year. All measures are normalized at 1999, the year
in which the first price measure is available in the IFR data.
average of the prices among the set of countries (France, Germany, Italy, South Korea, and
the UK, as well as Japan and the US) for which the price is available in 1999, the earliest
year in which the price data are available. Graetz and Michaels [2018] discuss prices of
robots with the same data source. Figure A.14 shows the comparison of the US price
index measure available between JARA and IFR. The JARAmeasures are disaggregated by
4-digit occupations. The figure shows the 10th, 50th (median), and 90th percentiles each
year, as in Figure 1.1a. All measures are normalized at 1999, the year in which the first price
measure is available in the IFR data. Overall, the JARA price trend variation tracks the
overall price evolution measured by IFR reasonably well: The long-run trends from 1999 to
the late 2010s are similar between the JARA median price and the IFR price index. During
the 2000s, the IFR price index drops faster than the median price in the JARA data. It
compares with the JARA 10th percentile price, which could be due to robotic technological
changes in other countries than Japan in the corresponding period.
I construct occupation cost shares G̃$
8,>,C0
and labor shares within occupation ;8,>,C0 as
follows. To measure G̃$
8,>,C0
, I aggregate the total wage income of workers that primarily
works in each occupation > in year 1990, the Census year closest to C0. I then take the
share of this total compensation measure for each occupation. To measure ;8,>,C0 , I take
the total compensation as the total labor cost and a measure of the user cost of robots
for each occupation. The user cost of robots is calculated with the occupation-level robot
price data available in IFR and the set of calibrated parameters in Section 1.4.1. Table
A.3 summarizes these statistics for the aggregated 5 occupation groups in the US. One can
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Table A.3: Baseline Shares by 5 Occupation Group











Routine, Production 17.58% 99.81% 64.59% 67.49% 62.45% 67.06%
Routine, Transportation 7.82% 99.93% 12.23% 11.17% 13.09% 11.04%
Routine, Others 28.78% 99.99% 10.88% 9.52% 11.68% 10.40%
Service 39.50% 99.99% 8.87% 8.58% 9.17% 8.32%
Abstract 6.32% 99.97% 3.43% 3.24% 3.60% 3.18%
Note: The author’s calculation of initial-year share variables based on the US Census, IFR, and JARA. As in the main text, country 1
indicates the US, country 2 Japan, and country 3 the rest of the world. See the main text for the construction of each variable.
see that the cost for production occupations and transportation occupations comprise 18%
and 8% of the US economy, respectively, totaling more than one-fourth. Furthermore, the
share of robot cost in all occupations is still quite low with the highest share of 0.19% in
production occupations, revealing still small-scale adoption of robots from the overall US
economy perspective.





/∑> . '8,>,C0 and the absorption share G'8,>,C0 ≡ -'8,>,C0/∑> -'8,>,C0 .
To obtain H'
8,>,C0





2,>,C0 and assume the same distribution for other countries due to the data limi-
tation: H'
8,>,C0
= H'2,>,C0 for all 8. To have G
'
8,>,C0
, I compute the occupational robot adoption








is the occupation-level robot quantity
obtained by the O*NET concordance generated in Section 1.2.2 applied to the IFR applica-
tion classification. As mentioned above, the robot price index %'
8,C0
is available for a selected
set of countries. To compute the rest-of-the-world price index %'3,C0 , I take the average of
all available countries weighted by the occupational robot values each year. The summary




at 5 occupation groups are shown in Table A.3.
All values in Table A.3 are obtained by aggregating 4-digit-level occupations, and raw and
disaggregated data are available upon request.
I take a more standard measure, the intermediate input share U8," , from World Input-
Output Tables (WIOT Timmer et al., 2015). Finally, I combine the trade matrix generated







In particular, with the robot trade matrix, I take the total sales value by summing across
importers for each exporter, and total absorption value by summing across exporters for
each importers. I also obtain the total good absorption by WIOT. From these total values,
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Table A.4: 1990 Occupation Group Switching Probability
Routine Service AbstractProduction Transportation Others
Routine
Production 0.961 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.012
Transportation 0.020 0.926 0.020 0.008 0.025
Others 0.005 0.006 0.955 0.020 0.014
Service 0.003 0.002 0.020 0.967 0.007
Abstract 0.014 0.014 0.036 0.015 0.922
Note: The author’s calculation from the CPS-ASEC 1990 data. The conditional switching probability to column occupation group
conditional on being in each row occupation.
I compute expenditure shares. are obtained by aggregating 4-digit occupations, and the
disaggregated data are available upon request.
As initial year occupation switching probabilities `8,>>′,C0 , I take 1990 flow Markov
transition matrix from the cleaned CPS-ASEC data created in Section A.1.1. Table A.4
shows this initial-year conditional switching probability. The matrix for the other years
are available upon request. As for other countries than the US, although Freeman et al.
[2020] has begun to develop occupational wage measures consistent across country, world-
consistent occupation employment data are hard to obtain. Therefore, I assign the same
flow probabilities for other countries in my estimation.
A.2 Theory Appendix
A.2.1 Further Discussion of Model Assumptions
Capital-Skill Complementarity Occupation production function (1.10) also nest the one
in the literature of capital-skill complementarity (Krusell et al., 2000 among others). To
simplify, I focus on individual producer’s production function in the steady state. Thus I drop
subscripts and superscripts of country 8 and time period C. Suppose the set of occupations
is $ ≡ {',*} and 0* = 0. ' stands for the robotized occupation (e.g., spot welding) and
* stands for “unrobotized” (e.g., programming). Note that since * is unrobotized 0* = 0.
















Thus different skills ' and* are substituted by robots with different substitution parameters
\' and V, respectively. Since the literature of capital-skill complementarity studies the
rising skill premium, the current model also has an ability to discuss the occupation (or
skill) premium given the different level of automation across occupations.
Adjustment Cost of Robot Capital To interpret another key feature of the model, the
convex adjustment cost of robot adoption, consider the cost of adopting new technology and
integration. With the convex adjustment cost, the model predicts the staggered adoption of
robots over years that I observe in the data (see Figure 1.3b), and implies a rich prediction
about the short- and long-run effects of robotization.
First, when adopting new technology including robots, it is necessary to re-optimize the
overall production process since the production process is typically optimized to employ
workers. More generally, the literature of organizational dynamics studies the difficulty,
not to say the impossibility, of changing strategies of a company due to complementarities
(see Brynjolfsson and Milgrom, 2013 for a review). Such a re-optimization incurs an
additional cost of adoption in addition to the purchase of robot arms. Moreover, even within
a production unit, there is a variation of this difficulty of adopting robots across production
processes. In this case, the part where the adjustment is easy adopts the robots first, and
vice versa. This allocation of robot adoptions over years may aggregate to make the robot
stock increase slowly [Baldwin and Lin, 2002]. Waldman-Brown [2020] also finds that the
incremental and sluggish automation is particularly well-observed in small and medium-
sized firms, as they add “a machine here or there, rather than installing whole new systems
that are more expensive to buy and integrate” [Autor et al., 2020].
The second component of the adjustment cost may come from the cost of integration
as I discussed in Section 1.2.1. The marginal integration cost may increase as the massive
upgrading of robotics systemmay require large-scale overhaul of production process, which
increases the complexity and so is costly. The adjustment cost may capture the increasing
marginal cost component of the integration cost. It explains an additional component of the
integration cost implied by constant returns-to-scale robot aggregation in equation (1.14).
Another potential choice of modeling a staggered growth of robot stocks is to assume a
fixed cost of robot adoption and lumpy investment. Humlum [2019] finds that many plants
buy robots only once during the sample period. Since JARA data does not observe plant-
level adoptions, I do not separately identify lumpy investment from the staggered growth
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of robot stocks in the data. To the extent that fixed cost of investment may make the policy
intervention less effective (e.g., Koby and Wolf, 2019), the counterfactual analysis in this
paper may overestimate the effect of robot taxes since it does not take into account the fixed
cost and lumpiness of investment.
A.2.2 Derivation of Worker’s Optimality Conditions
In this section, I formalize the assumptions behind the derivation and show equations (1.4)
and (1.5). Fix country 8 and period C. There is a mass !8,C of workers. In the beginning








that follows an independent Fréchet distribution with scale parameter +
8,>,C
and shape parameter 1/q. Note that one can simply extend that the idiosyncratic preference
follows a correlated Fréchet distribution to allow correlated preference across occupations,
as in Lind and Ramondo [2018]. To keep the expression simple, I focus on the case of
independent distribution. A worker l then works in the current occupation, earns income,
consumes and derives logarithmic utility, and then chooses the next period’s occupation
with discount rate ]. When choosing the next period occupation >′, she pays an ad-valorem
switching cost j8,>>′,C in terms of consumption unit that depends on current occupation
>. She consumes her income in each period. Thus, worker l who currently works in
occupation >C maximizes the following objective function over the future stream of utilities




















where 8,>,B is a consumption bundle when working in occupation > in period B ≥ C, and
C is the expectation conditional on the value of /8,>C ,C (l). Each worker owns occupation-
specific labor endowment ;8,>,C . I assume that her income is comprised of labor income
F8,>,C and occupation-specific ad-valorem government transfer with rate )8,>,C . Given the
consumption price %
8,C
, the budget constraint is




for any worker, with %
8,C
being the price index of the non-robot good .
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Write the value function conditional on the realization of shocks at period C as follows:



































































































where +8,>C ,C is the unconditional expected value function +8,>C ,C ≡ C−1+8,>C ,C (l) . Changing
the notation from (>C , >C+1) into (>, >′), I have








Solving the worker’s maximization problem is equivalent to finding:
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A.2.3 Relationship with Other Models of Automation
The model in Section 1.3 is general enough to nest models of automation in the previous
literature. In particular, I show how the production functions (1.8) and (1.10) imply to
specifications in AR and Humlum [2019]. Throughout Section A.2.3, I fix country 8 and
focus on steady states and thus drop subscripts 8 and C since the discussion is about individual
producer’s production function.
Relationship with the model in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020, AR)
Following AR that abstract from occupations, I drop occupations by setting $ = 1 in this
paragraph. Therefore, the EoS between occupations V plays no role, and \> = \ is a unique











for each sector and location (See AR, Appendix A1, equation A5). In this equation, 2' is
the steady state marginal cost of robot capital defined in equation (A.27) and ! and '
represent per-unit efficiency of labor and robots, respectively. In Lemma 2 below, I prove
that my model implies a unit cost function that is strict generalization of ?' with proper
modification to the shock terms and parameter configuration. I begin with the modification
that allows per-unit efficiency terms in my model.
Definition 3. For labor and robot per-unit efficiency terms ! > 0 and ' > 0 respectively,














)\−1 + 0̃ (')\−1] . (A.2)
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(1 − 0) F1−\ + 01−\
] 1
1−\ ,
where %$ is the unit cost of tasks performed by labor and robots. Substituting equations
























Lemma 2 immediately implies the following corollary that shows that the steady state
modified unit cost (A.3) strictly nests the unit cost formulation of AR as a special case of
Leontief occupation aggregation.
Corollary 1. Suppose U" = 0. Then as \ → 0, ? → ?'.
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Relationship with the model in Humlum [2019]
I show that production functions (1.8) and (1.10) nest the production function used by
Humlum [2019]. Since the setting of Humlum [2019] does not have non-robot capital, in
this section, I simplify the notation for robot capital  ' by dropping the superscript and
denote as  . For each firm in each period, Humlum [2019] specifies
& = exp
[






i> + W>  
] ) 1V (!>) V−1V ] VV−1 , (A.6)




, i> and W> are parameters, and superscript





i> + W>  
)
= 1.
I will start from production function (1.8) and (1.10), place restrictions, and arrive at
equation (A.6). As a key observation, relative to the discrete choice of robot adoption
in Humlum [2019], the continuous choice of robot quantity in production function (1.10)
allows significant flexibility. In this paragraph, I assume away with intermediate inputs.
This is because Humlum [2019] assumes that intermediate inputs enter in an element of
CES, while production function (1.8) implies that intermediate inputs enter as an element
of the Cobb-Douglas function.
Now, given our production functions (1.8) and (1.10), suppose producers follow the
binary decision rule defined below.
Definition 4. A binary decision rule of a producer is that producers can choose between
two choices: adopting robots  = 1 or not  = 0. If they choose  = 1, they adopt robots
at the same unit as labor  > = !> ≥ 0 for all occupation >. If they choose  = 0,  > = 0
for all >.
Note that the binary decision rule is nested in the original choice problem from  '> ≥ 0















\−1 (V−1) if  ' = !>
> (1 − 0>)
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Then one can substitute equations (A.8) and (A.9) to equation (A.7) and confirm that
& = & . Summarizing the discussion above, I have the result that my model can be
restricted to produce the production side of the model of Humlum [2019] as follows.
Lemma 3. Suppose that (i) producers follow the binary decision rule in Definition 4 and
that (ii) occupation productivity > and robot task space 0> satisfy equations (A.8) and
(A.9) for each >. Then & = & .
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A.2.4 Equilibrium Characterization
To characterize the producer problem, I show the static optimization conditions and then the
dynamic ones. To solve for the static problem of labor, intermediate goods, and non-robot




















= F8,>,C , (A.10)
where )$
8,C

























= A8,C , (A.12)
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and the corresponding price index %',
8,>,C
.
By the first order condition with respect to &'
;8,>,C








































































































which is a standard gravity representation of robot trade.
























































































































9,>,C+1 = 0. (A.18)



















Turning to the demand for non-robot good, I will characterize bilateral intermediate
good trade demand and total expenditure. Write -
9,C
the total purchase quantity (but not


















is the total expenditures on non-robot goods.





















































For country 9 and period C, by substituting into income  9 ,C the period cash flow of non-robot
good producer that satisfies












1 + D8 9 ,C
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and robot tax revenue )9 ,C =
∑


























or in terms of variables in the definition of equilibrium,












8 9 ,>,C .























Note that this equation embeds the balanced-trade condition. By substituting equation
































8 9,C , (A.24)







for all 8, >, and C, respectively.




C , RC ,\C
}
, equations (1.4), (A.10), (A.15),















, equations (1.13), (A.19), and (A.18)
characterize the sequential equilibrium.
Finally, the steady state conditions are given by imposing the time-invariance condition
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to equations (1.13) and (A.19):




















≡ 2'8,> . (A.27)
Note that equation (A.27) can be interpreted as the flow marginal profit of capital must be
equalized to the marginal cost term. Thus I define the steady state marginal cost of robot
capital 2'
8,>
from the right-hand side of equation (A.27). Note that if there is no adjustment








= 2'8,> = (] + X) _'8,>,
which states that the marginal profit of capital is the user cost of robots in the steady state
[Hall and Jorgenson, 1967].
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof takes the following four conceptual steps. First, I will write the real wage change(F8,>/%8 ) in terms of the weighted average of relative price changes, making use of the
fact that the sum of shares equals one. Second, I rewrite relative price change into layers
of relative price changes with the technique of addition and subtraction. Third, I show that
each layer of relative price changes is a change of relevant input or trade shares controlled
by elasticity substitution. In other words, an input or trade shares reveals a layer of relative
price changes. Finally, I make use of the fact that the sum of shares do not change after the
shock to arrive at equation (1.23).
































Note that by additions and subtractions, I can rewrite








































































































































































Combined with the Cobb-Douglas assumption of production function (1.8), equations
(A.29), (A.30), and (A.31) imply
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1 − V +
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= 0 for all 8, I have equation (1.23).
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A.2.6 Details of the Two-step Estimator









0. The GMM estimator based on N is


















which is consistent under the moment condition (1.27) if N satisfies the rank conditions
in Newey and McFadden [1994]. The exact specification of N determines the optimality,
or the minimal variance, of estimator (A.32). To specify N, I apply the approach that
achieves the asymptotic optimality developed in Chamberlain [1987]. Formally, define the











a> () (a> ())> |7C1
]−1
, (A.33)
and assume the regularity conditions 4 in Section A.2.7 of the Appendix.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 4,N∗ is asymptotically normal with theminimum
variance among the asymptotic variances of the class of estimators in equation (A.32).
Proof. See Section A.2.7. 
To understand the optimality of the IV in equation (A.33), note that it has two com-





which takes the gradient with respect to the structural parameter vector. Thus, it assigns
large weight to occupation that changes the the predicted outcome variable sensitively
to the parameters. The second term is the conditional inverse expected variance matrix
E
[
a> () (a> ())> |7C1
]−1, which put large weight to occupation that has small variance
of the structural residuals.
Substituting equation (A.33) to the general GMM estimator (A.32), I have an estimator
N∗ = arg min [
∑
> />a> ()]> [
∑
> />a> ()]. Since /> depends on unknown parame-
ters , I implement the estimation by the two-step feasible method, or the model-implied
optimal IV [Adao et al., 2019a]. I first estimate the first-step estimate 1 from arbitrary
initial values 0. Since the IV is a function of the Japan robot shock 7C1 , 1 is consistent
by Assumption 1. However, it is not optimal. To achieve the optimality, in the second step,
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I obtain the optimal IV using the consistent estimator 1. To summarize the discussion so











a> (=) (a> (=))> |7C1
]−1
. (A.34)
Then I have the following result.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 4, the estimator 2 obtained in the following
procedure is consistent, asymptotically normal, and optimal:
Step 1: With a guess 0, estimate 1 = N0 using />,0 defined in equation (A.34).
Step 2: With 1, estimate 2 by 2 = N1 using />,1 defined in equation (A.34).
Proof. See Section A.2.8. 
A.2.7 Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition I follow the arguments made in Sections 2 and 3 of Newey and Mc-
Fadden [1994]. The proof consists of four sub results in the following Lemma. Proposition
2 can be obtained as a combination of the four results. The formal statement requires the
following additional assumptions.










≠ 0 for any ̃ ≠ . (ii)
\ ≤ \> ≤ \ for any >, V ≤ V ≤ V, W ≤ W ≤ W, and q ≤ q ≤ q for






































Lemma 4. Assume Assumptions 1 and 4(i)-(iii).
(a) The estimator of the form (A.32) is consistent.
Additionally, assume Assumptions 4(iv)-(v).
(b) The estimator of the form (A.32) is asymptotically normal.
(c)
√







, and the asymptotic variance is the min-
imum of that of the estimator of the form (A.32) for any function N.
Proof. (a) I follow Theorems 2.6 of Newey and McFadden [1994], which implies that it
suffices to show conditions (i)-(iv) of this theorem are satisfied. Assumption 4(i) guarantees
160
condition (i). Condition (ii) is implied by Assumption 4(ii). Condition (iii) follows because
all supply and demand functions in the model is continuous. Condition (iv) is implied by
Assumption 4(iii).
(b) I followTheorem3.4 ofNewey andMcFadden [1994], which implies that it suffices to
show conditions (i)-(v) of this theorem are satisfied. Condition (i) is satisfied byAssumption
4(i). Condition (ii) follows because all supply and demand functions in the model is
continuously differentiable. Condition (iii) is implied by Assumption 1 and Assumption
4(iv). Assumption 4(v) implies condition (iv). Finally, the gradient vectors of the structural
residual is linear independent, guaranteeing the non-singularity of the variance matrix and
condition (v).
(c) By Theorem 3.4 of Newey and McFadden [1994], for an arbitrary IV-generating
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M ≡ E [∇a> ()] and 
 ≡ E
[
a> () (a> ())>
]
.


















































































































where Ω> ≡ E
[
a> () (a> ())> |7C1
]












































is positive semi-definite, so is , which completes the proof. 
A.2.8 Proof of Proposition 3
I apply arguments in Section 6.1 of Newey and McFadden [1994]. Namely, I define the
joint estimator of the first-step and second-step estimator in Proposition 3 that falls into the
class of general GMM estimation, and discuss the asymptotic property using the general
result about GMM estimation. In the proof, I modify the notation of the set of functions











a> () (a> ())> |7C1
]−1
.

































gives the consistent estimator for ,






































































































= 0. Therefore, M̃ is a block-diagonal ma-





























)>] . By Proposition 2, this asymptotic variance
is minimal among the GMM estimator (A.32).
A.3 Further Estimation and Simulation Results
A.3.1 Estimation at 2 Digit-level Occupation Groups
In this section, I study how the occupation grouping defined in Section 1.4.1 affects the
estimation result. Specifically, I apply the estimation method in Proposition 3 for 2-digit
occupation groups provided by the US Census “[f]or users who wish to further aggregate
occupation to broader categories[.]”2 Table A.5 shows the result. I find that the elasticity
estimates for “Production” and “Transportation and Material Moving” occupations remain
around 4 with small standard errors. However, the estimates for the other occupations
become different from the case with the 5-occupation aggregates, and the standard errors are
larger and volatile. This exercise reveals that the 5-occupation aggregation in Section 1.4.1
2Further details can be found at https://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variables/OCC2010 (Ac-
cessed on December 6, 2020).
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provides the conservative grouping and tightly estimated elasticities of substitution. The
reason is that I use the 4-digit occupational variation for estimation, and 2-digit occupation
grouping often yields only a small number of 4-digit occupations, reducing estimation
power (see “# Occ.” column in Table A.5).
At this point, it is also worth noting the time-series variation. Since I have annual obser-
vation for occupational robot costs, it is potentially possible to leverage this rich variation
for the structural estimation, which may permit me to estimate the EoS \> at a narrower
occupation group level. However, the bottleneck of this approach is the computational bur-
den to compute the dynamic solution matrix LC . Specifically, dynamic substitution matrix
LH
C+1 in equation (1.19) is based on the conditions of Blanchard and Kahn [1980]. This
requires computing the eigenspace, as described in detail in Section A.4. This is computa-
tionally hard since we cannot rely on the sparse structure of the matrix LH
C+1. In contrast, the
estimation method in Proposition 3 does not involve such computation, but only requires
computing the steady-state solution matrix K. Then I only need to invert steady-state sub-
stitution matrix KH, which is feasible given the sparse structure of KH. Therefore, a future
potential breakthrough on computation technology could make it possible to estimate the
model based on the dynamic solution matrix LC and annual observation of my dataset.
A.3.2 Robot Trade Elasticity
To estimate robot trade elasticity Y', I apply and extend the trilateral method of Caliendo and











is tariff on robots taken from the UNCTAD-TRAINS database and g',
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captures symmetric bilateral trade costs such as











are the origin and destination fixed effects such as non-tariff barriers
respectively, and g',,
;8,C
is the random error that is orthogonal to tariffs. From the robot









































+ 4;8 9 ,C , (A.35)
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Table A.5: Estimates of Elasticities of Substitution between Robots and Workers, \>, at the 2-digit Occupation Level
OCC2010 2-dig. Label OCC2010 Range # Occ. 2-dig. EoS 2-dig. SE Group 5-group EoS 5-group SE
Management, Business, Science,
And Arts [30, 430] 9 0.15 1.57
Abstract 0.80 0.60
Business Operations Specialists [500, 730] 9 1.98 0.91
Financial Specialists [800, 1240] 8 0.04 1.29
Architecture And Engineering [1300, 1560] 15 -0.31 1.48
Life, Physical, And Social Science [1600, 1960] 14 -0.05 1.49
Community And Social Services [2000, 2140] 6 0.23 0.69
Education, Training, And Library [2200, 2540] 9 0.24 0.64
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports,
And Media [2600, 2910] 13 0.98 0.77
Healthcare Practitioners
And Technical [3010, 3650] 23 0.6 1.48
Protective Service [3720, 4130] 13 1.94 0.58
Service 1.35 0.48Building And Grounds Cleaning
And Maintenance [4200, 4650] 16 0.5 0.9
Sales And Related [4700, 4965] 15 2.07 1.49
Routine,
Others 1.27 0.53
Office And Administrative Support [5000, 5940] 38 -0.24 1.06
Farming, Fishing, And Forestry [6005, 6130] 7 2.15 1.22
Construction [6200, 6765] 22 1.03 0.85
Extraction [6800, 6940] 5 1.44 1.22
Installation, Maintenance,
And Repair [7000, 7610] 22 -0.7 1.36
Production [7700, 8965] 55 3.91 0.24 Routine,Production 4.04 0.24
Transportation And Material Moving [9000, 9750] 25 4.41 0.36 Routine,Transportation 4.29 0.28
Note: The estimates of the structural parameters based on the estimator in Proposition 3. In header, “OCC2010 2-dig. Label” shows the label of 2-digit occupations groups in the OCC2010
coding scheme, “OCC2010 Range” shows the range of OCC2010 codes that fall into the 2-digit occupation group, “Num. Occ.” shows the number of 4-digit level occupations in the 2-digit
occupation group, “2-dig. EoS” shows the point estimate of the elasticity of substitution between robots and workers in the 2-digit occupation group, “2-dig. SE” shows the standard error
estimate of the elasticity of substitution between robots and workers in the 2-digit occupation group, “Group” shows the 5-group I defined in Section 1.4.1, “5-group EoS” shows the point
estimate of the elasticity of substitution in the “5-group”, and “5-group SE” shows the the standard error estimate of the elasticity of substitution in the “5-group.”
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Table A.6: Coefficient of equation (A.35)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HS 847950 HS 847950 HS 8479 HS 8479
Tariff -0.272*** -0.236*** -0.146*** -0.157***
(0.0718) (0.0807) (0.0127) (0.0131)
FEs h-i-j-t ht-it-jt h-i-j-t ht-it-jt
N 4610 4521 88520 88441
r2 0.494 0.662 0.602 0.658
Note: The author’s calculation based on BACI data from 1996 to 2018 and equation (A.35). The first two columns show the result for the
HS code 847950 (Industrial robots for multiple uses), while the last two columns HS code 8479 (Machines and mechanical appliances
having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter). The first and third columns control the unilateral fixed
effect, while the second and fourth the bilateral fixed effect. See the text for the detail.
where -'
;8,C











. The benefit of this approach is that it
does not require symmetry for non-tariff trade cost g',
;8
, but only requires the orthogonality
for the asymmetric component of the trade cost. My method also extends Caliendo and
Parro [2015] in using the time-series variation as well as trilateral country-level variation
to complement the relatively small number of observations in robot trade data.
When implementing regression of equation (A.35), I further consider controlling for
two separate sets of fixed effects. The first set is the unilateral fixed effect indicating if
a country is included in the trilateral pair of countries, and the second set is the bilateral
fixed effect for the twin of countries is included in the trilateral pair. These fixed effects are
relevant in my setting as a few number of countries export robots, and controlling for these
exporters’ unobserved characteristics is critical.
Table A.6 shows the result of regression of equation (A.35). The first two columns
show the result for the HS code 847950 (Industrial robots for multiple uses, the definition
of robots used in Humlum, 2019), and the last two columns HS code 8479 (Machines and
mechanical appliances having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in
this chapter). The first and third columns control the unilateral fixed effect, and the second
and fourth the bilateral fixed effect. The implied trade elasticity of robots Y' is fairly tightly
estimated and ranges between 1.13-1.34. Given these estimation results, I use Y' = 1.2 in
the estimation and counterfactuals.
To assess the estimation result, note that Caliendo and Parro [2015] show in Table 1
that the regression coefficient of equation (A.35) is 1.52, with the standard error of 1.81,
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Figure A.15: Trends of Robot Stocks
(a) Data (b) Model
Notes: Figures show the trend of the observed (left) and predicted (right) stock of robots for each occupation groupmeasured by quantities.
The predicted robot stocks are computed by shocks backed out from the estimated model and applying the first-order solution to the
general equilibrium described in equation (1.20).
for “Machinery n.e.c”, which roughly corresponds to HS 84. Therefore, my estimate for
industrial robots falls in the one-standard-deviation range of their estimate for a broader
category of goods.
Note that the average trade elasticity across sectors is estimated significantly higher than
these values, such as 4 in Simonovska and Waugh [2014]. The low trade elasticity for
robots Y' is intuitive given robots are highly heterogeneous and hardly substitutable. This
low elasticity implies small gains from robot taxes, with the robot tax incidence almost on
the US (robot buyer) side rather than the robot-selling country.
A.3.3 Actual and Predicted Robot Accumulation Dynamics
Figure A.15 shows the trends of robot stock in the US in the data and the model. Although
I do not match the overall robot capital stocks, the estimated model tracks the observed
patternwell between 1992 and the late 2010s, consistent with the fact that I target the changes
between 1992 and 2007. There is a slight over-prediction of the growth of production robots
and under-prediction of the growth of transportation (material moving) robots between
occupation groups.
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Table A.7: Shocks Aggregated at 5 groups
Group k 0̂>1B
Routine, Production -0.305 2.453
Routine, Transportation -0.497 3.428
Routine, Others -0.460 0.335
Service -0.378 0.623
Abstract -0.289 0.133
Note: The author’s calculation based on JARA, O*NET, and US Census/ACS. The Japan robot shock k is based on the regression of
equation (1.1). The observed automation shock 0>1B> is backed out from equation (1.25) with the estimated parameters in Table 1.2.
Both measures are aggregated from the 4-digit level to 5 groups using the initial employment weight.
Figure A.16: Correlation between k> and 0̂>1B>
Note: The author’s calculation based on JARA, O*NET, and US Census/ACS. The Japan robot shock is taken from the regression of
equation (1.1). The observed automation shock is backed out from equation (1.25) with the estimated parameters in Table 1.2. Each
circle is 4-digit occupation and dashed line is the fitted line.
A.3.4 Japan Robot Shock and Observed Automation Shock
Table A.7 shows the Japan robot shock and observed automation shock backed out from
the estimated model. On the one hand, one can see that the Japanese robots’ cost declined
similarly across occupation groups. On the other hand, the observed automation shock
shows a significant variation, namely, larger in production and transportation occupations
than other occupations. In turn, FigureA.16 shows a further detailed scatter plot between the
two shocks, delivering a mild negative relationship. This negative correlation is consistent
with the example of robotic innovations in Appendix A.1.2.
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Figure A.17: The Steady-state Effect of Robots on Wages
(a) Occupation Groups (b) All Occupations
A.3.5 Automation and Wages at Occupations
Figure A.17 shows the observed and counterfactual growth rate of real wages for each occu-
pation, where the counterfactual change means the simulated change absent the automation
shock. Figure A.17a shows the results aggregated at the 5 occupations groups defined
in Section 1.4.1. I compute the counterfactual growth rate from the observed rate of the
wage change, subtracted by the change predicted by the first-order steady-state solution K
and the observed automation shock âobs. The result is based on the observed high growth
rates of robots in routine production and transportation (material moving) occupations, and
these occupations’ high EoS estimates between robots and workers. In particular, at the
5-occupation aggregate level, most of the observed differences in the real wage growth rates
in the three routine occupation groups are closed absent the automation shock. Applying
the similar exercise for all occupations in my sample, Figure A.17b shows a more granular
result, where occupations are sorted by the observed changes of wages from 1990-2007.
A.3.6 Wage Polarization Exercise under Different Robot-labor EoS
To learn the role of my robot-labor EoS estimates in deriving the wage-polarizing effect of
robotization, I perform the same robotization exercise as in Section 1.5.1 under different
values of the EoS \6 and study the occupational wage consequence. Specifically, I consider
the following two cases: \6 = 0 for any occupation group 6 as in Acemoglu and Restrepo
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Figure A.18: Wage Polarization Exercise under Different Elasticity of Substitution, \6
(a) \6 = 1 (b) \6 = 0
Notes: The annualized wage growth rates predicted by the backed-out shocks and the estimated model’s first-order steady-state solution
given in equation (1.18) under specific value of the elasticity of substitution between robots and labor, \ . The left panel shows the case
with \ = 1 and the right \ = 0. See Figure 1.2b for comparison to the case under my parameter estimates.
[2020] as described in Section A.2.3, and Cobb-Douglas case of \ = 1 for any 6. The results
are shown in Figure A.18. Compared with the right panel of Figure 1.2b, we do not find that
the observed robotization shock does not contribute to wage polarization when θ is as low
as 0 or 1. This finding is because the increased robot use in the middle of the distribution
does not reduce wage in such a case. In this sense, it is critical to have a cost shock measure
to estimate the robot-labor EoS to derive the wage-polarizing effect of robotization.
A.3.7 Robot Tax and Workers’ Welfare
To examine how the robot tax affects workers in different occupations, I define the equivalent

























Namely, theEV is the fraction of the occupation-specific subsidy thatwouldmake the present
discounted value (PDV) of the utility in the robotized and taxed equal to the PDV of the
utility if the occupation-specific subsidy were exogenously given in the initial equilibrium.
On the left-hand side, I hit the robotization shock backed out in Section 1.4.4. As in Section
1.5.2, I consider the US unilateral (not inducing a reaction in other countries), unexpected,
and permanent tax on robot purchases. By this definition, the worker in occupation > prefers
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Figure A.19: Robot Tax and Workers’ Welfare
(a) Occupational Equivalent Variation (b) Total EV and Revenue
Note: The left panel shows the US workers’ equivalent variation defined in equation (A.36) as a function of the US robot tax rate. Labels
“Rout., prod.”, “Rout., transp.”, and “Rout., others” mean routine, production; routine, transportation; and routine, others occupations,
respectively. The right panel shows monetary values of equivalent variations aggregated across workers and robot tax revenue as a
function of the robot tax rate, measured in 1990 million USD.
the robotized and taxed world if and only if the EV is positive for >.
Figure A.19a shows this occupation-specific EV as a function of the tax rate. The far-left
side of the figure is the case of zero robot tax, thus a case of only the robotization shock.
Consistent with the occupational wage effects (cf. Figure A.17), workers in production and
transportation occupations lose significantly due to robotization. In contrast other workers
are roughly indifferent between the robotizedworld and the non-robotized initial equilibrium
or slightly prefer the former world. Going right through the figure, the production and
transportation workers’ EV improves as the robot tax reduces competing robots. The EV of
production workers turns positive when the tax rate is around 6%, and that of transportation
workers is positive when the rate is about 7%. However, these tax rates are too high and
would make EVs in other occupations negative. In fact, in production and transportation
occupations, robots do not accumulate and adversely affect labor demand in the other
occupations.
To study if the reallocation policy by robot tax may work, I also compute the equivalent
variation in terms of monetary value aggregated by occupation groups (total EV) and
compare it with the robot tax revenue, both as a function of robot tax. Figure A.19b shows
the result. One can confirm that the marginal robot tax revenue is far from enough to
compensate for workers’ loss that concentrates on production and transportation workers,
at the initial equilibrium with zero robot tax rate. The robot tax revenue is negligible at this
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Figure A.20: Effects of the Robot Tax on the US Real Income
margin compared with the workers’ loss due to robotization. It is true that as the robot tax
rate increases, the total EV rises: When the rate is as large as 6-7%, the sum of the total
EV and the robot tax revenue is positive. However, one should be cautious that my solution
to the model is to the first order. Thus the approximation error may play an important role
when the robot tax rate is significantly higher than the one in the initial equilibrium, zero.
Extending my solution to the higher-order or even finding the exact solution is left for future
research.
A.3.8 The Role of Trade that Plays in the Robot Tax Effect
Figure A.20 shows the dynamic effect of the robot tax on the US real income. If the robot
trade is not allowed, the robot tax does not increases the real income in any period since the
terms-of-trade effect does not show up, but only the long-run capital decumulation effect
does. On the other hand, once I allow the robot trade as observed in the data, the robot tax
may increase the real income because it decreases the price of imported robots. The effect
is concentrated in the short-run before the capital decumulation process matures. In the
long run, the negative decumulation effect dominates the positive terms-of-trade effect.
A.3.9 The Robot Tax Effect on Occupations
In Figure A.21a, I show two scenarios of the steady-state changes in occupational real wages.
On the one hand, I shock the economy only with the automation shocks. On the other hand,
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Figure A.21: Effects of the Robot Tax on Occupational Real Wages
(a) Steady-state Comparison (b) Transitional Effect of Tax
I shock the economy with both the automation shocks and the robot tax. The result shows
heterogenous effects on occupational real wages of the robot tax. The tax mitigates the
negative effect of automation on routine production workers and routine transportation
workers, while the tax marginally decreases the small gains that workers in the other
occupations would have enjoyed. Overall, the robot tax mitigates the large heterogeneous
effects of the automation shocks, that could go negative and positive directions depending
on occupation groups, and compresses the effects towards zero. Figure A.21b shows the
dynamics of the effects of robot tax, net of the effects of automation shocks. Although the
steady-state effects of robot tax were heterogeneous as shown in Figure A.21a, the effect is
not immediate but materializes after around 10 years, due to the sluggish adjustment in the
accumulation of the robot capital stock. Overall, I find that since the robot tax slows down the
adoption of robots, it rolls back the real wage effect of automation–workers in occupations
that experienced significant automation shocks (e.g., production and transportation in the
routine occupation groups) benefit from the tax, while the others lose.
To study how the occupational effects unfold over time and if the US policy affects third
countries, I study occupational value evolution given the US general robot tax. Figure A.22
shows the impact of the US’s unilateral, unexpected, and permanent 6% general robot tax
on the world’s occupational values in the short run and the long run. In the first row, panels
show the US occupational values and corroborate the finding in Figure A.21 that production
and transportation workers gain from the robot tax but not other workers. As can be seen
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Figure A.22: US General Robot Tax and Global Occupational Value Evolution
Note: Transition dynamics of workers’ occupation-specific values given the US’s unexpected, unilateral, and permanent 6% general robot tax at the initial steady-state (period 0) are shown. Blue
solid lines are the transitional dynamics, and red dashed lines are the steady-state values.
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Figure A.23: The Effect of Robot Trade Cost Reduction
from the figure, it takes roughly 10 years until the worker values reach steady states. In
other countries than the US, the US robot tax effect is negative but quantitatively limited.
A.3.10 Trade Liberalization of Robots
Following Ravikumar et al. [2019], I consider unexpected and permanent 20% reduction in
the bilateral trade costs to study the effect trade liberalization of capital good and dynamics
gains from trade. Figure A.23 shows the result of such a simulation for a 20-years time
horizon. All country groups in the model gain from the trade liberalization. The US gain
materialize almost immediately after the trade cost change. A possible explanation is the
combination of the following two observation. First, it takes time to accumulate robots after
the trade liberalization, which makes the gains from trade liberalization sluggish. Second,
by exporting robots to ROW, the US increases the revenue of robot sales immediately after
the trade cost drop, improving the short-run real income gain. The real income gain is
the largest for Japan, a large net robot exporter. It is noteworthy that ROW loses from the
reduction in the robot trade cost, possibly due to the terms-of-trade deterioration in the
short-run.
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A.4 Detail of the GE Solution
I discuss the derivation log-linearization in equations (1.16), (1.18), and (1.20), so that I
can bring the theory with computation. Throughout the section, relational operator ◦ is
Hadamard product,  indicates Hadamard division, and ⊗ means Kronecker product.
It is useful to show that the CES production structure implies the share-weighted log-
change expression for both prices and quantities. Namely, I have a formula for the change in
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By log-linearizing equation (A.24) for any 8 ,
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a #$ × # matrix, and
SG,3 ≡









a #$ × #2 matrix. Then I have
−SG,2 p̂C + p̂'C = −Ĝ'C + SG,33̂C .
By log-linearizing equations (1.4), (1.5), and (1.6) for any 8, >, and >′, I have
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are $ × 1 vectors. By equation (A.39),
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and -8,>·,C0 is given by equation (A.41) for any 8 and >. By equation (A.39),
ˇRC+1 = S`!,2 ˇ-vecC + S`! ŘC
where S`! being the #$ × #$ matrix





















and S`!,2 being the #$ × #$2 matrix













































and -8,>·,C0 is given by equation (A.41) for any 8 and >.
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In matrix notation, define











a #2 × #$ matrix,
SH' ≡ 1# ⊗










a #2 × #$ matrix,
SH,2 ≡ 1# ⊗ SH .





































































a #2 × #2$ matrix,
SG,4 ≡ 1# ⊗ SG
a #2 × #2 matrix,












a #2 × #2 matrix,
SH',3 ≡ 1# ⊗

[














a #2 × #2 matrix, and
SG$,2 ≡ 1# ⊗ SG$ ,
















































































By log-linearizing equation (A.15) for each 8, 9 , and >„(
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In matrix notation, write a preliminary # × # matrix ũC0 as such that the (8, 9)-element is
1 + D8 9 ,C0
1 + D8 9 ,C0 + 2WX
.
Then 1# (1# )>− ũC0 is a matrix that is filled with 2WX/
(
1 + D8 9 ,C0 + 2WX
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,̂'C + SD,3Q̂'C .
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In matrix notation, write
SH,3 ≡ SH ⊗ 1$
a #$ × #2 matrix,
SG$;,3 ≡ SG$; ⊗ 1$
a #$ × #$ matrix,







































a #$ ×$ matrix,
SG$;,4 ≡ SG$;,2 ⊗ 1$ ,
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a #$ × #$ matrix. I have





































































Hence the log-linearized temporary equilibrium system is
JG x̂ = J Ĝ
where matrices JG and J are defined as
JG ≡

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,5, JG52 ≡ S
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To normalize the price, one of the good-demand equation must be replaced with log-






















To analyze the steady state conditions, first note that the steady state accumulation
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. Using robot integration function, integration demand





































































































a #$ × #$ matrix, and
SG,7 ≡

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= X. Note also
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1 + D8 9 ,C0
)−(1−Y') ) 11−Y' U' + 2WX] − WX2 ,
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G̃'8 9 ,>,C0 ĝ
'
;8
In matrix notation, write
SG$,3 ≡ SG$ ⊗ 1$






















































































































In the steady state, I write equations (A.39) and (A.40) as











R̂ − S`!,2 -̂vec = 0.
respectively.
Hence the log-linearized steady state system is
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KΔ such that ŷ = K.Write dimensions of y and 
as =H ≡ # + 3#$ + #2 + #2$ and =Δ ≡ 3#2 +$ + 2#$ + 2# , respectively.
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SG',8 p̌'C + XSG',7W̌'C + (1 − X) O#$ Q̌'C .
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1 − X O#$ ,̌
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C .
Hence the log-linearized transitional dynamic system is JH,)
C+1 y̌C+1 = J
H,)




























































































































SG',8 0 0 XSG',7 0 (1 − X) O#$ 0

























Recall the temporary equilibrium condition JG x̂C − J,( ŶC = J,Δ̂ for any C. Thus
LH
C+1 ŷC+1 = L
H



































C+1, one can write
ŷC+1 = L
H ŷC + LΔ. (A.46)
It remains to find the initial values of the system (A.46) that converges to the steady
state. To this end, I apply a standard method in Stokey and Lucas [1989]. In particular,






















I follow Blanchard and Kahn [1980] to find such a condition. Write Jordan decomposition
of LH as LH = H−1H. Then Theorem 6.4 of Stokey and Lucas [1989] implies that it must


































that corresponds to vector ,̂'.
Extracting =-th row from LΔC0 and L
_
C0 where |_= | > 1 and writing them as a #$ × =Δ matrix
MΔC0 and #$ × #$ matrix M
_
C0 , the condition of the Theorem is









MΔC0 . Finally, tracing back to obtain the initial
















Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Other Application Examples
Out of the application list Table 2.1, we list some of example tasks for each category.
Handling operations/Machine tending (or Handling) includes material handling, picking,
and packaging. Recent developments enable food industries to package foods automatically
by robots. Welding and soldering (Welding) includes several welding technologies, such as
spot welding discussed in the main text, and arc welding. Dispensing includes painting and
plating. Processing includes loading and unloading, polishing, and deburring. Assembling
and disassembling (Assembling) includes surface mounting, as discussed in Section 2.2.2,
and bonding. Finally, Others include robots used for education and research and to clean
rooms.
B.2 Net Elasticity of Factor Prices
The purpose of this section is to show that the compensated (net) elasticity of factor price is
always negative. This implies that the net elasticity concepts cannot explain the empirical
findings of positive elasticities in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. The net elasticity with respect to
robot prices must be negative out of the standard profit-maximizing factor demand. To
simplify the notations, we drop all subscripts in this section. The Allen-Uzawa Elasticity








































\' = f,\' . (B.2)















= −f,\! . (B.3)








Thus, the sign must be flipped.
B.3 Detail in the JARA
B.3.1 Coverage of the JARA
JARA data cover most robot producers in Japan. In 1996, 587 establishments were asked
to answer the survey, among which 445 answered, for a response rate of 76 percent. To
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Figure B.1: Comparison of JARA and Census of Manufacture
Note: Authors’s calculation based on JARA and CoM/ECBA data. The trend for the JARA is the sum of
shipment value of any robot applications to any industries. The trend for the CoM is the sum of shipment
value (net of VAT) of all products categorized as industrial robots (available from 1983 to 2016). The CoM
was not conducted in 2011 and 2015. Instead, in these years, we employ data from the ECBA.
show the coverage trend of the JARA data in Japan’s robot production, we compare the
aggregate trend with government-based statistics. In particular, we employ Japan’s Census
of Manufacture (CoM) and Economic Census for Business Activity (ECBA), the latter
of which was conducted jointly by METI and MIC. From these data sources, we take
the aggregated total sales of industrial robots each year. The construction of aggregate
statistics by CoM and ECBA is discussed in detail in Appendix B.7.1. Figure B.1 shows the
comparison of total shipment values taken from the JARA and CoM/ECBA data. As one
can see, overall, the two trends are parallel. In some years, the JARA data even surpass the
total shipment values observed in the CoM/ECBA data. Therefore, the JARA covers most
of the robot transactions measured in government statistics.
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B.3.2 JARA Cross Tables
The cross tables we were able to access are as follows. The cross tables by application by
buyer industry are available between 1978 and 2017 and are the data source for our primary
analysis. The cross tables by types and buyer industry are also available, but only for the
years between 1974 and 2000. From 2001 to 2017, cross tables of robot structures and
buyer industries are available. This is consistent with the statement of the IFR that since
2004, the robot classifications should only be done in structures.1 For 1982-1991, we can
also access the cross tables by application and types.
In our study, we leverage the heterogeneity in these robot classifications. Robots may be
categorized by several dimensions, such as applications, types, and structures. Applications
are the classification of robots due to the tasks (applications) that robots are expected to
perform by each user. Examples include Welding and soldering (WS) that are intensively
needed tasks in the automobile industry, and Assembling and disassembling (AD) that are
intensive in the electric machine industry. Types refer to the physical structure and features
of robots. For instance, a playback robot is a type of robot that remembers pre-specified
moves and plays them back over and over again. Numerical control robots receive the
input by programs and move without memory based on the moves performed beforehand.
Playback robots are relatively intensively used in automobile industry, while numerical
control robots tend to be in electric machine industry.
Starting in 2004, the IFR and major robot producers agreed that robots should not be
classified according to the above types but instead, by structures that represent the physical
feature of robots. In the JARA data, the type classification discontinues in 2000 and the
structure classification begins in the following year. The classifications are as follows:
articulated robot, SCARA robot, polar coordinate robot, cylindrical robot, cartesian robot,
and parallel link robot.
B.3.3 Further Raw Trends of the JARA
Figure B.2 shows the trend of expenditure shares across industries in Japan taken from the
JARA data. The industries are sorted according to their value in 2017. As one can see,
the distribution is historically highly skewed to particular industries within manufacturing.
1Seehttps://www.ifr.org/downloads/press2018/SourcesandMethodsWRIndustrialRobots2018.
pdf. (Accessed on October 23, 2019)
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In particular, in 2017, the top 10 industries (industries above Chemical, pharmaceuticals,
cosmetics, etc. in Figure B.2) constitute more than 97 percent of the domestic expenditure.
Furthermore, the electric machine and automobile industries are noticeable significant
purchasers. These two industries represent 68.2 percent of the absorption in Japan in 2017.
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Figure B.2: Industry Shares
Note: Authors’ calculation based on JARA data. Industries are sorted by the total quantity in 2017.
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We then show the raw trends of shipment quantity and unit values for each industry,
aggregated by all applications for the industry. To calculate unit values, we take the sales
value and the corresponding quantity units and divide the former measure by the latter.
In addition to the domestic adsorptions, we also show the trend of exports from now on
for comparison. Figure B.3 shows the result. The left panel shows the quantity unit of
robots, while the right shows the unit values. First, note that our data spans 1978-2017.
The coverage of our data allows us to study the early period in which the quantity shipment
grew rapidly in Japan. Our data show that the growth did not concentrate in a particular
industry, but instead occurred across a large set of industries. As the other data source
confirms, since 1990, shipments to domestic industries shrank in general, while the export
trends continued to grow at a somewhat slower pace than before. These constant growth
shares across domestic industries suggest that the robot penetration to domestic industries is
caused not only by demand shocks to a particular set of buyer industries, but by the overall
growth of the robot-producing industry.
Second, in the right panel, we see that the unit-value trends for each industry are
relatively constant or slightly decreasing over time, with some exceptions. The constant or
decreasing unit prices would suggest that the robot producers become efficient and offer
lower prices as time goes on. Note that these patterns hold for the two large buyers of
industrial robots, electric machines, and automobiles.
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Figure B.3: Raw Trends by Industry
(a) Quantity Units (b) Unit Values
Note: Authors’ calculation based on JARA data. Industries are sorted by the total quantity in 2017. Exports are not classified by industries in the survey.
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With the JARAdata, we are able to show the trends by industry by applications according
to Table 2.1 in Figure B.4. Panel (a) shows the quantity and Panel (b) shows the unit value.
From Panel (a), one can see that the shipment quantity increases for broad applications and
broad industry during 1980s, while the increasing trend stops after the 1990s, confirming the
trend we found in Figure B.3. In contrast, there is significant within-application and across-
industry variation. For example, the electric machine industry intensively purchased robots
for Assembling and disassembling, while the Automobile industry bought a significant
amount of robots for Welding and soldering. This suggests that industries have different
tasks for which they demand robots.
Panel (b) of Figure B.4 reveals the following two features. First, it shows relatively
small within-application and across-industry variations. This suggests that the robot prices
are not driven solely by particular industries, but by the technology for producing robots.
Second, there are significant variations in trends across different applications. For example,
robots for Welding and soldering show a stable decline in the unit value for a broad set of
industries. This suggests that the production technology for Welding-soldering robots grew
consistently over the sample period.
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Figure B.4: Raw Trends by Industry and Applications
(a) Quantity Units (b) Unit Values
Note: Authors’ calculation based on JARA data. Industries are sorted by the total quantity in 2017. Exports are not classified by industries in the survey.
The y-axis is log scale and lines reaching the x-axis imply zero quantity in level.
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To further highlight the application compositions, we show the expenditure share of
applications for each industry in Figure B.5. One may see significant variations across
industries. As we have discussed, the Electric machine industry and the Automobile indus-
try intensively buy robots for Assembling and disassembling, and Welding and soldering,
respectively. Furthermore, Figure B.5 reveals that the within-industry patterns of expen-
diture shares are stable with some exceptions in minor industries. This confirms that the
expenditure share is driven by the feature of industries.
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Figure B.5: Raw Trends by Industry and Applications
Note: Authors’ calculation based on JARA data. Industries are sorted by the total quantity in 2017. Exports are not classified by industries in the survey.
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Figure B.6: Robot Trends Before and After 1978
Note: Authors’ calculation based on JARA data. The red dashed line indicates 1978, the initial year of our
primary analysis. Trends before 1977 are taken by aggregating type-buyer industry across tables.
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Figure B.7: Raw Trends by Industry and Types
(a) Quantity Units (b) Unit Values
Note: Authors’ calculation based on JARA data. Industries are sorted by the total quantity in 2017. Exports are not classified by industries in the survey.
The y-axis is log scale and lines reaching the x-axis imply zero quantity in level.
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Table B.1: Pooled Regression
Dependent variable:
log stock units (thousand)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log unit value −0.728∗∗∗ −1.449∗∗∗ −0.344 0.200 −1.250∗∗∗ −0.081 −0.230
(0.126) (0.253) (0.426) (0.301) (0.232) (0.318) (0.266)




Observations 818 144 129 134 138 135 138
R2 0.039 0.188 0.005 0.003 0.176 0.0005 0.005
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Log unit values are in the unit of current million JPY.
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Table B.2: Industry-Fixed Effects
Dependent variable:
log stock units (thousand)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log unit value −0.370∗∗∗ −0.210 −0.739∗∗∗ −0.237 −0.135 −0.105 −0.101
(0.098) (0.188) (0.188) (0.191) (0.153) (0.162) (0.176)
Sample All 110, Handling 160, Welding 170, Dispensing 180, Processing 200, Assembling 900, Others
Industry FE X X X X X X X
Year FE
Application FE
Observations 818 144 129 134 138 135 138
R2 0.499 0.785 0.893 0.753 0.823 0.813 0.720
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Log unit values are in the unit of current million JPY.
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Table B.3: Industry- and Year- Fixed Effects
Dependent variable:
log stock units (thousand)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log unit value −0.504∗∗∗ −0.388∗∗∗ −0.572∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.333∗∗∗ −0.512∗∗∗ −0.333∗
(0.097) (0.139) (0.140) (0.198) (0.123) (0.138) (0.183)
Sample All 110, Handling 160, Welding 170, Dispensing 180, Processing 200, Assembling 900, Others
Industry FE X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X
Application FE
Observations 818 144 129 134 138 135 138
R2 0.545 0.912 0.950 0.828 0.903 0.897 0.770
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Log unit values are in the unit of current million JPY.
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Table B.4: Industry-Year-Application Fixed Effects
Dependent variable:
log stock units (thousand)








Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
B.4 Robot Imports in Japan
Japan produces most of its robots domestically (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018b, among
others). To confirm this, we compare the import (from the rest of the world to Japan) and the
domestic sales measures of robots (from Japan to Japan). In particular, we visit Comtrade
data, take HS Code 847950 (Industrial Robots for Multiple Uses), and compare the trend
with domestic shipment trends from our main data source, the JARA, discussed in detail
in the next section. Trade data for the HS code are available only since 1996, while JARA
data exist from 1978. Table B.8 shows the result. We also calculate the shipment share by
domestic producers. We obtained 97.9 percent to 99.3 percent shares, depending on the
year, between 1996 and 2017. Therefore, we interpret that most of robot purchases in Japan
have been domestic-sourced. In our paper, we focus only on JARA data, from which we
may exploit a rich set of information that is crucial for our analysis, as we will discuss in
detail.
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Figure B.8: Domestic Shipments and Import of Robots in Japan
(a) Level Scale (b) Log-10 Scale
Note: Authors’ calculation based on Comtrade and JARA data. The Comtrade trends show the total import
value (reported by importer, Japan) of HS Code 847950 (Industrial Robots for Multiple Uses). The JARA
trends show the total shipment from the domestic producers, aggregated by all applications and industries.
The Comtrade data is denominated by current USD, while the JARA data are denominated by current JPY.
To convert the monetary values, we use the FRED data, the annual current JPY-USD exchange rate.
B.5 Calculating Robot Stock
As we briefly discussed in Section 2.3.6, we assume alternative and flexible assumptions
on the robot stock calculation. The first set of assumptions is based on the immediate
withdrawal method (IWM). The IWM assumes the shipped robots are in use immediately
after purchase and not in use in a specified length of years. IFR follows this method with
the withdrawal period of 12 years. To better compare the results with the literature, our
primary specification follows the stock definition based on IWMwith 12 years. The 12-year
assumption is debatable, however, as IFR admits: “This assumption was investigated in an
UNECE/IFR pilot study, carried out in 2000 among some major robot companies ... This
investigation suggested that an assumption of 12 years of average life span might be too
conservative and that the average life/ service life was closer to 15 years.” (IFR, 2018).
German and US tax authorities, in contrast, suggest the standard depreciation schedules be
shorter. Given these discussions, we consider three alternatives: 10, 12 (baseline), and 15
years of depreciations.
The second set of assumptions is based on the perpetual inventory method (PIM).
The PIM is a standard method used when calculating capital stocks, adopted in National
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Accounts [OECD, 2009]. A key parameter in the method is depreciation rates. There is
no systematic empirical study on the value. As one measure, following Artuc et al. [2020],
we use an annual 10 percent depreciation rate. As a more context-based estimate, we
employ the result from Nomura and Momose [2008]. Based on disposal asset data in Japan
(Survey on Capital Expenditures and Disposables), Nomura and Momose [2008] estimated
the depreciation rate of machinery, with the category of machinery and equipment, as 18
percent. Admitting that machinery is a broader category than industrial robots, we employ
18 percent as a larger alternative than 10 percent.
TableB.5 shows the baseline regression result of specification (2.2)with these alternative
stock measures. Column 2 shows the main regression result based on a 12-year IWM.
Columns 1 and 3 show the different-year based IWM, 10 years and 15 years, respectively.
Columns 4 and 5 show the results with a PIM with depreciation rates of 10 percent and 18
percent, respectively. The regression coefficients are robust to alternative choices of stock
measurement of robots.
B.6 Detail in ESS
Employment status is based on the usual employment status (the “usual method”). Any
answer of mostly worked, worked besides doing housework, worked besides attending
school, andworked besides doing housework and attending school are recorded as employed.
For the education attainment, we define four values that are consistent across surveys: less
than high-school diploma (LHS), high-school diploma (HS), technical/vocational school
diploma (TVS), four-year college diploma or more (FC). For age, we define the five-year
bins from age 15 up to age 79 and aggregate the age groups over 80. The survey records the
annual earnings, annual days worked, and weekly hours worked in categories. Industry and
occupations are encoded according to the Japan Standard Industry Classifications (JSIC)
and the Japan Standard Occupation Classifications (JSOC). We convert these categorical
variables into continuous variables using the mid-point of the range. Taking the 2007 survey
as an example, the mean annual earnings is 3,170,263 current JPY (27,330 current USD),
and the mean hours worked is 1,516 hours.
Another set of representative labor statistics is from the Basic Survey of Wage Structure
that is based on the random sampling of payroll records for June. For the purpose of
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Table B.5: Industry-level, 2SLS, Different Stock Measurement
Dependent variable:
ln(!8C)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln('8C) 0.255∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗ 0.322∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.108) (0.123) (0.114) (0.093)
Industry FE X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X
Globalization Controls X X X X X
Technology Controls X X X X X
Stock Measurement 10 Years 12 Years 15 Years X = 0.1 X = 0.18
Observations 104 104 104 104 104
R2 0.987 0.988 0.987 0.988 0.988
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between shift-share measures of changes in robot stock per thousand workers and log difference
of outcome variables multiplied by 100. All regressions control demographic variables, globalization
controls, and technology controls as well as the industry and year fixed effects. All regressions are weighted
by initial-year population. The standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. The demographic variables
include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates, share of female workers, share
of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. The globalization controls
contain the logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA.
The technology controls include logarithm stock value measures for ICT capital, innovation capital, and
competition capital from the JIP database. The outcome variables are total employment (baseline), under
age-35 employment, age 35-50 employment, and over age-50 employment in columns 1-4,
respectively.∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
comparison, we report the statistics of 2007. The mean of the estimated annual salary based
on the June salary and bonus payment of the previous year is 3,858,233 yen, and the mean
of the estimated annual hours worked is 1,869 hours.
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B.7 Details in Other Data
B.7.1 Census of Manufacture
The Census of Manufacture (CoM) annually surveys manufacturing establishments in
Japan.2 The CoM asks each establishment for its product-level shipment values. The
product code for industrial robots used in CoM exists since 1977. We take the CoM data
since 1983 to 2016. The survey was not conducted in 2011 and 2015, because a substituting
government survey, the Economic Census of Business Activity (ECBA), was conducted.
We also take ECBA data to construct the complete observations of Japan’s establishments
that shipped robots in any years between 1983 and 2016.
The CoM and the ECBA treat the VAT in the following way. For CoM, before 2014,
respondents were forced to report the shipment value gross of VAT. Since 2016, they have
been allowed to choose to gross or net VAT. For the ECBA, both surveys allowed respondents
to select. For consistency, we net out the VAT from all data by the legislative VAT rate
from the total sales value. The VAT rate is 0 before 1988, 0.03 between 1989 and 1996,
0.05 between 1997 and 2013, and 0.08 since 2014 and onward.
The primary purpose of using the CoM and the ECBA is to take robot-producers’
employment. For this purpose, we follow the following steps. First, we calculate each
establishment’s intensity of robot production by taking the share of robot sales among total
sales. To take robot sales, we aggregate shipment values and processing fees of all products
under the 1976 Japan Standard Industrial Code (JSIC) of 3498, 1984 and 1993 JSIC of
2998, 2002 JSIC of 2698 (“Industrial Robot Manufacturing,” all above), and 2007 and
2013 JSIC of 2694 (“Robot Manufacturing”). Second, assuming a proportional allocation
of workers for dollar sales, we multiply total workers by robot production intensity for
each establishment. These steps generate robot-producing workers for each establishment,
aggregating up to industry-level robot-producing workers.
Table B.6 shows the result of the specification (2.4) with employment, net of robot-
producing workers as an outcome variable. The column structure is the same as that of
our main result Table 2.4. One should note the very close estimates to the ones in Table
2.4. This solely comes from the fact that the number of robot-producing workers is very
2The survey was conducted for all establishments in years with last digit 0, 3, 5, or 8 until the Economic
Census of Business Activity (ECBA) started in 2011. In other years and after 2011, all establishments with
the number of employees more than three are surveyed.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(A/
8C
) −0.853∗∗∗ −0.466∗∗∗ −0.274∗ −0.437∗∗
(0.130) (0.144) (0.151) (0.171)
Industry FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Globalization Controls X X
Technology Controls X
IV F-stasitic 9.1 11.047 10.912 16.703
Observations 104 104 104 104
R2 0.975 0.984 0.985 0.987
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, CoM, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of
the relationship between log robot cost measure and log robot stock measure across industries and years.
The employment measure excludes the employment of robot-producing plants. All columns control the
industry and year fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by purchase values of robots in each year. The
standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. Columns 1 shows the result without other control variables.
Column 2 includes the demography controls. Demography controls include share of high school graduates,
share of 4-year university graduates, share of female workers, share of workers under age of 35, and share of
workers above age of 50 from ESS. Column 3 includes the logarithm import values from JIP database and
logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA. Column 4 includes logarithm stock value measures for ICT
capital, innovation capital, competition capital from the JIP database. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
small relative to the size of the Japanese manufacturing industry. In fact, the share of
robot-producing workers in manufacturing is between 0.001 and 0.004 percent throughout
the sample period. Therefore, as far as the directly robot-producing workers are concerned,
the reinstatement effect of automation is quite small [Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018a].
B.7.2 Basic Survey on Overseas Business Activities
Basic Survey on Overseas Business Activities (BSOBA) is a firm-level census of Japanese
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and their foreign subsidiaries. We take offshoring in-
tensity measures by aggregating operating revenues in foreign subsidiaries. We take sub-
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sidiaries’ industry codes when allocating revenues to each industry.
B.7.3 Japan Industrial Productivity Database
Japan Industrial Productivity (JIP) database is a long-run industrial aggregate of several
measures starting in 1970. Among them, we use import and intangible capital. The intan-
gible capital measure is composed of following items: ICT assets (ordered and packaged
software, own-developed software), innovation assets (R and D expenditures, mineral ex-
ploration, copyright and trademark right, other product/design/research development), and
competition assets (brand capital, firm-specific human capital, expenditure for restructur-
ing). Basic concepts of these variables follow National Accounts. Detailed discussion is
provided in Fukao et al. [2008].
B.8 Further Industry-level Results
B.8.1 Industry-specific Prices
In this section, we assume that the prices at which each industry purchases robots may









is purchase value of application 0 in industry 8 and year C. Armed with these
variables, in Table B.7, we report the regression results of the specification (2.2) based on
the price index (B.4). The results are not robust across control variables. In particular,
in our preferred specification of column 4, we find a positive but insignificant coefficient
estimate.
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Table B.7: Industry-level, 2SLS, industry-specific prices
Dependent variable:
ln(!8C)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln('8C) 0.429∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.103 0.139
(0.079) (0.061) (0.101) (0.101)
Industry FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Globalization Controls X X
Technology Controls X
IV F-stasitic 27.262 17.462 12.754 15.404
Observations 104 104 104 104
R2 0.968 0.987 0.987 0.988
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between log robot stock measure and log employment across industries and years, with the
instrument of log robot cost measure, based on equation (B.4). The employment measure includes the
employment of robot-producing plants. All columns control the industry and year fixed effects. All
regressions are weighted by purchase values of robots in each year. The standard errors are shown in the
parenthesis. Columns 1 shows the result without other control variables. Column 2 includes the demography
controls. Demography controls include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates,
share of female workers, share of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS.
Column 3 includes the logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added
from SOBA. Column 4 includes logarithm stock value measures for ICT capital, innovation capital,
competition capital from the JIP database. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
B.8.2 First Stage for Efficiency-adjusted Regressions
B.9 Further CZ-level Analysis
B.9.1 Similar Country SSIV Result
Table B.9 shows the results of regression (2.7) with the standard geographic SSIV. Among
the three specifications (log changes in total employment in column 1, log changes in total
population in column 2, and changes in employment-to-population ratio in column 3), the
point estimates show signs consistent with those of our main results in Table 2.10. They
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Table B.8: Industry-level, First Stage, Efficiency-adjusted Quantity
Dependent variable:
ln('̃8C)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(A/
8C
) −0.325 −1.564∗∗∗ −1.244∗∗∗ −1.156∗∗
(0.352) (0.416) (0.435) (0.477)
Industry FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Globalization Controls X X
Technology Controls X
IV F-stasitic 0.855 14.131 8.195 5.860
Observations 104 104 104 104
R2 0.949 0.969 0.973 0.977
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between log robot stock measure and log employment across industries and years, with the
instrument of log robot cost measure. The employment measure includes the employment of
robot-producing plants. All columns control the industry and year fixed effects. All regressions are weighted
by purchase values of robots in each year. The standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. Columns 1
shows the result without other control variables. Column 2 includes the demography controls. Demography
controls include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates, share of female
workers, share of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. Column 3
includes the logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA.
Column 4 includes logarithm stock value measures for ICT capital, innovation capital, competition capital
from the JIP database. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
are not precise enough, however, to conclude the positive impacts of robots.
B.9.2 Heterogeneous Impacts
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Table B.9: Regressions with Exposure to Robots IV
Dependent variable:
Δ ln(!) Δ ln(%) Δ(!/%)
(1) (2) (3)
Δ' 1.661 0.835 0.472
(1.479) (1.287) (0.386)
Controls X X X
CZ and year FEs X X X
Observations 906 906 906
R2 0.423 0.358 0.587
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on IFR, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between shift-share measures of changes in robot stock per thousand workers and log difference
of outcome variables multiplied by 100. The dependent variable is instrumented by the shift-share measure
whose shift is taken from German robot adoption trends and share is taken by the baseyear industrial
employment share in each CZ. As outcome variables, column 1 takes log total employment, column 2 takes
log total population, and column 3 takes employment-to-population ratio. All regressions are weighted by
base-year populations in each CZ. Control variables include demographic, industry, trade and capital
controls in the base year. Demographic variables consists of CZ’s female share and elderly (age 65 and
above) share. Industry variables are CZ’s manufacturing and service employment shares. Trade variable
includes the import exposure from China as in Autor, Dorn, Hanson (2013). Capital control is made from
the information-technology capital in each industry from JIP database. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.10: CZ-level, 2SLS. Results by Education Groups
Dependent variable:
Δ ln(!2C) Δ ln(!(2C ) Δ ln(!2C )
(1) (2) (3)
Δ'2C 2.203∗∗ 2.426∗∗ 3.320∗∗
(1.017) (1.200) (1.616)
CZ FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Globalization Controls X X X
Technology Controls X X X
Group All High School Grad. 4-year Univ. Grad.
Observations 1,466 1,466 1,439
R2 0.817 0.841 0.759
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between shift-share measures of changes in robot stock per thousand workers and log difference
of outcome variables multiplied by 100. All regressions control demographic variables, globalization
controls, and technology controls as well as the industry and year fixed effects. All regressions are weighted
by initial-year population. The standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. The demographic variables
include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates, share of female workers, share
of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. The globalization controls
contain the logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA.
The technology controls include logarithm stock value measures for ICT capital, innovation capital, and
competition capital from the JIP database. The outcome variables are total employment (baseline),
high-school graduate employment, and 4-year university graduate-or-more employment in columns 1-3,
respectively. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.11: CZ-level, 2SLS. Results by Sex Groups
Dependent variable:
Δ ln(!2C) Δ ln(!4<0;42C ) Δ ln(!"0;42C )
(1) (2) (3)
Δ'2C 2.203∗∗ 3.112∗∗∗ 1.816∗
(1.017) (1.122) (1.028)
CZ FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Globalization Controls X X X
Technology Controls X X X
Group All Female Male
Observations 1,466 1,466 1,466
R2 0.817 0.802 0.802
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between shift-share measures of changes in robot stock per thousand workers and log difference
of outcome variables multiplied by 100. All regressions control demographic variables, globalization
controls, and technology controls as well as the industry and year fixed effects. All regressions are weighted
by initial-year population. The standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. The demographic variables
include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates, share of female workers, share
of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. The globalization controls
contain the logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA.
The technology controls include logarithm stock value measures for ICT capital, innovation capital, and
competition capital from the JIP database. The outcome variables are total employment (baseline), female
employment, and male employment in columns 1-3, respectively. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.12: CZ-level, 2SLS. Results by Age Groups
Dependent variable:
Δ ln(!2C) Δ ln(!0≤342C ) Δ ln(!35≤0≤492C ) Δ ln(!50≤02C )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ'2C 2.203∗∗ 1.463 4.656∗∗∗ 0.499
(1.017) (1.428) (1.467) (1.209)
CZ FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X
Globalization Controls X X X X
Technology Controls X X X X
Group All Age ≤ 34 35 ≤ Age ≤ 49 50 ≤ Age
Observations 1,466 1,458 1,465 1,466
R2 0.817 0.818 0.804 0.881
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between shift-share measures of changes in robot stock per thousand workers and log difference
of outcome variables multiplied by 100. All regressions control demographic variables, globalization
controls, and technology controls as well as the industry and year fixed effects. All regressions are weighted
by initial-year population. The standard errors are shown in the parenthesis. The demographic variables
include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university graduates, share of female workers, share
of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50 from ESS. The globalization controls
contain the logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm offshoring value added from SOBA.
The technology controls include logarithm stock value measures for ICT capital, innovation capital, and
competition capital from the JIP database. The outcome variables are total employment (baseline), under
age-35 employment, age 35-50 employment, and over age-50 employment in columns 1-4, respectively.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.13: CZ-level, 2SLS, Wage Effects By Education Level
Dependent variable:
Δ ln(F"(2C ) Δ ln(F(2C ) Δ ln(F)2C ) Δ ln(F4*2C )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ'2C 2.275∗ 3.595∗∗∗ 4.842∗∗∗ 3.213∗∗
(1.295) (0.929) (1.445) (1.613)
CZ FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X
Globalization Controls X X X X
Technology Controls X X X X
Education Middle School High School Technical College 4-year Univ.
Observations 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
R2 0.899 0.951 0.836 0.879
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between shift-share measures of changes in robot stock per thousand workers and log difference
of hourly wages multiplied by 100 for different education group of workers. All regressions control
demographic variables, globalization controls, and technology controls as well as the industry and year fixed
effects. All regressions are weighted by initial-year population. The standard errors are shown in the
parenthesis. The demographic variables include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university
graduates, share of female workers, share of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50
from ESS. The globalization controls contain the logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm
offshoring value added from SOBA. The technology controls include logarithm stock value measures for
ICT capital, innovation capital, and competition capital from the JIP database. The first column shows the
result for the sample of middle-school graduates, the second for high-school graduates, the third for technical
and vocational college graduates, and the fourth for four-year university graduates or more education.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table B.14: CZ-level, 2SLS, Hours Effects By Education Level
Dependent variable:
Δ ln(ℎ"(2C ) Δ ln(ℎ(2C ) Δ ln(ℎ)2C ) Δ ln(ℎ4*2C )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ'2C −2.160∗ −2.253∗∗∗ −3.336∗∗∗ −0.932
(1.117) (0.649) (1.017) (0.896)
CZ FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X
Globalization Controls X X X X
Technology Controls X X X X
Education Middle School High School Technical College 4-year Univ.
Observations 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
R2 0.446 0.780 0.734 0.748
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on JARA, ESS, SOBA and JIP data. The table presents estimates of the
relationship between shift-share measures of changes in robot stock per thousand workers and log difference
of hours worked multiplied by 100 for different education group of workers. All regressions control
demographic variables, globalization controls, and technology controls as well as the industry and year fixed
effects. All regressions are weighted by initial-year population. The standard errors are shown in the
parenthesis. The demographic variables include share of high school graduates, share of 4-year university
graduates, share of female workers, share of workers under age of 35, and share of workers above age of 50
from ESS. The globalization controls contain the logarithm import values from JIP database and logarithm
offshoring value added from SOBA. The technology controls include logarithm stock value measures for
ICT capital, innovation capital, and competition capital from the JIP database. The first column shows the
result for the sample of middle-school graduates, the second for high-school graduates, the third for technical




Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Data and Empirical Result Appendix
C.1.1 Further Data on Labor Share and Multinational Activities
Figure C.1 shows the longer-run trend of labor share in Japan since 1980 to complement
Figure 3.2 in the main text. Although there is a countercyclical component and a sag around
1990, the overall long-run trend reveals the same message as Figure 3.2: the persistent
decline in the labor share for the three decades.
While Figure C.1 is concerned about labor compensation, Figure C.2a shows the trends
of both labor and capital earnings by Japanese MNEs from the BSOBA data. Note that
capital income has been increasing since 1995, but the trend is more volatile than payment
to labor. This increase can partly explain the more rapid increase in GNI than GDP in Japan
because the income from the foreign capital is accounted for under the positive net primary
income from abroad. It will be a crucial step to explicitly allow foreign capital in our model.
C.1.2 Robust Labor Share Decrease
As explained in Section 3.1.1, neither the conceptual or operational measurement of labor
share is trivial. In this section, we provide several measures of the labor share in Japan
between 1995 and 2007 to see that irrespective of the measurement process, we have robust
evidence that the labor share has been decreasing. First, the green line in Figure C.2b
shows our preferred measure, the total labor cost divided by GDP. However, since GDP
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or value added includes capital depreciation, it overstates net capital income [Bridgman,
2018]. To overcome this, we take the SNA data from the Japan Cabinet Office Long-run
Economic Statistics and calculate the trend in the share of nominal employee compensation
over nominal national income, which excludes capital depreciation (as well as indirect
tax, while including subsidies). This trend is shown by the blue line. Another issue is
the treatment of the mixed income of self-employees. Since self-employees are typically
owners of both the production capital and labor, the allocation of the generated income to
labor and capital can be distorted (e.g., Rognlie, 2018). To remove any biases due to the
misallocation of such mixed income, we take the trend of domestic corporate factor income
and their compensation payment to the labor, which is shown by the red line. We can see in
Figure C.2b that all of these trends are decreasing.
C.1.3 Comparison of MNEs and Non-MNEs
To further analyze the role of MNEs in the decrease in labor share, we conduct a simple
decomposition analysis across MNEs and non-MNEs by aggregating total sales, labor
compensation and net income separately for MNEs and non-MNEs. We then calculate
the labor share for the two groups. Figure C.3 shows the trends for labor share and MNE
composition. The blue line depicts the trends in the share of the sum of MNE HQ sales
relative to the sum of sales of all firms. In 1995, the share was roughly 12 percent, which
rose to close to 15 percent in 2007. Therefore, the composition of sales became skewed
toward MNEs over the period. The red lines show the labor share trends among MNEs
(solid line) and non-MNEs (dashed line), and we can see that the labor share of MNEs
decreases more rapidly. Additionally, throughout the period, MNEs had a lower labor share
than non-MNEs. Since the labor share composition by MNEs increased (as shown by the
blue line), both of these facts have contributed to the decrease in aggregate labor share.
One of the interpretations of these facts is that within MNEs, the payment to labor
relative to capital decreased over the period, and more firms become MNEs. In the model
section, we develop a framework in which both of these may be explained by foreign factor
augmentation.
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Figure C.1: Labor Share and Payment to Foreign Employment, Japan
Note: The authors’ calculation based on Japan Industrial Productivity (JIP) Database 2015 from Research
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) and the Basic Survey on Overseas Business Activities
(BSOBA) 1996-2008. The labor share is calculated by the share of the nominal labor cost in the value added
of JIP market economies in nominal terms. The payment to foreign labor is the sum of compensation to
workers in foreign subsidiaries of all Japanese multinational corporations in BSOBA.
C.1.4 Other Potential Mechanisms
There are several mechanisms behind decreasing labor shares proposed in the literature.
I review some first-pass evidence that neither of recent automation and surge in market
powers is likely to play a main role in explaining shrinking labor share.
Automation in Japan As discussed in Section 3.1.1, bias in technological change can
arise from at least two sources: automation and offshoring. Since the current paper focuses
on offshoring; in particular, factor offshoring as opposed to goods offshoring [Hummels
et al., 2014], the evolution of automation technology in Japan is not our main focus.
However, by examining the aggregate data used in automation literature (e.g., Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2019), we see suggestive evidence that automation acceleration was not
observed in Japan as rapidly as in other highly automating countries from the 1990s to
2010s.
To examine this, we employ data from the International Federation of Robotics (IFR)
to obtain the operational stock of industrial robots in each country by year. Figure C.4a
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Figure C.2: MNE Activities and Labor Shares, Detailed
(a) Earnings by Foreign Labor and Capital (b) Labor Share Measures in Japan, 1995-2007
Note: The authors’ calculation based on the Basic Survey on Overseas Business Activities (BSOBA) 1996-
2017, the 2015 Japan Industrial Productivity (JIP) Database, Cabinet Office Long-Run Economic Statistics
(COLES, https://www5.cao.go.jp/j-j/wp/wp-je12/h10_data01.html, accessed on May 13, 2019), and Japan
SNA, Generation of Income Account, 2009. The left panel shows the trends of the total profit and labor
compensation in the foreign subsidiaries of all Japanese MNEs. Foreign subsidiary profit is the sum of current
net profit of all subsidiaries of Japanesemultinational corporations in BSOBA, and payment to offshore labor is
the sum of worker compensation to foreign subsidiaries of all Japanese multinational corporations in BSOBA.
The right panel shows labor share trends in Japan from several sources. JIP-based labor share is calculated by
the share of nominal labor cost in the nominal value added of JIP market economies. National income-based
labor share is the fraction of nominal employee compensation over nominal national income from COLES.
Domestic corporate-based labor share is the net labor share of domestic corporate factor income, calculated
from the SNA by the fraction of the item “Wages and salaries” over the sum of “Wages and salaries” and
“Operating surplus, net.”
shows the trends for the five most robot-adopting countries (China, Japan, United States,
South Korea, Germany). All countries other than Japan rapidly introduced industrial robots
from 1993 to 2016. In particular, China’s absorption has been extraordinarily fast since the
mid 2000s, when it entered the international trade markets after being granted membership
in the WTO following the removal of a number of political and institutional barriers. In
contrast, Japan’s automation capital stock was declining during this period.
In a related argument, Fort et al. [2018] emphasizes the impact of globalization on
country-level labor markets, but qualifies this statement because “providing a definitive ac-
counting of the amount of employment change attributable to either factor is extraordinarily
difficult.” Given this difficulty, focusing on Japan might offer insight because the analysis
is not contaminated by concurrent extensive technological growth.
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Figure C.3: Labor Shares of MNEs and Non-MNEs
Note: The authors’ calculation based on the Basic Survey on Overseas Business Activities (BSOBA) 2007-
2016, the Basic Survey on Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BSJBSA) 1996-2017, and the JIP
2015. The red lines indicate labor shares of MNEs (solid line) and non-MNE (domestic, dashed line) firms in
Japan. The blue line shows the sales share of MNEs in Japan.Multinational enterprise (MNE) is defined as
firms that appeared in BSOBA at least once during 2007-2016. For each firm, labor share is calculated as the
fraction of total payroll over the sum of total payroll and current profit from BSJBSA. Share of MNE size is
calculated as the fraction of aggregated sales of all multinational firms over the total nominal output from JIP
2015.
A Surge in Market Powers Another potential explanation for the labor share decline is
provided by De Loecker and Eeckhout [2017], who argue that it is explained by a surge in
market power. They develop a parsimonious but versatile method to back out the markups
from the firm- or plant-level data and conclude that the markup in the U.S. has been
increasing remarkably since around 1980. Applying this method to our Japanese firm-level
data (BSJBSA), we find a much smaller increase in markups relative to the U.S., a finding
that is in line with De Loecker and Eeckhout [2018]. The result is shown in Figure C.4b.
Remaining Culprits Other potential explanations for declining labor share include lower
capital prices. For example, Hubmer [2018], Karabarbounis and Neiman [2013] explore if
and how much a decrease in capital goods prices causes demand for labor to be substituted
by demand for capital. Also, since capital income is intrinsically related to the financial
sector, some authors discuss the possibility that labor share may have fallen due to financial-
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Figure C.4: Other Potential Mechanisms
(a) Industrial Robot Stock, Top 5 Countries in 2016 (b) Markup Estimates for Japan
Note: The left panel shows the trend of operational robot stocks in the largest 5 countries of robot adoption as
of 2017, sourced from the International Federation of Robotics. The right panel shows the trend of markups
computed by applying the method of De Loecker and Eeckhout [2017] using data from the Basic Survey on
Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BSJBSA) 1995-2016. Variable input cost is the sum of labor
compensation and intermediate purchases. Output elasticity is estimated by the method of Olley and Pakes
[1996] for each JSIC 4-digit industry. The average is calculated using the weight of each firm’s sales.
market features such as increasing risk premiums [Caballero et al., 2017] or equity values
[Greenwald et al., 2019].
C.1.5 MNEs and Labor Share, Cross Country
This section describes the construction of Figure 3.1 and some further results from it.
To see the first pass evidence that multinational activities have an impact on labor share,
we take the cross country variation in the change of outward multinational activities and
the change in labor share using labor share data from Karabarbounis and Neiman [2013]
and assembling data on multinational activities from UNCTAD. We calculate the level
and change in outward multinational activities as follows. For the level, we take a snap-
shot (1996-2000 average) of net outward multinational sales, taking a five-year average to
control the noise in the raw data. For the change, we obtain the difference in net outward
multinational sales between the 1991-1995 average and the 1996-2000 average.
Figure 3.1 shows the results in the form of a correlation plot. To allow for a lagged
response in the labor share to multinational intensity changes, we take the change in the
labor share between 1995 and 2007. The left panel shows the results for the level of
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Figure C.5: Net Outward Multinational Sales and Labor Share
Note: The authors’ computation from the data from Karabarbounis and Neiman [2013] and UNCTAD.
Note: The horizontal axis is the 1991-1995 average sum of bilateral net outward multinational sales. The
vertical axis is the change in labor share from 1991 to 2000. Singapore was dropped because it had an outlier
value for the outward multinational sales measure.
outward multinational sales and the right panel shows the change. We fit the correlation
by the weighted regression by country size measured by the base-year GDP. The number
of countries in both plots is 36, and even with such a small sample, we see a remarkably
significant negative relationship both in the level of multinational intensity and the change.
Both regression slope coefficients are significantly negative at the two-sided 95 percent
level.
An interpretation of this negative relationship is that the outward multinational activities
substitute labor in the home country more than capital. Hence, the demand for labor in
the home country decreases more than proportionately to the decrease in the demand for
capital. The theory is detailed in Section 3.3.
Figure C.5 shows a plot of the levels of net multinational sales (1991-1995) and the
changes in labor share (1991-2000). Again, the countries that have higher multinational
sales have relatively larger decreases in labor share in the next 10 years.
236
Figure C.6: Trend of Thailand’s Trade
Note: The authors’ computation from the Comtrade data.
C.1.6 Thailand’s Gross Export and Import Trends
Figure C.6 shows the trend in Thailand’s exports and imports using data from Comtrade.
Recalling that the floods occurred in 2011, exports and imports show a roughly parallel
trend before the floods, but after 2011, export growth falters and the trend breaks from that
of imports. This is consistent with our interpretation that the flooding hit the supply-side
of the economy heavily, given that several large-scale manufacturing industrial parks were
inundated. Also, this is consistent with Benguria and Taylor [2019], who present a method
for identifying demand and supply shocks from gross export and import data in the context
of financial crises. They claim that “firm deleveraging shocks are mainly supply shocks and
contract exports,” while leaving imports largely unchanged.
Next, we provide an overview of Thailand’s economic policies. Thailand began inter-
national liberalization ahead of other Southeast Asian countries, being one of the original
member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and entering
GATT in 1982. In the early 2000’s, it formed FTAs with several large economies (India
in 2003, the U.S. in 2004, Australia and Japan in 2005). This is in addition to some major
internal and external FTAs made by ASEAN. The internal FTA among member countries
went into effect in 1993, and by 2003, internal tariffs had been driven down to below five
percent. External FTAs with other large economies include one with China in 2003. Given
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this history, over the period of our analysis from 2007 to 2016, we do not see a large
degree of institutional internationalization, as much of this had occurred beforehand.1 The
gross trade trends shown in Figure C.6 are consistent with this fact, as the drivers behind
the changes in trade trends were external business cycles (e.g., the global great recession
after 2008) or political upheaval (e.g., a coup d’etat in 2014) rather than large trade policy
changes.
C.1.7 Discussion of Data Sources
Country-level Analysis from BSOBA
Throughout the main sections, we maintained the assumption of an aggregated rest of the
world (ROW). Although this simplifies the analysis greatly, there are at least two reasons
why we believe this may not be consistent with empirical findings. First, ample empirical
evidence suggests that the motivation for MNE investment is different for high-income and
low-income countries (see, e.g., Harrison and McMillan, 2011). Second, to the extent that
our natural experiment involves a local natural disaster, a model in which the factors in the
affected area can be separated from factors in other regions would be more realistic. To
move in this direction, this section discusses several country-level data. By doing so, we
provide the motivation for the future development of multi-country analyses.
Our major data source for MNEs is BSOBA which, as described in Section 3.2.1,
contains the universe of offshore plants owned by headquarter firms located and registered
in Japan, covering both private and public firms. As each plant-level observation has the
country-level location, total employment and total labor compensation, we may aggregate
the country-level averagewage and labor productivitymeasure. These variables are analyzed
in detail below.
ProductivityGrowth inEachDestinationCountry Applying themodel inversion (3.25)
for each destination country, Figure C.7 shows the results for Japan’s five most intensive
MNE destination countries measured by size of total employment, taking the U.S. as the
base country in equation (3.25). Therefore, observed productivity growth relative to the
base country shows the relative augmentation of factors in these developing economies.
1Several exceptions include the ASEAN-South Korea FTA that reduced the tariff between South Korea
and Thailand in 2010 and the Chile-Thailand FTA that went into effect in 2015.
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Figure C.7: Country-level Measured Productivity
Broader Country-level Wage Trends–Evidence from PWT Figure C.8 shows country-
level wages generated from Penn World Table (PWT) data. Each line indicates the country-
level average wage, where wage is calculated as per-capita average labor compensation. To
highlight the differences between developed and developing countries, blue lines indicate
OECD countries and red lines non-OECD countries. Since our empirical application
focuses on Thailand, it is highlighted in bold. Several points can be taken from the figure.
First, there is significant wage variation across countries. In particular, OECD countries
on average have historically paid higher wages than their non-OECD counterparts. This
in itself might indicate that the reasons behind multinational activities differ, which would
make a theory based on multiple countries more realistic. For example, Harrison and
McMillan [2011] point out that cost changes in high-income and low-income countries
result in different effects in home-country employment, so future research should take this
into consideration. Second, average wages have grown in many countries, in both OECD
and non-OECD countries alike. This may make it more difficult to derive conclusions
about the desirability for multinational firms to hire foreign workers based on differences
in labor costs. Our approach is therefore to invert the factor demand to obtain the implied
factor-augmenting productivity shocks, as detailed in Section 3.5.1. Third, our natural
experiment shock in Thailand in 2011 did not appear to change the average wage drastically.
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Figure C.8: Offshore Labor Cost in Thailand and Other Countries
This might be due to the fact that the flood shock was local and short-lived, which might
not be well-captured in coarse country-year aggregate data. We thus employ microdata set
out in Section 3.2.1 to study the exogenous negative foreign factor productivity shock.
Comparison of BSOBA and PWT In this section, we check the differences in the
aggregate (average) wage measures from PWT and BSOBA, our primary source of data
on multinational production. Note that PWT aggregate wage is calculated from the total
labor cost and total employment in each country. Thus, a wage difference emerges if
Japanese-parented subsidiaries hire a different type of worker than the typical firm in each
country. Figure C.9 shows the comparison of BSOBA and PWT for a selected set of nine
countries chosen by their ranking in terms of total employment by Japanese subsidiaries at
the end of FY2015. From the Figure, one can see that BSOBA and PWT show a similar
trend for each country overall. This suggests that Japanese subsidiary firms hire workers
from a similar labor market as other firms in each country. However, there are several
interesting deviations from this pattern, particularly in high-income countries such as the
U.K. and the U.S. This might reflect the fact that the subsidiaries in these countries focus
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Figure C.9: Comparison of BSOBA and PWT
on high-value added activities such as finance, which might cause the hiring structure of
Japanese subsidiaries there to be different from that of other firms. We also show in Table
C.1 the results of a regression of the PWTwage on the BSOBAwage with and without fixed
effects to confirm that the goodness of fit is remarkably high for cross-section-cross-year
data.
Table C.1: Discrepancies between SOBA and PWT
All All Top 9 Top 9
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PR 0.332 0.038 0.772 0.409
(0.014) (0.007) (0.028) (0.045)
Country FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Observations 1,350 1,350 180 180
R2 0.300 0.950 0.805 0.983
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Data-linking strategy
We match the BSJBSA and BSOBA datasets in the following way. First, for each firm,
we pick up from both BSOBA and TSR the firm name, the headquarter address and phone
number for each year. To match the datasets using this information, we first need to deal
with a problem of spelling variation. Due to language translation, there are several potential
spelling variations that refer to the same company or address, so we prepare a spelling
variation table and applied it to the data to obtain a variation-proof dataset.2 In addition,
to further improve the precision of the addresses, we geocode the written address to the
layered system of all Japanese addresses using the CSV Geocoding Service offered by the
University of Tokyo Center for Spatial Information Science.3 The layers are defined as
follows. 1 and 2: “todofuken” (prefecture), 3: city, 4: district in large cities, 5 and 6: coarse
street address, and 7: fine street address.
Using the obtained data for each year, we conduct the following matching. To break
the potential multiple matches within and across years, for each match in each year we
assign a match score that measures the quality of the match. The match score is defined as
follows: a firm name match receive a score of 1,000, a firm phone number match receive
100, a firm address match before geocoding receive 10, and a firm address match after
geocoding at the layer of ; = 2, . . . , 7 received ;.4 We considered the match successful if
the match score is strictly larger than 1,000. In other words, this means that we require the
following two criteria. First, the firm names have to match between the two datasets up to
any spelling variation. Second, either the address or the phone number have to match. If
there are multiple successful matches, we pick the one with the highest match score. Then
we compare the matching results across years and use the results with the highest score.
This procedure results in a match rate of 93.0% from all firm IDs in BSOBA to firm IDs in
TSR.
We match BSJBSA and TSR data by a similar method except that we have BSJBSA data
from the year of 1995. The resulting match rate for all firm IDs in BSJBSA in year 2007-
2016 is 88.9%. Figure C.10 provides a schematic diagram that summarizes the data-linking
strategy set out above.
2The spelling variation table is available upon request.
3http://newspat.csis.u-tokyo.ac.jp/geocode/ (in Japanese, accessed on July 27, 2018)
4We did not assign any points for the match at the level of todofuken because it is too coarse.
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Figure C.10: Schematic Data-linking Strategy
Figure C.11: Industry Distribution of the Treated Subsidiaries of Japanese firms, 2011
(a) Total Sales (b) Number of Subsidiaries
Overview of Japanese Subsidiaries in Thailand
Using the datasets described above, we here show statistics about production in the flooded
region. First, to understand the industry clustering patterns in detail, Figure C.11 shows
the industry distribution of Japanese subsidiaries in the flooded region in Thailand by sales
in 2011. As mentioned earlier, most of the subsidiaries in the flooded region produced
Transportation Equipment, including automobiles, whether measured by total sales or
number of local subsidiaries. The second and third largest sectors were Electronics and
ICT Equipment when measured by total sales. Transportation Equipment dominates other
industries in terms of total sales because the unit value is high, but the difference is slightly
less dramatic in terms of the number of subsidiaries.
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Figure C.12: Top 10 Countries in which Japanese Firms Have Subsidiaries
(a) 2007 (b) 2016
Destination Countries of Japanese MNEs
To further support our empirical analysis, we discuss here the strong relationship with
respect to foreign direct investment (FDI) from Japan to Thailand. In 2011, Japan was
the largest country investing in Thailand, while Thailand was the third largest destination
country for Japanese FDI. Therefore, the flooding in Thailand was not only a local shock
but also had a non-negligible impact on the Japanese MNEs and their employment as well.
To confirm the importance of the Japan-Thailand relationship, Figure C.12 shows the
top 10 countries in which Japanese firms had subsidiaries in 2007 and 2016. During these
10 years, the ranking of the top five countries did not change (China, U.S., Thailand, Hong
Kong, and Singapore), which indicates the stable economic relationship between these
countries and Japanese firms. The number of Japanese firms with links to Thailand actually
grew during this period.
Balancing Analysis
To check the similarity between the firms that experienced and did not experience flooding,
we conduct several balancing tests. FigureC.13 shows the industry distribution of subsidiary
manufacturing firms for the group of parent firms that invested in 2011 in the flooded region
in Thailand (labeled Thai) and other regions of Thailand and the ROW (labeled Others).
Qualitatively, industries that had many firms in the flooded region of Thailand are likely
to also have had a higher number of firms in other countries, but the flooded region had
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Figure C.13: Industry Distributions, Flooded Region of Thailand vs Other Regions
relativelymore “Automobile parts and accessories” industry firms relative to other countries.
Figure C.14 shows the estimated distribution of the size of subsidiary firms of the parent
firms that invested in the flooded region of Thailand versus other regions. We measure
the size by log sales in 2011, and the estimation is a kernel density estimation with an
Epanechinikov kernel. At the top of the distribution, the densities of the flooded group
(labeled Thai) and the other group (labeled Others) are similar, while at the bottom of the
distribution, the Thailand group dominates the Others group. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test rejects the null hypothesis that the distribution of the two groups is the same.
Other Trends
Complementing the relative aggregate trend analysis in Section 3.4.1, the left and right
panels of Figure C.15 show the trends in investment and sales. The red vertical line
indicates 2011, the year of the floods. Interestingly, the investment trend in the flooded
region and the rest of the world follows a parallel path before the flood, but the trend breaks
sharply after the flood. Intuitively, this is reasonable because plants in the damaged area
would have needed to substantially increase investment to repair flood damage. On the
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Figure C.14: Sales Distributions, Flooded Region of Thailand vs Others
other hand, the sales trend in the right panel does not show a parallel pattern even before
the flood.
Choice of Treatment Groups
As described in Section 3.4.1, the flood severely affected Ayutthaya and Pathum Thani
provinces. However, it is important to acknowledge these particular provinces because
Thailand overall was relatively unaffected in terms of employment or number of subsidiaries
of Japanese MNEs after the flood, as seen in Figure C.16, which shows the trends in
employment and number of Japanese subsidiaries inside and outside of Thailand instead of
only in the flooded provinces. One can see that the impact on total Thai employment and
number of subsidiaries is not as stark as when we compare the flooded provinces versus the
rest of the world in Figure 3.3. Therefore, in our main analysis, we take these two heavily
flooded provinces as the shocked regions and construct the IV based on that idea. Note
again that, for this purpose, it is critical to link our BSOBA data, which only contains the
country information of each Japanese MNE overseas factory, to Orbis BvD that contains
specific factory addresses.
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Figure C.15: Relative Trends in Investment and Sales of Japanese MNEs
(a) Investment (b) Sales
C.1.8 Calibration Details
Estimation of f
Following recent developments in estimating capital-labor elasticities [Oberfield and Raval,
2014, Raval, 2019], we estimate f using the regression equation (3.20). Our coefficient of
interest is 11 since f = 11 + 1.
To obtain the factor payment ratio (A:/F;)8, we use the annual Census of Manufacture
(CoM) survey. For our purposes, we use the initial stock of tangible assets in the next
year survey. To obtain the total payment to workers, we use the variable total payroll for
all workers, which includes both full-time and part-time workers. Since we can obtain
the rental rate of capital at the industry level, it drops with the industry-fixed effect in
specification (3.20). Finally, CoM also offers municipality, 4-digit industry, and multiplant
status variables. The multiplant status includes three values: no other plants or headquarter
office; no other plant but a headquarter office; has other offices. We include the fixed effect
for all of these values in specification (3.20).
For the local wage, we use themunicipality-level wage taken from the long-run economic
database of the Japan Cabinet Office. The long-run trend data offers the taxpayer-per-capita
taxable income from 1975 to 2013.5 The municipality unit is as of the last day of April
2014. We convert the municipality code in each analysis year to the one as of April 2014
5The primary data source of this dataset is the Survey of Municipality Taxation administered by Ministry
of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan.
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Figure C.16: Trends in Employment and Japanese MNE Subsidiaries, Thailand versus
ROW
(a) Total employment (b) Count of subsidiaries
using Municipality Map Maker [Kirimura et al., 2011].
To control the endogeneity in equation (3.20), we use a shift-share instrument [Bartik,
1991, Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018]. Specifically, estimation equation (3.20) may be
biased with the existence of labor-augmenting productivity shocks to locality< (8). If< (8)
receives a positive shock, then F<(8) increases and (A /F!)8 decreases, so V would be
negatively biased. To obtain the exogenous shifter that changes F<(8) but not (A /F!)8
without the influence through F<(8) , we take the average of national growth in employment
weighted by the base-year employment share of non-manufacturing industries. In particular,
from the Employment Status Survey (ESS), we take the ten year growth in employment in




/10. We then take the base-year industry-= share of
employment l<,=,C−10 in municipality <, and calculate our shift-share instrument by




Table C.2 shows the results of regression (3.20) for 1997 since it is the nearest year to
that of the ESS survey.
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Table C.2: Estimates of f − 1
OLS, CO OLS, BSWS, all OLS, BSWS, manuf. IV, CO IV, BSWS, all IV, BSWS, manuf.
log(F<(8)) −0.60 −0.20 −0.13 −1.15 −1.24 −0.88
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.18) (0.18) (0.13)
Num. obs. 51477 51477 51477 51477 51477 51477
CO indicates that the wage data is from the Cabinet Office. BSWS indicates that the wage data is from the Basic Survey of Wage Structures. "BSWS, all" indicates that the wage variable is taken
from all industries, while "BSWS, manuf." indicates that the wage variable is taken from manufacturing industries. See the text for detail. All regressions include industry FE and multiunit
status indicator. Standard errors are clustered at municipality level.
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Comparison to the Literature The central estimate of Oberfield and Raval [2014] was
around 0.7. However, this value includes industry-level heterogeneity in substitutability
and the caused reallocation mechanism. Oberfield and Raval [2014] reports that plant-level
elasticity estimates range from 0.4-0.7 depending on the industry, which is closer to our
value. Incorporating heterogeneity into the model is our high-priority next research step.
Moreover, the capital-labor substitution parameters at micro and macro-level estimates
sometimes disagree. In fact, although microdata-based findings by ourselves and Oberfield
and Raval [2014] both point to gross-complementary capital and labor, the macro estimates
often indicate that they are gross substitutes [Hubmer, 2018, Karabarbounis and Neiman,
2013]. Note that these macro estimates typically rely on U.S. data. In Japan, even at the
macro level, Hirakata and Koike [2018] show that the capital-labor elasticity is below one,
which is qualitatively consistent with our findings.
Detailed Results regarding Y and ("
Figure C.17 shows the distribution of measured markups, which exhibits a spike at a value
slightly larger than one and a longer tail on the right side than the left. Our estimate Y = 4
is based on the peak value of measured markup < = 4/3, which is standard in the literature
[Oberfield and Raval, 2014].
To calculate (" at the firm level, global total cost is calculated as the sum of domestic
cost andmultinational cost. The domestic cost is the sum of the following items: advertising
expense, information processing communication cost, mobile real estate rent, packing and
transportation costs, total payroll, depreciation expense, welfare expense, taxes, interest
expense, and lease payments. The international cost is the sum of each subsidiary’s total
costs, which is its total sales minus the total purchase of intermediate goods.
250
Figure C.17: Distribution of Measured Markup <
Note: The authors’ computation from Census of Manufacture, 2011. Estimates are obtained by inverting the
markup, following Oberfield and Raval (2014). The markup is defined as sales divided by the sum of costs
from capital, labor, and materials.
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Figure C.18: Share of Foreign Labor Cost in Total Cost ("
Note: Global total cost is calculated by the sum of domestic cost and multinational cost, where domestic cost
is the sum of the following items: advertising expense, information processing communication cost, mobile
real estate rent, packing and transportation costs, total payroll, depreciation expense, welfare expense, taxes,
interest expense, and lease payments. The international cost is the sum of each subsidiary’s total cost, which
is total sales minus total purchases of intermediate goods.













× 0.05 ≈ 0.13. Given our
point estimate _̂ = 1.4, we can test if 0 : _ ≤ 1; namely, that home labor and foreign labor
are gross complements. As the standard C-value is C = 0.40/0.13 ≈ 3.08., we reject 0 at
the 0.1 percent level of significance.
C.1.10 Robustness Checks
Alternative Extensive-Margin Instrument
We consider the following instrumental variable:
/-)8C = 1
{




Table C.3: Extensive Margin Estimates















/ 5 C -0.321 -0.0681
(0.0854) (0.0291)
Observations 22,795 22,795 22,795 22,795 22,795
Model OLS FE 2SLS 2SLS-1st 2SLS-reduced
Firm FE - YES YES YES YES
Year FE - YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The idea is to take the extensive margin of the shock, meaning that a firm located in the
flooded region changes employment relative to those in other regions. Table C.3 shows the
results and, notably, the estimate for 1̂+ in column 3 here (0.212) is remarkably similar to
the 0.192 in column 3 of Table 3.2. As there is no statistical difference between these two
estimates, our result is robust to the choice of IV.
It is also worth noting the reasons underlying the similar estimates. In columns 4 and
5 of Table C.3, we find significantly smaller first stage and reduced-form estimates than
the corresponding values in Table 3.2. This is because we define the shock /-)
8C
at the
extensive margin taking the binary value of zero or one, which has a larger variance than
/8C ∈ [0, 1] in equation (3.22), and this larger variance in the regressor results in smaller
estimates in columns 4 and 5. This signifies our choice of target reduced-form parameter
(3.18); since we do not know the exact size of the flood shock, we do not have a precise
measure of its size. Therefore, arbitrary definitions of the shocks such as (3.22) or (C.1)
would result in quantitatively different estimates of equations (3.15) and (3.16), recalling
that they are proportionally corresponding to columns 4 and 5 up to the choice of the shock
measure or IV. Our choice of the target parameter (3.18), however, does not depend on such
a choice. Specifically, as can be seen in the 2SLS formula, the variance of the instrument
does not affect the estimator, but the relative covariance of the regressand and regressor
does. Therefore, our 2SLS produces stable and robust estimates.
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Different Control Groups
In our main specification, we consider only MNEs in our sample, a choice that is justified
because MNE and non-MNE firms differ substantially, and also because the inclusion of
fixed effects in regression equations (3.23) and (3.24) makes the variation in the IV for firms
that are never MNEs irrelevant since then /8C = 0 for any C by definition (3.22), which is
absorbed by the fixed effect. However, to ensure that the home employment trend did not
differ significantly between MNEs and non-MNEs, Table C.4 shows the reduced form of





= 0A>1DBC=4BB8 + 0A>1DBC=4BBC + 1A>1DBC=4BB/8C + 4A>1DBC=4BB8C ,
with different samples and different IV definitions.
Columns 1-4 show the results including all firms in Japan. Since our data is an
unbalanced panel, we select firms that are observed throughout the period 2007-2016
to construct a balanced panel, and columns 5-8 show these results. Columns 1 and 2
show the results based on the IV /-)
8C
defined in equation (C.1) (labeled “Extensive”),
and columns 3 and 4 show /8C in equation (3.22) (labeled “Intensive”). Note that both
of these IVs leverage the shock induced by the 2011 Thailand Floods, though the precise
definition differs. Column 1 defines the flooded region as Ayutthaya and Pathum Thani
provinces, which is our preferred definition (labeled “Flooded”), while column 2 defines
the flooded area as all of Thailand (labeled “Thailand”). The other columns show the
results based on the specifications following this basic structure. Overall, we find a robust
result irrespective of the choice of sample and IV definition; that is, the flood-affected firms
reduced employment in Japan.
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Table C.4: Different Reduced Form Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Extensive Extensive Intensive Intensive Extensive Extensive Intensive Intensive
VARIABLES Flooded Thailand Flooded Thailand Flooded Thailand Flooded Thailand
shock -0.0497 -0.0159 -0.172 -0.127 -0.0490 -0.00747 -0.249 -0.101
(0.0126) (0.00585) (0.0667) (0.0242) (0.0139) (0.00612) (0.0774) (0.0248)
Observations 185,703 185,703 185,703 185,703 91,690 91,690 91,690 91,690
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Balanced panel? YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Indeed, it is crucial to have the IV defined according to the flood-induced variation,
despite minor differences in definitions between equations (3.22) and (C.1). In Section
C.1.11, we see that another widely-used IV definition, the Bartik instrument, does not work
in our context, which highlights our choice based on the natural experiment and its power
of identification.
The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake
As another check of the robustness of our results, we now consider the potential impact
on our results of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake, another severe natural disaster that affected
Japanese industry that year. It’s impact on the country was so profound that it remains in the
minds of Japanese today almost a decade later. Carvalho et al. [2016] summarizes the event
as follows: “On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred off the northeast
coast of Japan. This was the largest earthquake in the history of Japan and the fifth largest
in the world since 1900. The earthquake brought a three-fold impact on the residents of
northeast Japan: (i) the main earthquake and its aftershocks, directly responsible for much
of the material damage that ensued; (ii) the resulting tsunami, which flooded 561 square
kilometers of the northeast coastline; and (iii) the failure of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear
Power Plant that led to the evacuation of 99,000 residents of the Fukushima prefecture.”
Since our data is annual and the flooding in Thailand began about four months after the
earthquake in Japan, we want to ensure that our results using the Thai Floods as a natural
experiment are not qualitatively affected by the co-ocurrence of the Tohoku earthquake
that same year. There are two ways to address this concern. First, our specifications
(3.23) and (3.24) include the fixed effects of firms, which means that we are leveraging
the variation within a firm across years, not the differences between firms that may or may
not have experienced the earthquake. Second, in order to further mitigate any concern that
the existence of flooded firms in the main sample still biases the fixed effect estimator,
we conduct the following robustness check exercise. We drop firms located in the four
most severely hit prefectures in Japan–Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima (called
“damaged prefectures” below). These damaged prefectures include 36 municipalities that
were designated as disaster areas by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
Tourism (MLIT) of Japan after the earthquake, and this is also used by Carvalho et al.
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Table C.5: Specification Without Earthquake-hit Firms

















Observations 5,551 5,551 5,551 5,551 5,551
Model OLS FE 2SLS 2SLS-1st 2SLS-reduced
Firm FE - YES YES YES YES
Year FE - YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
[2016], which an interested reader may refer to for the rationale.6
Table C.5 shows the results of the 2SLS regression based on equations (3.23) and (3.24)
for the sample that omits firms in the damaged prefectures. We do not find any statistically
significant difference in the estimates between the two samples, which is expected given
the similar samples considered. Further, because the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake hit the more
rural northeast regions of Japanmost severely while firms that intensively engage in FDI and
multinational activities are skewed to large cities such as the Tokyo and Osaka metropolitan
areas, dropping the firms that suffered from the earthquake did not substantially alter our
original estimation sample of multinational firms. Consequently, we find similar estimates
in Tables 3.2 and C.5, which indicates that the effect of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake on our
estimate is limited at most.
Other Measures of Foreign Factors
In our main empirical specification, we use foreign labor employment as the measure of the
foreign factor due to the data limitation that other factor employment quantities are difficult
6Although the propagation of the shock due to the input-output linkages makes it not trivial to measure
the exact impact of the earthquake on each firm, we view our choice as a conservative test for the existence of
an earthquake effect on our estimator. Namely, since the firms located in the defined four prefectures suffered
most from the earthquake, if there are any confounding effects of the earthquake on our estimator, dropping
such firms should substantially alter the estimate. Thus, if we find no difference between our full sample
and the sample omitting these four prefectures, this indicates that any potential earthquake effects are not
significant.
257
to measure and not readily available. However, our model shows that the foreign factor
is more general than just labor employment. For example, the foreign factor may contain
foreign capital and land that produce additional value added to the output of the MNE from
country . To capture this feature of the model, we now consider the value added measure
by subtracting the value of all intermediate good purchases from the total sales of each
subsidiary. We then aggregate these subsidiary-level sales for each MNE to construct the
MNE-level foreign value added measure +'$,
8C










+ 4+8C . (C.2)
As an additional check, we also substitute a raw sales measure for the value added measure.










× 1 {C ≥ 2012} . (C.3)
Since both IVs (3.22) and (C.3) satisfy the standard requirements for IVs under our main-
tained assumption that the floodwas an unexpected augmentation shock to theMNEs located
in the damaged region, we conduct the robustness exercise based on both definitions.
Tables C.6 and C.7 show the results from our VA-based regressor specification (C.2)
using our preferred IV (3.22) and the IV defined by equation (C.3), respectively. Both tables
share the same structure; Columns 1-3 show the results using+'$,
8C
as the regressor, while
columns 4 and 5 use the raw sales measure. Columns 1 and 4 show the first stage results
to check the relevance of the IV, and column 2 shows the reduced form relating the IV to
the outcome variable. Note that the value added and crude sales regressors share the same
reduced form. Finally, columns 3 and 5 show the 2SLS results, and particularly worth
mentioning is that they are all qualitatively similar no matter what regressors and IVs were
used. Therefore, we view our preferred result reported in Table 3.2 as robust to the choice
both of variables for foreign factor employment and IVs.
Long-difference Specification
Our main empirical specification (3.23) and (3.24) is meant to identify the medium- to
long-run elasticity for five years after the flood. Another way to approach this is to conduct
a long-difference specification by taking the difference between variables after the flood and
258
Table C.6: VA-based Regressor with IV (3.22)





















Observations 5,460 5,460 5,460 5,460 5,460
Model 2SLS-1st 2SLS-reduced 2SLS 2SLS-1st 2SLS
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES











where the time difference Δ takes the difference between the 2012-2016 average after the











The results are shown in Table C.8, with column 1 the 2SLS first stage, column 2 the 2SLS
reduced form, and column 3 the 2SLS result. Although the sample size reduced significantly
due to time-averaging, the qualitative result of the regressions remain the same as in Table
3.2: strong first-stage correlation (column 1), weaker but significant negative correlation
in the reduced form (column 2), and the positively significant 2SLS estimate (column 3)
which is not significantly different from the preferred 2SLS estimate (column 3 of Table
3.2).
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Table C.7: VA-based Regressor with IV (C.3)























Observations 5,460 5,460 5,460 5,460 5,460
Model 2SLS-1st 2SLS-reduced 2SLS 2SLS-1st 2SLS
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
C.1.11 Further Empirical Results
Next, we conduct several extension exercises of the linear regression results discussed in
Section 3.4.2.
Shift-share-type Instrument and Identifying the Substitution Elasticity
Hummels et al. [2014] considers a type of offshoring whereby a firm does not hire foreign
factors directly but imports the intermediate good instead of producing it in the home
country, which we call output offshoring. Our concern, however, is multinational firms’
foreign employment, or factor offshoring. The firm-level specification of Hummels et al.
[2014] is
ln ;8C = 0"-8 + 0"-C + 1"- ln<8C + 4"-8C ,
where ;8C is firm 5 ’s employment in year C and <8C is the value of offshoring, measured
by the value of imports.7 They address the endogenous offshoring value by adopting the
7More specifically, this corresponds to the row named “log employment,” with point coefficient 0.044 in
Table 3, Column 2 ofHummels et al. [2014].
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Table C.8: Long-difference Specification
(1) (2) (3)












Observations 674 674 674
Model 2SLS-1st 2SLS-reduced 2SLS
Robust standard errors in parentheses.





where B82: is the pre-sample year (1994) share of the country 2-product : pair in total
material imports of firm 5 , and 2:C is a world export shifter such as world export supply or
transport costs of country 2, product : , in year C.
Analogously, in our factor offshoring framework, the relevant regression is
ln ;%#8C = 0
$
8 + 0$C + 1$ ln ;'$,8C + 4$5 C , (C.4)
where ;'$,
8C







where B$2 is the pre-sample year (in our case, 2007) share of offshore employment in country
2 of firm 8, and 4<?$,−%#2C is the stock of workers at subsidiaries of multinational firms
excluding those in Japan. However, as we do not find a relevant measure for !'$,2C , we need
a proxy for that.
Note that Desai et al. [2009] takes the GDP growth rate in each country as the in-
strumental variable, based on the idea that “national economic growth is associated with
productivity gains that correspond to declining real input costs” (p. 186). A problem that
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one can imagine with this proxy is that the GDP growth rate does not necessarily reflect
the offshorability or availability of offshore factors in the destination country. For example,
the GDP growth rate might not reflect political instability [Pierce and Schott, 2016]. If a
country has high growth but high political instability that makes employment difficult for
multinational firms, then GDP growth might overstate the actual ability to offshore in the
country. Moreover, the Desai et al. [2009] measure is the GDP growth rate rather than the
level of GDP, whereas Hummels et al. [2014] take world trade value levels to construct the






where 62C is the GDP growth rate of country 2 from year C − 1 to year C.
While Hummels et al. [2014] find a statistically significant substitution of home labor
with the foreign imported intermediate input, in contrast, we do not find a similar substitution
result (Table C.9). This highlights the difficulty in using a Bartik-type instrument to identify
the effect of factor-usage offshorability on home employment, as we emphasized in the
beginning of Section 3.4.
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Table C.9: Results with GDP Growth-based Bartik Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS FE 2SLS 2SLS first stage 2SLS reduced form
Log Subsidiary Employment 0.304 0.0314 0.0770
(0.00364) (0.00245) (0.0896)
Shift-share Shock 0.435 0.0335
(0.123) (0.0388)
Observations 20,317 20,317 20,317 20,317 20,317
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Long-run Impact on Foreign Employment
In our main specification (3.23) and (3.24), we consider the average long-run, but not
time-varying, impacts. As we saw in Figure 3.3, the flood had long-lasting effects on
employment in Thailand, so to see if this is true at the firm-level of those affected by the
flood, we consider the following event-study regression:
H8C = 0
(











× 1 {C = g} + 4(8C . (C.5)
Figure C.19 shows the event-study plots of 1(C ,which confirm that the effect of the flood
persisted for at least five years in terms of foreign employment.
We next turn to the long-run effect on Home employment. Namely, we take log
employment in Japan as H8C and run regression (C.5), with the results shown in Figure C.20.
Consistent with the reduced form results of our main specification in Table 3.2, we find
significantly negative effects four years after the flood at the 5 percent significance level. We
can also confirm that the pre-trends are balanced since no coefficient before the year of the
flood is statistically significantly different from zero. In 2016, the coefficient is negative but
only marginally different from zero (significant only at the 10 percent level). This reversion
to zero may imply recovery from the flood for the firms that were severely hit. However,
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Figure C.20: Results of Event Study Regression on Home Employment
even in the Home country (Japan), the recovery in terms of employment took at least five
years after the flood. In a nutshell, the event-study analysis supports our interpretation of
the shock as having a medium-run impact on worldwide factor employment by affected
firms.
Third Country Substitution
Where do subsidiaries substitute production after the flood? To answer this in a brief
manner, we can observe the sales growth of subsidiaries in nearby countries (Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam) between 2011 and 2012 for those firms affected
and unaffected by the flooding. If production substitution occurred in nearby countries,
then the MNEs affected by the floods would increase sales in nearby countries relative to
unaffected MNEs. Figure C.21 shows the sales growth rates of foreign subsidiaries in each
country near Thailand for those MNEs with subsidiaries in Thailand (labeled as “suffered”)
and those without (labeled as “not suffered”). As one can see, for all countries except Laos,
there is no relative increase in sales for firms hit by the flooding. Therefore, on average,
production substitution to nearby countries did not occur very strongly, which supports the
validity of our main analysis of production substitution between Japan and Thailand.
To more formally and systematically study the substitution after the flood, we conduct
the same regression specification as in the main text with a modified coefficient notation to
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Figure C.21: Growth in Sales Across Firms Located in Thailand in 2011 or Not
indicate Third Country Substitution (TCS):
H8C = 0
)(
8 + 0)(C + 1)(/8C + 4)(8C , (C.6)
and also with the outcome variable about operations in third countries. Specifically, we take
as an outcome variable log employment in Southeast Asian countries other than Thailand
(Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Phillipines, Cambodia, Laos, with notation
4<?(
8C
), log employment in the world other than in Thailand and Japan (4<?,>A;3
8C
), log
sales in Southeast Asian countries other than Thailand (B0;4B(
8C
), and log sales in the world
other than in Thailand and Japan (B0;4B,>A;3
8C
). To best control any unobserved subsidiary
heterogeneity, we restrict the sample to subsidiaries located in Thailand, and compare the
headquarters that have subsidiaries in the flooded regions versus those that do not, using
our IV /8C . If third country substitution were significant, we would observe the positive
coefficient 1)( > 0.
Table C.10 shows the results of regression (C.6), and throughout columns 1-4, we do not
find positive substitution from the flooded regions to non-flooded third countries. Perhaps
surprisingly, we do find some strong negative effects on third country employment and sales.
In fact, this is consistent with our interpretation that the flood decreased overall productivity
of the affected MNEs, so that they decreased factor employment and sales everywhere in
the world, including third countries and Japan. Recall that this productivity effect could be
seen in our main regression result 3.2.
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Table C.10: Third Country Substitution









/8C 0.443 -1.039 -0.600 -0.951
(0.354) (0.270) (0.253) (0.184)
Observations 2,434 5,549 2,364 5,489
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Regression by Industries
Table C.11 shows the results of the headquarter industry-regression for specification (3.22)
and (C.1), with panel C.11a showing the 2SLS results and C.11b and C.11c showing the
corresponding first stage and reduced-form regressions. In each panel, column 1 refers
to the aggregated manufacturing sector and columns 2-6 the Chemical, Metal, General
Machinery, Electronic Machinery, and Automobile industries, respectively.
C.2 Theory Appendix
This appendix provides proofs and extensions of the model described in Section 3.3.
C.2.1 Uniqueness of the Equilibrium
A desirable property of a general equilibrium is its uniqueness, as uniqueness guarantees
that the equilibrium is robust across shocks and parameter values. Although it is well-known
that the uniqueness result is difficult to obtain [Debreu, 1974, Mantel, 1974, Sonnenschein,
1972], our constant returns to scale model allows us to adopt the generic uniqueness
approach described in Chapter 17 of Mas-Colell et al. [1995]. In the explanation below,
proposition numbers that begin with “17” are all taken from that chapter.
We begin with the following facts: (i) Under a regularity condition, any equilibrium
factor price vector (A, F) is locally isolated (Proposition 17.D.1) and, furthermore, the reg-
ularity condition holds generically (Proposition 17.D.5); (ii) If the weak axiom of revealed
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preference (WARP) is satisfied, then under constant returns to scale technology, the set
of equilibrium price vectors (A, F) is convex (Proposition 17.F.2). Note that as our factor
demand functions are obtained by solving a cost-minimization problem, so they satisfy
WARP. Thus, the set of equilibrium factor price vectors is both locally isolated convex and
a singleton. Thus, we may conclude the following:
Proposition 4. (Generic Uniqueness) The general equilibrium defined in Section 3.3.1 is
generically unique.
C.2.2 Equivalence Results
We consider a special case of our model within offshoring and multinational models,
beginning the equilibrium analysis from modified versions of Feenstra and Hanson [1997]
and Arkolakis et al. [2017] to arrive at equation (3.6).
Offshoring
First, we propose a modified version of Feenstra and Hanson [1997] in which we do not
distinguish between high-skill and low-skill workers but we do distinguish between factor
augmenting productivity shocks in the Home country  and the Foreign country . Each
country 2 = ,  is endowed with (!2,  2), and the factor prices are (F2, A2). Competitive
producers in  and  produce a single numeraire final good @ by combining continuum
intermediate inputs I ∈ [0, 1]. To produce the intermediate good, producers may use the
















8Note that this formulation is more general than the nesting of Cobb-Douglas and Leontief production as
in Feenstra and Hanson [1997].
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where 0 (I) is increasing and f < 1. That is, labor and capital are gross complements. The




U (I) ln G2 (I) 3I. (C.8)
There is no cost to trade the output good. Consider for now that world income  =  is
fixed and spent on the output so that
@ = . (C.9)
The equilibrium is characterized by factor prices
(
F , A , F , A
)
that solve the market
clearing condition. To formally derive such conditions, suppose that foreign labor ! is







or  has a comparative advantage in producing the capital-intensive intermediate good.
Further assume ! is large so that F̃ > F̃ where F̃2 ≡ F2/2,! and Ã2 ≡ A2/2, are
augmented factor prices.10 We will consider our case of CES output demand and income
effects after solving the current simple version.
To solve the model, consider the cost-minimizing factor demand given factor prices(
F , A , F , A
)










Given the comparative advantage assumption, in equilibrium, there is I∗ ∈ [0, 1] that
satisfies I being produced in the Home country if and only if I ≤ I∗. I∗ satisfies 2 (I∗) =
















The marginal cost is thus 2 (I) ≡ min2 {22 (I)}. Given such I∗, by Shepherd’s lemma, the
9Note that the same production function with costless intermediate good trade makes the trade in the
final good irrelevant. Specifically, countries do not have an incentive to specialize (or not specialize) in the
production of the final good. In this sense, the model is all about intermediate good trade. As we see in
equation (C.11),  exports I < I∗ and imports I > I∗.
10This assumption is not essential, but allows us to proceed without unnecessary complications.
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for 2 = , , where ;̃2 (I) ≡ 2,!;2 (I) and :̃2 (I) ≡ 2, :2 (I) are the augmented factor
















:̃ (I) 3I, (C.17)
where !̃2 ≡ 2,!!2 and  ̃2 ≡ 2,  2 are the augmented endowments for 2 = , . To
solve G2 (I), by Cobb-Douglas assumption (C.8), we have ? (I) G2 (I) = U (I) @, where
? (I) is the price of the intermediate good I. Moreover, the perfect competition assumption
implies that ? (I) is given by the (minimum) marginal cost 2 (I). Thus, by good market
clearing condition (C.9), we have
G2 (I) = U (I)
2 (I) . (C.18)








that solves equations (C.11), (C.14),
(C.15), (C.16), and (C.17). To study the Home labor share, we still have !( ≡
F!/
(
F! + A 
)
that is to the first order
3!( = !(0 (1 − !(0)
(
3 lnF − 3 ln A
)
.
Hence, it remains to study 3 lnF and 3 ln A . For this purpose, we have log first-order
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approximations with respect to 3 ln ,! and 3 ln , to equations (C.11), (C.14), (C.15),
(C.16), and (C.17) as follows:
(,! (I∗)
(
f0I3 ln I∗ + 3 ln F̃
)
+ (, (I∗) 3 ln Ã
= (,! (I∗)
(
f0I3 ln I∗ + 3 ln F̃
)























f3 ln 2 (I) + 3 ln G (I)
)
3I,
3 ln ,! = − I
∗ ;̃ (I∗)
!̃






f3 ln 2 (I) + 3 ln G (I)
)
3I,
3 ln , = − I
∗ :̃ (I∗)
 ̃






f3 ln 2 (I) + 3 ln G (I)
)
3I.
Note that by equation (C.10), 3 ln 22 (I) = (2,! (I) 3 ln F̃2 + (2, (I) 3 ln Ã2 and by
equation (C.18), we have
3 ln G2 (I) = −3 ln 2 (I) . (C.20)





3 ln I∗ +
(
−f + (f − 1) (,! (I∗)
)





3 ln I∗+ (f − 1) (,! (I∗) 3 ln F̃+
(
−f + (f − 1) (, (I∗)
)
3 ln Ã ,
(C.22)




3 ln I∗ +
(
−f + (f − 1) (,! (I∗)
)
3 ln F̃ + (f − 1) (, (I∗) 3 ln Ã ,
(C.23)




3 ln I∗ + (f − 1) (,! (I∗) 3 ln F̃ +
(
−f + (f − 1) (, (I∗)
)




























are the average cost shares of each factor in each country. Assume for now that F̃ > F̃ .
We can then show that (,! (I∗) > (,! (I∗),11 as we prove below. Also, we will come
back to the condition that guarantees F̃ > F̃ . By (C.19), we have
3 ln I∗ =
(




(,! (I∗) 3 ln F̃ + (, (I∗) 3 ln Ã
)(

















−f + (f − 1) (,! (I∗)
)]











I∗ ;̃ (I∗) (, (I∗)(
(,! (I∗) − (,! (I∗)
)
f0I
+ (f − 1) (, (I∗)
]








(,! (I∗) − (,! (I∗)
)
f0I︸                                               ︷︷                                               ︸
≡f
;̃ F̃




(,! (I∗) − (,! (I∗)
)
f0I︸                                               ︷︷                                               ︸
≡f
;̃ Ã
3 ln Ã ,
11To see this, note that at I = I∗ we have 2 (I∗) = 2 (I∗). Hence, it remains to show F̃ ;̃ (I∗) >
F̃ ;̃ (I∗) . By substituting the factor demand functions and noting that 2 (I∗) = 2 (I∗) and thus G (I∗) =








. Our assumption f < 1 means that this is
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,! (I∗) − (,! (I∗)
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+ (f − 1) (,! (I∗)
]

















−f + (f − 1) (, (I∗)
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(,! (I∗) − (,! (I∗)
)
f0I︸                                                ︷︷                                                ︸
≡f
:̃ F̃




(,! (I∗) − (,! (I∗)
)
f0I︸                                                ︷︷                                                ︸
≡f
:̃ Ã
3 ln Ã ,




(,! (I∗) − (,! (I∗)
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(,! (I∗) − (,! (I∗)
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−f + (f − 1) (,! (I∗)
)]










(,! (I∗) − (,! (I∗)
)
f0I
+ (f − 1) (, (I∗)
]
︸                                                                                     ︷︷                                                                                     ︸
≡f
;̃ Ã
3 ln Ã ,
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,! (I∗) − (,! (I∗)
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(,! (I∗) − (,! (I∗)
)
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−f + (f − 1) (, (I∗)
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︸                                                                                                 ︷︷                                                                                                 ︸
≡f
:̃ Ã
3 ln Ã .





































Now we consider extension cases of non-homogeneous output and income effects. In
particular, consideration of non-homogeneous output makes the model more isomorphic to
ours. Again, this helps us to think of the heterogeneous firm case and identification given






where % and & are given exogenously (as  is a small open economy). Then the change in
cost structure 3 ln ? further has a feedback loop through the reduction in output demanded
3 ln @ with elasticity Y. With this effect taken into consideration in the demand for the
intermediate good, equation (C.18) becomes
3 ln G2 (I) = −3 ln 2 (I) − Y3 ln ?.





(2,! (I∗) 3 ln F̃2 + (2, (I∗) 3 ln Ã2
)
. With these considerations, we have









Next, we consider income effects by relaxing the small open economy assumption. This
is desirable even when we are willing to assume that Japan is small-open because since
the reduction in the cost of multinational production and offshoring are global phenomena
and not limited to a particular country such as Japan, it affects world income even if Japan
is small-open. To put it differently, only in the case of Japan being small-open and an
isolated country that experienced a reduction in multinational production cost does the
no-income-effect assumption hold. To put it simply, we come back to the homogeneous
outcome case and consider the changes in income due to productivity growth. Particularly,




(F2!2 + A2 2) .
This implies that 3 ln @ =
∑
2 (
2 (!(23 lnF2 + (1 − !(2) 3 ln A2), where (2 ≡ F2!2 +
A2 2/∑2′ (F2′!2′ + A2′ 2′) is the income share of country 2. This again modifies equation
(C.20) to
3 ln G2 (I) = −3 ln 2 (I) + 3 ln @
= −3 ln 2 (I) +
∑
2
(2 (!(23 lnF2 + (1 − !(2) 3 ln A2) .
Hence, the relevant modification to the elasticity matrix (C.26) would accommodate this.
Multinational Production and Export Platforms
Following Arkolakis et al. [2017], we consider a different type of offshoring whereby firms
from different source countries may produce a good in a different production country and
sell to different destination countries. In particular, we take a special case of Arkolakis et al.
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[2017] in which is there are two distinct factors, which we interpret as labor and capital. To
simplify matters, consider the two country case with  and . There are no trade costs,
whereas there could be an iceberg-type cost for producing in different countries W8; > 1 for
8 ≠ ;. In each country, there are two types of factors, labor and capital, with endowment
(!2,  2), where 2 = , .12 Labor is used for production and capital for innovation. A
potential firm in country 8 can enter themarket and create a new variety by paying fixed entry




from the multivariate Pareto distribution
Pr
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) (1−d)−1 ]1−d. d ∈ [0, 1) is
a parameter that governs the correlation between countries, and d = 0 is the case of
uncorrelated / and / while d → 1 is the perfect collinear extreme. We assume






4,8.13 Wecall 4,8 the quality of innovation
in country 8 and ?,; the productivity in production of country ;.





















- 8;= = k8;=_,8=-= (C.30)
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12This is a special case of the treatment in Arkolakis et al. [2017]; namely, inelastic supply of production
and innovation workers, by letting ^ → 1.











We now characterize the equilibrium conditions that pin down
(
F , A , F , A
)
as follows.
The labor market equilibrium is given by the payment to workers equalling the sum of the







1 − [ − 1
f̃
)
- ; = F;!; (C.34)
for each ; = , . The capital market equilibrium condition is such that the payment to




_,8=-= = A8 8 (C.35)
for each 8 = , . Finally, the budget balance condition is
F8!8 + A8 8 + Δ8 = - 8 (C.36)
for each 8 = , , where Δ8 is the transfer to country 8 from the ROW.
Consider a multinational production shock to the economy 3 ln W < 0. The log
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are the (value) labor demand share in production of each country, the production sales share
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to country =, and innovation sales share to country =. Substituting equation (C.39) into















3 ln_,8= + !(=3 lnF= + (1 − !(=) 3 ln A=
)
= 3 ln A8 . (C.41)
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3 ln" 8 + 3 lnΨ8=
)
. (C.43)
To further deduce, it remains to know 3 lnk8;=, 3 ln" 8, and 3 lnΨ8=. By equations (C.27),
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′=′ + 3 ln_,8=′ + 3 ln -=′ − 3 lnF=′
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.
By substituting equations (C.42), (C.43), (C.44), (C.45), and (C.46), into equations (C.40)









for a reduced demand elasticity matrix Σ and shock vector 1.
C.2.3 Derivation of Equation (3.13)

















)1−_ + (?"/0" )1−_)1/(1−_) is the aggregate wage index and ? ≡( (
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By substituting these expressions,
!( ≡ F!
















































































C.2.4 Derivation of Equations (3.15) and (3.16)
We prove the effect of the shock with the following property: The shock decreases only the
foreign augmentation 3 ln 0" < 0 but not capital and labor 3 ln 0 = 3 ln 0! = 0, and hits
only an infinitesimal set of firms so that factor prices are not affected. Note that perfect




























Then the (first-order) elasticity of the cost with respect to log foreign factor-augmenting
productivity 3 ln  is
3 ln ? = −("0 3 ln 0
" ,
where (" ≡ ?"</
(
A: + F; + ?"<
)
is the share of foreign labor cost in the overall cost.
In addition, by equation (3.1) we have 3 ln @ = −Y3 ln ?. This in turn reduces the factor
demand 3 ln G = 3 ln @ according to aggregate labor demand (C.48). Lower-nest labor
demands (C.49) and (C.50) imply that 3 ln ; = 3 ln G and 3 ln< = (_ − 1) 3 ln 0" + 3 ln G.
In a nutshell, we arrive at equations (3.15) and (3.16).
C.2.5 Elasticity Matrix under Nested CES
Under the homogeneous nested CES, by factor demand functions (C.47), (C.48), (C.49),
and (C.50), we may obtain that the reduced elasticity matrix
Σ ≡
©­­­«
−f + (f − Y) ( (f − Y) (! (f − Y) ("
(f − Y) ( −_ + (_ − f),(! + (f − Y) (! (_ − f),(" + (f − Y) ("
(f − Y) ( (_ − f),(! + (f − Y) (! −_ + (_ − f),(" + (f − Y) ("
ª®®®¬ .
C.2.6 Derivation of Equation (3.26)


















We assume that Assumption 2 is satisfied for the purpose of the matrix inversion exer-
cise below. For simplicity, assume additionally that the competitive environment features
constant markups such as in perfect competition or monopolistic competition. The factor
supply ( , !, ") and total demand& are fixed.14 Thus, the following factor market clearing
14Note that the fixed total demand & means that & is independent of the income of factors. This further
implies that the treatment of the economic profits of firms is immaterial because so long as their shares enter
as incomes. An assumption that justifies this would be that the Home country is a small-open exporter of the
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Unless otherwise noted, the integrals below are with respect to each firm and so from 0 to
1, which are omitted to keep the notation concise.




































































































closed-form solution is hardly tractable. We thus rely on our first order approximation
obtained in (3.6). Therefore, it suffices to know the log first-order approximation on F and
A. The log first-order approximations with respect to 0" to the system (C.53), (C.54), and
goods each Home firm produces. In this case, the factor income of the Home country is negligible relative






















(_ − 1) 3 ln 0" − _3 ln ?" + (_ − f) 3 ln ?-8 + (f − Y) 3 ln ?8
)
38,
where, by equations (C.52) and cost-minimizing demand functions,
3 ln ?8 =
A:8
?8@8

















With slight abuse of notation, for / =  , !, " and H = :, ;, <, write(/H as the employment
of factor H-weighted average of payment share to factor / . For instance, with the home labor









38. Accordingly, for / = !, " and H = ;, <, write,(/H as the employment
of factor H-weighted average of wage payment share to factor / .15 With these notations, we
can summarize the first-order approximation as the linear algebraic problem I = 1, where
 ≡
©­­­«
(f − Y) ( 
:
− f (f − Y) (!
:
(f − Y) ("
:




+ (f − Y) (!
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+ (f − Y) ("
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15Note the similarity of the definition to the one used in the homogeneous case in equation (3.14). ,(-H
is the version that accommodates heterogeneity and contains the homogeneous case as a special case–with












+ (f − Y) ("
;
− _ − (_ − 1)
ª®®®¬ 3 ln 0
" . (C.57)
Hence, if  is non-singular, I can be solved as I = −11 and the log first-order approximation
of labor share (3.6) can be solved accordingly. Indeed, equation (3.6) shows that only G2−G1
is our variable of interest.
To proceed, note that











is (8, 9)-element of inverse matrix −1. According to the formula of inverting
3 × 3 matrices, we have
I2 − I1 ∝ {(031 + 032) 023 − (021 + 022) 033} 11
+ {(011 + 012) 033 − (031 + 032) 013} 12
+ {(021 + 022) 013 − (011 + 012) 023} 13
= (011 + 012) (03312 − 02313) + (021 + 022) (01313 − 03311)
(031 + 032) (02311 − 01312) .
Note that from equations (C.56) and (C.57), we have 013 = 11, 023 = 12, and 033 = 13 +
(_ − 1). Therefore, 03312−02313 = [13 + (_ − 1)] 12−1213 = (_ − 1) 12, 01313−03311 =
1113− [13 + (_ − 1)] 11 = − (_ − 1) 11, and 02311−01312 = 1211− 1112 = 0. Using these
facts, we further deduce that
I2 − I1 ∝ (011 + 012) 12 + (021 + 022) 11.
Substituting the elements in expressions (C.56) and (C.57), we finally have expression
(3.26).
C.2.7 Derivation of Equations (3.27) and (3.28)
Here, we prove only equation (3.27), as (3.28) follows the same logic. First, recall that
the quantity-conditional factor demand cross derivatives m:̃8/m ?̃"8 |@8 and m<̃8/mÃ8 |@8 are
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equal because (i) due to Shephard’s lemma, factor demands are the partial derivative of the
(quantity-conditional) cost function and (ii) the Hessian matrix is symmetric due to Young’s





























definitions of factor augmentation notations (tilde). By rearranging, we have
("8 f<̃Ã,8 |@8 = ( 8 f:̃ ?̃" ,8 |@8 . (C.58)
Finally, we have
f<̃Ã,8 ≡ f<̃Ã,8 |@8 + f@?
m ln ?̃8
m ln Ã8
= f<̃Ã,8 |@8 + f@?( 8 ,





|@8 + f@?("8 . Hence, we have
("8 f<̃Ã,8 = (
"






8 f:̃ ?̃" ,8,
where the second equality holds by equation (C.58).
C.2.8 Properties of the Factor Demand Elasticity Matrix
Generalizing the results in Section C.2.7, we may establish the following result regarding
off-diagonal elements of the (quantity-controlled and -uncontrolled) elasticity matrix. We
further establish additional results below.
























(ii) (Singularity) Σ8 |@8 is singular.
Proof. (i) is a generalization of other factor-factor price pairs of the arguments in Section
C.2.7. To show (ii), recall that by zero-th order homogeneity of the cost-minimizing factor


































Hence, Σ8 |@8 is singular. 
C.3 Further Simulation Results
C.3.1 Calibration Details
Home Labor Productivity Growth since 1995
Figure C.22 shows the evolution of 3 ln 0!C ≈ ln 0!C − ln 0!1995, with the base year 1995.
Although labor productivity in Japan has grown somewhat since 1995, it is less than the
foreign productivity growth shown in the left panel of Figure 3.4, with foreign factor pro-
ductivity growing by more than three log points from 1995 to 2007 while labor productivity
in Japan grew only by 0.1 log point. This is consistent with our interpretation of foreign
factor augmentation; that is, that over the period, other countries grew relatively more
quickly than Japan due to relatively faster technological growth and several international
trade liberalization events such as China’s entry into the WTO.
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Figure C.22: Evolution of 3 ln 0!
Factor-bias and Implied Factor Augmentation
Here we provide additional suggestive evidence that _ is likely to be greater than one, which
indicates that foreign factor augmentation is foreign factor-biased technological change.
Note that relative aggregate employment !/! and wages F/F increased over the



















= 3 ln 0"C − 3 ln 0!C when _ = 0.2 (= f). Therefore, _ < 1 would
imply observed relative foreign factor compression over the period 1995-2007.
Sensitivity to Parameters
Our numerical results in Section 3.5.1 are sensitive to parameter values _ and f, as we
show some implied counterfactual results for different values in Figure C.24.
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Figure C.23: Implied 0" Trend When _ = f = 0.2
C.3.2 Implications of a More Recent Trend, 1995-2015
The 2008SNA from the Japan Cabinet Office provides System of National Accounts (SNA)
data for 1994-2015. The 2008SNA introduced many modifications to the previous SNAs,
among them the capitalization of Research and Development (R&D) expenditures which,
for our purposes, bumps up value added and drives down labor share.
Another qualification regarding the use of the more recent trend is the Great Recession
that began in 2008 which empirically shows a halt in the reduction in labor share in the
mid 2000s that is consistent with a widely found fact that labor share is countercyclical
[Schneider, 2011]. Since our focus is the structural change in foreign factor augmentation,
we do not emphasize this period, but as described below, our mechanism of relative factor
substitution of labor might help to explain this countercyclicality.
Figure C.25 shows the actual and counterfactual labor share trends derived by the same
exercise as in Figure 3.4b. As mentioned above, while labor share has generally been
decreasing, there was a halt in the decline in the mid 2000s to early 2010s. Remarkably,
the counterfactual trend shows a similar pattern of an overall decline that paused during the
Great Recession. To understand this, recall that an important factor driving the changes in
the counterfactual trend is the observed foreign factor augmentation (e.g., equation (3.25)),
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Figure C.24: Sensitivity Analysis to Parameter Values _ and f
(a) (Preferred Calibration) _ = 1.4, f = 0.2
(b) _ = f = 0.2 (c) _→ 1, f = 0.2 (d) _ = 1.4, f = 0.7
which is backed out by relative foreign employment and wages. To the extent that during the
Great Recession globalization halted andMNEmultinational activities stalled, themeasured
foreign factor augmentation process slowed down and even reversed, which is consistent
with the slow-down and increase in counterfactual labor share seen in Figure C.25. Although
we do not centralize this hypothesis in the current paper, a more thorough examination of
the validity of attributing the countercyclicality in labor share to the countercyclicality of
globalization would be a promising future research project. Finally, from the quantitative
analysis, we find that during period 1995-2015, 57.9 percent of the decrease in the labor
share may be explained by increased productivity of foreign factors.
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Figure C.25: Actual and Counterfactual Labor Shares, 1995-2015
C.3.3 Standard Errors of the Method of Moments Estimator
To find the standard errors of the method of moments estimator given by (3.9), we refer to
Greene [2003], Section 13.2.2, and conclude that
√
= (2̂ − 20) →3 #
(
0, [Γ (20)]−1Φ [Γ (20)]−1
)
(C.59)








vector of target parameters, 20 is the true value and 2̂ is the estimator implied by the sample















/8∇2a8 (2) →? Γ (2) ,
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for any 2, where = is the effective sample size after removal of fixed effects, a8 (2) =(
3 ln 0 
8
(2) , 3 ln 0!
8
(2)
)′ and the dependence on 2 is given by equations (3.10), (3.11),
and Assumption 3. To learn more about ∇2a8 (2), recall that the derivative of the inverse
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To estimate Φ and Γ (2), we use their sample analogs Φ̂ and Γ̂ (2)





/28 3 ln 0
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where 91, 92 ∈ { , !}. We evaluate Γ̂ at the estimated parameter value 2 = 2̂, and then












Table C.11: Industry-level Regression
(a) 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Log Subsidiary Employment 0.120 -0.00447 0.168 0.0774 -0.184 0.507
(0.0501) (0.610) (0.0486) (0.0694) (0.162) (0.292)
Observations 3,704 773 540 563 521 915
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry manuf chem metal machine elec auto
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(b) First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 1st 1st 1st 1st 1st 1st
Thai Flood Shock -0.730 -0.152 -1.655 -2.223 -0.655 -0.303
(0.169) (0.173) (0.358) (1.101) (0.161) (0.132)
Observations 3,704 773 540 563 521 915
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry manuf chem metal machine elec auto
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(c) Reduced Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES reduced reduced reduced reduced reduced reduced
Thai Flood Shock -0.0874 0.000677 -0.277 -0.172 0.120 -0.154
(0.0428) (0.0923) (0.0594) (0.225) (0.105) (0.0700)
Observations 3,704 773 540 563 521 915
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry manuf chem metal machine elec auto
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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